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“Risk areas or rich areas?”: state-led precarity and resistance to favela removal in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

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Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the Lancaster University is solely my own work and has not been submitted for the award of a higher degree elsewhere.

Abstract

After the severe landslides that affected Rio de Janeiro in April 2010, causing 67 deaths, the city authorities implemented what they called “a paradigm shift” in responding to disasters. This new approach, which echoes international discourses on urban resilience, builds on the government of urban uncertainties through risk technologies. Such technologies have underpinned a biopolitics of favelas removals. From 2009 to 2016, approximately 21,000 families were expelled from their homes due to ‘disaster risk prevention’, now one of the core repertoires of urban policy in Rio. This research aims to understand how risk and resilience are mobilised to govern marginalised areas and groups, how this is grounded in a long history of state-led precarization of favelas and how favela dwellers have responded to and resisted attempts to remove their right to stay in place.

The study builds on the results of a multi-sited case study in Rio by analysing five favelas over a total of 10 months between 2016 and 2017, involving archival research, politically engaged participant observation, semi-structured and in-depth interviews with key participants. The approach to data analysis draws on a hybrid thematic analysis driven by a feminist and postcolonial conceptual framework, moving between concepts of biopolitics, precarity, vulnerability and resistance.

Analysed through the concepts of (urban) biopolitics and precarity, this new mode of risk-based urban governance appears as a depoliticised and de-historicised form of risk management in favelas, producing precarity and displacement rather than ‘resilience’. Along these lines, the thesis presents three key findings. First, the characterization of favelas as ‘high-risk areas’ through the governmental technologies of risk assessment serves to justify displacements, undermine favelados' agency and obscure the historical process of governmental precarization. Second, state-led precarization has been the key driver of favelas and favelados’ vulnerability, while simultaneously exposing both displaced and those left behind to further risks. Third, by articulating an interpretation of vulnerability as both a deliberate exposure to power and an essence of political resistance, this research shows how

favelados have successfully mobilized their shared and produced vulnerability to resist disaster risk displacements through epistemic, temporal, affective and material forms of contestation.

Key words: disaster risk displacement; vulnerability, precarity; resistance; favelas; informal settlements

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I dedicate this act of resistance to you, Francisco!

Abbreviations

AEIS - Área de Especial Interesse Social Associação dos Moradores

AMAHOR – Associação de Moradores e Amigos do Horto

AMAJB - Associação de Moradores e Amigos do Jardim Botânico

CHISAM – Coordenação da Habitação de Interesse Social da Área Metropolitana do Grande Rio

CLT – Consolidação das Leis Trabalhistas

COR – Centro de Operações Rio

DRRM – Disaster Risk Reduction and Management

EMOP – Empresa Municipal de Obras Públicas

FAFEG – Federação das Associações de Favela do Estado da Guanabara

FAFERJ – Federação de Favelas do Estado do Rio de Janeiro

GEORIO – Fundação Instituto de Geotécnica

HFA – Hyogo Framework for Action

IBGE – Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística

IJBRJ – Instituto de Pesquisas Jardim Botânico do Rio de Janeiro

ITERJ – Instituto de Terras e Cartografia do Estado do Rio de Janeiro

MMA – Ministério do Meio Ambiente

MPF – Ministério Público Federal

NUTH – Núcleo de Terras e Habitação do Estado do Rio de Janeiro

PLHIS – Plano Local para Habitação de Interesse Social

PUC-Rio – Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro

SERFHA – Serviço Especial de Recuperação de Favelas e Habitações Anti-higiênicas

SFH – Sistema Financeiro de Habitação

SMU – Secretaria Municipal de Urbanismo

SPU – Secretaria de Patrimônio da União

STS – Science and Technology Studies

UERJ – Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro

UFRJ – Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro

UPP – Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora

UTF – União dos Trabalhadores Favelados

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Chapter 1 - Introduction

"Only power that springs from the weakness of the oppressed will be sufficiently strong to free both" – Paulo Freire, The Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1968)

1.1 Setting the scene: responses to disaster risk and dispossession in Rio de Janeiro

The growing process of urbanisation in a changing climate has led cities to adopt a new approach in the way that urban planners are thinking, interrogating, and planning the urban space. Resilience, generally defined as a capacity of an individual, community or system to respond to shocks and stresses, has been presented as a potential response to the threats arising from this process. Interest in this topic has been expanded to embrace challenges faced by cities like urban crises, social inequalities (Fainstein, 2015) and urban insecurity (Coaffee, Wood, & Rogers, 2009).

Under the insignia of resilience, Rio's municipality implemented a set of strategies to prepare the city[1] to face the potential threats and opportunities placed, respectively, by climate change and mega-events. This governance for resilience mostly driven by disaster risk prevention has marked out a series of conflicts over the right to the city, with favelas in the centre of these disputes.

The milestone is the year 2010, when mud and debris that swept through parts of the City slopes in April 2010 led the then-mayor, Eduardo Paes, to promise to take decisive action to prevent future catastrophes. A range of steps was initiated, including the setting up of a central emergency coordination room, new weather monitoring systems and infrastructure works, along with a policy of "resettling residents of high-risk areas" (Prefeitura do Município do Rio de Janeiro, 2016). In framing this package of measures, the notion of resilience took centre stage, focusing on the shocks and chronic stresses with the potential to disrupt the everyday life of the city, or, in the resilience vocabulary, the city's normalcy.

[1] 'The city' in this thesis refers to Rio de Janeiro official authorities, unless otherwise stated

In that year, then, the Municipality moved fast to lay out the arguments for a large scale and rapid programme of evictions. As the Mayor stated, the time has arrived “to end the demagogy and remove the houses in risky areas" (*O Globo*, 2010), seizing the opportunity to announce the launch of a “large package of removals” (ibid, 2010), despite all the legal and administrative apparatus aimed at protecting the right of favela dwellers to housing. This event marked a portentous turn in the disaster risk response in the city since the end of the dictatorship in the 1980s. In fact, between 2009 and 2016, approximately 22,059 families (roughly 300,000 people) were removed under the argument of “preservation of lives” (Prefeitura Municipal do Rio de Janeiro, 2015).

Backed up by expert science, the speed of the announcement of the clearance programme constituted a “politics of emergency” (Honig, 2009), driven by the apparently noble objective of preserving life. Several authors have portrayed the shift into a politics of emergency as a moment in which increased precarity can be forced onto populations (Bracke, 2016; Klein, 2007; Massumi, 2009). Honig, however, recognises that official declarations of emergency can be both a way of imposing new forms of control and discipline *and* an opportunity for marginalised and excluded groups to reassess unfair situations and develop alternative political responses and strategies. What the evocation of an emergency politics in the Rio context did was “de-exceptionalise exceptions” (Honig, 2009), like favela removal. The emergency here instead of creating exceptionalities, brought them to the field of normalcy, imposing a future imperative that neglects both past and present needs claimed by favela dwellers (Compton, 2018).

Discourses of ‘resilience building’, that have become ubiquitous in Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (DRRM) and related strategies of climate adaptation, have been the subject of, particularly trenchant criticism. Fainstein (2015, p. 157) , for example, argues that “policy makers […] are seeking an innocuous label to justify controversial actions” and that power relations and hierarchies are readily obscured. How actions and resources to mitigate risk are socially distributed, how different communities are treated including in terms of who is allowed to stay ‘in place’ and who

must be removed, and who has the power to shape and influence resilience decision-making are all key justice concerns. Hurricane Katrina in the US catalysed connections between environmental justice activism and disaster management, with both the relocation of affected residents and decisions about returning to and redeveloping areas at risk, controversial in terms of the fractures of race and wealth these processes highlighted (Bullard & Wright, 2009; Morse, 2008). Other cases, for example, centred on the impact of sea-level rise on low lying islands, have similarly generated intense debate about the just enactment of consent in relocation strategies for affected communities (Barnett & Campbell, 2010), and the importance of realising relocation in a way that does not destroy senses of community, identity and heritage.

This thesis focuses on strategies of removing so-called 'informal' settlements from areas deemed too unsafe for continued habitation, and how these can be connected to a broader political intent to clear such settlements from urban spaces. Some equivalent cases have been reported in the literature. Saraçoğlu & Demirtaş-Milz (2014, for example, discuss the case of an "urban transformation project" in Izmir, Turkey, which was carried out to clear a low-income area because of the claimed threat of landslides. They argue that the 'naturalising' technocratic language that dominated the project, served to conceal its underlying neoliberal logic as well as the damaging social effects on already marginalised migrant populations, who were removed with little recognition of their needs or livelihoods. Bose (2016) looking specifically at char dwellers and slum populations in Bangladesh analysed "the possibility of being displaced not by climate change but rather by development processes meant to ameliorate its effects" (ibid, p.168). Ramalho's (2019, p.1) study on the clearance of low-income settlements in Metro Cebu in the Philippines aimed to address how "epistemologies of modernity, disaster risk and resilience endorsed and propagated by the state are facilitating processes of displacement and dispossession that serve elite commercial interests".

While such works have much to contribute to understanding how risk can be deployed as a technology of urban governance to displace informal settlements, few works have focused substantially on the

phenomenon of disaster risk displacements in informal settlements in Latin America, apart from the work of Heck (2016) and Anguelovski et al. (2018). Heck's study focused on how Ecolimites and disaster risk definitions discursively established the conditions for the relocation of favela residents in Santa Marta, Rio de Janeiro, while at the same time establishing new reforestation and protected areas as a mitigation strategy. Anguelovski et al (2018), also taking into consideration the "socio-political nature of risk assessment" (ibid, p.427), analysed a project of green urban zoning and landslide risk reduction in Medellin, Colombia. The authors show how the creation of a 72 km² green corridor around the city, which affected approximately 230,000 people, gave rise to acute conflicts in the relocation of thousands of low-income residents from "non-recoverable areas" (ibid, p. 427) because of estimated high risk of landslides or flooding. The study concludes that green and resilience discourses and interventions ended up supporting socio-spatial exclusionary logics for disadvantaged urban residents and thereby leading to further social vulnerability.

Despite such insightful contributions to understand how disaster risk has been mobilised to displace people living in informal settlements, less attention has been given to the strategies developed by the people affected by such policies to secure their right to stay put. In this study, while I'm looking at similar dynamics, that is, how risk-driven resilience towards DRRM serves to normalise the situation of those who are wealthy and have "ontological security" (Fainstein, 2015, p.163) while exacerbating the insecurity of others who do not, I am also interested in understanding how such risk claims can be counteracted through different strategies of resistance performed by the favela dwellers. This aspect deserves particular attention once the condition of emergency imposed by the city was not accepted as such by the favela dwellers, with the 'removal package' immediately interpreted by them as a product of ongoing anti-favela politics, rather than being based on a disinterested and objective technical assessment. Faced with the possibility of being uprooted from their homes and communities, the favela dwellers had to act fast and across many different fronts to resist their removal.

To this, this thesis connects analysis of DRRM and displacement in informal settlements with the literature on vulnerability to provide not only a critical analysis on the state's role in the production of favela precarity but also to understand how such precarious subjects not resilient enough to stay in their homes refuse such ascription. At a conceptual level, this thesis critically examines the paradigms through which we understand vulnerability, arguing for a feminist and postcolonial approach that enables analysis of the interplay between vulnerability as a condition that enables the forging of resilient subjects, to an approach to vulnerability that unpacks the key drivers of risk through resistance.

1.2 Research questions

Given this context and the gaps found in the literature, the study for this thesis was motivated by three over-arching questions:

1. How has environmental risk, as a contemporary governmental technology, been employed in discourse and practices to justify the resumption of favela removals?
2. How have removals been administratively addressed to prevent disaster risk and to what extent has this practice contributed to maintaining, transforming, or eradicating favelas' vulnerability?
3. How have favela dwellers experienced and responded to such politics of disaster risk displacement?

Concerning the first question, the emphasis on governmental practices in informal urban settlements in the face of increasing climate risk in cities of the Global South, like Rio, needs attention. This means understanding the risk assessment policies in these areas. To address this question, first, it is necessary to understand the discourses, norms and practices that historically have established differential regimes of favela recognition, or their intelligibility, responsible for locating favelas partially outside, partially inside of the gaze of political authorities and city planning (Yiftachel, 2009). This requires delving into the history of state interventions in those areas, currently left outside the analysis of

vulnerability, resilience, and adaptation. This account on favelas' intelligibility and, consequently, the genealogy of their precarity consists of a fundamental step to the analysis of the discursive practices of risk assessment applied in Rio to justify the clearance of favelas in the post-2010 period.

The opening of the "black boxes" (Ottinger, 2017) of risk assessment makes manifest the epistemic injustice and its relation to its politics that emerged within threatened favela communities to challenge the basis of the city's apparently expert risk-based decision-making. I focus on the role of a network of 'counter expertise' that supported the favela dwellers in their fight against the resumption of the removals policy, exposing what Yarina, (2018) calls "double-check rhetoric" about climate adaptation, or, in other words, the aspects left in the shadows by resilience-building strategies. Through paying attention to the details of epistemic resistance in this case, and the partial success it had in resisting favela clearance, I argue that local knowledge is crucial to mobilisation processes, but insufficient on its own to mount an effective challenge to the epistemic and procedural power exercised by the state. Only through coordinating multiple forms of expertise and strategically deploying these in the context, can the momentum of state-sanctioned processes be interrupted, and effective epistemic resistance deployed.

Concerning the second question, the purpose is to show how favela removals, a DRRM technique, take place through administrative practices presumed to 'make life live' (Barnidge, 2016; Dillon & Neal, 2008; Foucault, 2005). As I will argue the racialized frames of risk that will be discussed in Chapters 2 and 5, have contributed to forms of invisible disaster that have dragged on for years after the enactment of the first favela displacements post 2010. The social devaluations are not produced by the disaster itself; they are enacted by a collection of racialized biopolitical institutions which have created "disaster after disaster" (Schuller, 2008, p.17) in the name of making life live. To examine this incremental re-enactment of the disaster presented by the demolition of favelas or its anticipation, I rely on the routine encounters of favelas with the state in indirect and immediate ways, through its officials, norms, processes, discourses, and practices. To this end, I argue that state activities

undertaken to maximize life through removals – which I examine as a type of 'administrative violence' (see below) due to the forms of direct but also insidious and unnoticeable violence entailed by the administration of removals – proceed through deepening favela precarity. For this, I rely on the above concept of "administrative violence" (Beaugrand, 2011; Spade, 2017; Tyner & Rice, 2016) which works as an insightful tool to explain such action.

The third question surges from my politically engaged observation in favela movements against removals during over 10 months of fieldwork in Rio between 2016 and 2017, which awakened me to the urge to discuss vulnerability from a different standpoint. To interrogate the city's apparently noble biopolitical purpose of making favelados' life live" an alternative approach to vulnerability is necessary. The debate on vulnerability, mostly dominated by approaches to understanding vulnerable people as in need of protection or to some extent as accomplices of the risk exposure, does not open up alternatives to thinking of the experiences I had in the field. Therefore, how the favela dwellers have responded to such forms of life management posed by disaster risk displacement requires moving beyond the understanding of vulnerability as related to a predisposition to damage (Colette, 2016), which validates such biopolitical interventions based on violent administration of removals, to the logics and imperatives of vulnerability as a distinguishing regime of power relations.

Taking this into account, I am concerned with this potential sort of resistance and, possibly, social transformation the "emergency politics" (Honig, 2009) adopted in Rio entails. Unlike dealing with the issue of disaster risk displacements of favelas from disavowing and depoliticising angles, I consider feminists' accounts on vulnerability and precarity, which is "imperative to critically examine the logic of disavowal by which vulnerability becomes projected and distanced from prevailing ideas of agency and mastery" (Butler, 2016, p.03). It implies considering a concept of vulnerability that entails not only the susceptibility to harm – precluded by most definitions of vulnerability – but an openness to others. This paradoxical understanding of vulnerability creates the possibility for a concerted political agency which I witnessed in the field.

To pursue answers, I conducted a multi-sited case study with five favelas from different areas of the city, characterised by the municipality's 'removal package' as 'high-risk areas': Estradinha, Horto and Santa Marta, in the South Zone; Indiana in the North Zone; and Vila Autódromo in the West Zone. The data gathering took place in two different periods between 2016 and 2017, of approximately 11 months of duration in total. Data gathering involved semi-structured and in-depth interviews with key actors involved in the five selected cases, supported by participant observation and archival research.

1.2 Thesis outline

The thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, I introduce the city of Rio de Janeiro within the governmental precarization context of favelas. I review relevant literature that explains the state-led forms of precarity that contributed to the condition of the vulnerability of favelas mobilised by the state itself to justify favela removal. I review how urban policies conceived to address favela problems have contributed to the exacerbation of their precarity and vulnerability to disaster. I then set the scene of this research project: the risk drivers of favela displacement.

In Chapter 3, I establish the theoretical framework for the research. To introduce precarity and risk as categories to understand the biopolitical management of favela territories through displacements, I draw from Butler (2007, 2009, 2014, 2016) as well as Foucault (1978, 1997) to understand precarity as a biopolitically regulated condition actively produced and reiterated by the state to subjugate favela territories, taken as the 'Other' of the city, as we will see in Chapter 2. I also focus on vulnerability, a central concept in the definition of precarity, to demonstrate the potentiality of favelados' vulnerability to resist disaster risk displacement. I am interested in how urban "governmental precarization" (Lorey, 2011) has been responsible for the consolidation of favelas as 'at-risk' places, and how risk is understood as a frame of precarity, concealing the historical and calculated negligence of these territories and depoliticizing the longstanding roots of their state-led precarity.

Chapter 4 summarises my methodological choices in carrying out this study. It explains the research design and the methods for data collection and analysis used. I identify the research design, the motivations of this project and the motivations behind my choice for Rio de Janeiro as the primary object of investigation. I also present the sites selected. I will also address the complexities of doing research in over-researched and (sometimes) violent places, exploring my relationship with those places and the participants and the choices made regarding the challenges encountered.

Chapters 5 to 8 are the analytical chapters. In Chapter 5, I will interrogate the relationship between DRRM, the city authorities' resilience discourse and the urban interventions that have been made recently to explain the socio-spatial implications of the intersection of these agendas for favelas and favelados.

Chapter 6 will explain the paradoxical state policies posed by the biopolitical management of risk and displacements in favelas aimed at optimizing life through the maximization of favelas' precarity. In particular, I consider this type of precarity resulting from violent removal administration to be a sort of disaster in itself. Here, catastrophe is understood as an event that, as we will see in Chapter 2, does not occur from a single, tragic, and natural occurrence but from the gradual unfolding of consequences and effects of a historical state-led precarization of favelas. The regular encounters of favelados with the state in indirect and immediate ways, through its officials, norms, processes, discourses and practices of risk assessment and removals, will be the focus of the chapter.

Chapter 7 is the first of two to address the question on how favela dwellers respond to the forms of precarization posed to disaster risk displacement. Firstly, to answer what forms of response such a process of subjectification and subjection disaster risk displacements create and foreclose, this chapter takes vulnerability as a point of departure to tell another tale of risk governmentality. Informed by a feminist understanding of vulnerability, I will show what favelados' understanding of risk might tell us about vulnerability and resistance. I also raise the issue of what resistance to disaster risk displacement means.

Chapter 8 continues to show how the vulnerability of favelados is turned into agency capability, but now through ways of temporal, affective and material resistance practices which include the mobilization of memory and trauma, mutual caring, and the embodiment of hyper-precarity through self-demolition and rebuilding practices. The key contribution here is to demonstrate how the vulnerability of favelas to dual types of disaster (natural hazard exposure and removal) is not only social and environmental but also profoundly political. I explore how deep claims for social justice are contained in the practices of resisting state-led precarity created by disaster risk displacement.

Chapter 9 summarizes each chapter's key findings while addressing those concerning the theoretical context provided in Chapter 3. I also discuss how this study contributes to the body of literature on precarity, Southern urban studies and critical disaster studies. Moreover, when considering the limitations of this research, I discuss how the debates in this study can be extended to other contexts. Finally, I look at some of the drawbacks of this research, which opens an agenda for further research.

Chapter 2 - Favelas and their protracted history of state-led precarity

As outlined in Chapter 1, 2010 marked a confluence of political, economic, social, and environmental factors that enabled the city to announce the removal of 119 favelas. This recent wave of removals and the 'rationales' justifying them need to be seen as within a long tradition of precarisation in which political authorities have adaptively embodied different discourses and practices, such as salubrity, '*favelados* urbanization' (Soares Gonçalves, 2006), urban developmentalism, anti-communism measures, criminality, and recently, environmental risk, to justify favela displacement. While the new forms of urban risk management have been heralded as a break with the past, those 'new' approaches to favelas and their problems seem like a new chapter in a very old story. In this chapter, I will explore the history of how favela displacement has become a motif and effect of state-led precarisation of favela territories and favelados' subjectivities.

The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2.1, I present the troubling relationship between hygienism and housing at the end of the nineteenth century, in which the black, the *caboclo*, the indigenous, and the *sertanejo* (the countryman) were the preferred targets of eugenicists, as they were considered the main obstacle to the national march towards progress. In Section 2.2, I present how the pathologization of favelas shaped how they were made into a governmental object, with the consolidation of the favela as a 'problem'. In Section 2.3, I present how this has defined the whole range of state interventions in the face of different socio-spatial changes, usually aiming at the eradication of favelas. In Section 2.4, I present the more recent history of favelas with a focus on the 'apparent victory' over the chronic politics of removals, with Brazilian redemocratization. I review the chapter in Section 2.5 and preview Chapter 3.

2.1 Rio de Janeiro and its 'dark side of modernity': racism and the pathologization of collective housing

From the mid-nineteenth century to the first decades of the twentieth century, an age marked by economic, social, political, cultural and spatial changes brought about by the modernisation of Rio de Janeiro (Vaz, 1994), the small commercial city, with its colonial characteristics, gave way to the industrial city, accumulating traces of modernity influenced by modern European capitalist metropolises.

The city witnessed dramatic changes during this transition to modernity,[2] such as the replacement of slave labour by wage earners; the emergence of the capitalist market and the commodification of goods, including housing and jobs; the decline of Rio's coffee industry; the establishment of new social categories; and the replacement of the elites in power (Vaz, 1994). Such transformations were mirrored in the city's demographic growth: its population nearly doubled in just 20 years, increasing from 235,000 in 1870 to 522,000 in 1890 (Vaz, 1994). These changes also had spatial implications, with the introduction of public transport networks such as trams and railroads, sanitation and water supply systems, telegraph, gas lighting, telephone, electricity, etc. The colonial city gave way to the modern one.

The 1888 abolition of slavery marks the basis of the cycle of urban modernisation. In what has been called the “unfinished abolition”, the blacks (newly liberated by the slave owners or the state) became "an invisible class of abandoned people" (J. Souza, 2017), thrown into a highly competitive social order without any assistance or compensation. Now freed, the blacks joined the emancipated blacks and migrants, both domestic and international, who came to the city in search of a means of survival. The central area of the city was where the best housing and job opportunities were concentrated. Therefore, these *cortiços*[3] became the dwellings for blacks, *par excellence*. Described as a "social hell" by urban planners, hygienists and politicians, their inhabitants were referred to as *malandros* (rogues),

[2] This time includes the collapse of the Portuguese Empire in 1822 and the declaration of the Republic in 1889.
[3] The cortiços, also known as *estalagens* or *casas de cômodos*, consisted of a model of collective housing brought from Portugal to Brazil. Analogous to the slave quarters, these houses had a succession of rooms in a row, of precarious construction, with reduced internal spaces, poor lighting and ventilation (Vaz, 2002).

capoeiras,[4] vagabonds, and prostitutes (Valladares, 2008, p. 24) – which all became synonyms for blacks and poor migrants.

The racial makeup of Brazil was also a concern for the white urban elites. To 'purify' Brazil, a 'whitening' policy was introduced, promoting Western immigration as a way to shift the country's demographic composition. It was assumed that the number of blacks and *mestiços* (people of mixed race) would decrease through a method of deliberate miscegenation until they would almost disappear. The goal was that 100 years from 1912, Brazil's population would be 97 per cent white and three per cent mestiços (Maio, 2004). Eugenics[5] was at the centre of Rio's urban development, typically directed at urban planning and public health, with cortiços and the *febre amarela* (yellow fever) proclaimed by the urban elites, as the enemies of the new urban order.

Hygienic policies were aimed at fostering salubrious conditions, and this was closely linked to the ideology of racial improvement at that time. Certain diseases took precedence over others. Yellow fever, which had decimated European immigrants working in coffee plantations in the southeast, became the focus of medical and political effort. Meanwhile, hygienists overlooked diseases such as tuberculosis, which they found significant among Rio de Janeiro's black population. As Chalhoub (1996) points out, hygienists' interference in public policy appeared to follow the misconceived aim of rendering the urban environment salubrious to the white citizens.

The blacks remained abandoned to their fate and the elites preserved the order by the aforementioned future aspirations of a 'whitening policy' with the entrance of European workers, which was assumed would wipe out Brazilian society's African heritage (Challoub, 1996). As Almeida (2016) noted, in one way or another, the laissez-faire practice of the authoritarian liberalism of that period in Brazil justified the exclusion of the non-white masses; and the thesis of population whitening,

[4] *Capoeira* is a Brazilian martial art originated during the slavery of black Africans and linked to black resistance movements, being criminalized in the 19th century.

[5] Eugenics refers the social uses of knowledge of heredity focused on "better reproduction", for the "enhancement of the human breed" or to preserve the "purity" of certain "races" considered superior (Miskolci, 2006, p.116-117).

based on the assumption that the world was heading towards racial evolution, promised to phase out those incompatible with modernity. The violence of this transformation in Rio was staggering, not only because it was the country's largest and most important city, but particularly because it was still a very black city at the turn of the century (Rolnik, 1989).

The cortiços, the principal form of the condemned collective housing in colonial Brazil, had to disappear, and blacks and poor migrants with them. The campaigns for the eradication of cortiços were launched at the end of the nineteenth century. According to Vaz (2002), the most infamous example was Cabeça de Porco that was demolished by the municipal government in 1893, in what she terms a "true war operation" involving Major Barata Ribeiro and the municipality's entire institutional apparatus. The fact that it was demolished in dramatic circumstances led to its fame, and its name, translated as 'Pig Head', became synonymous with unsafe and degraded collective housing. The use of this negative picture helped to condemn this housing pattern, which later spread to the favela, its successor.

Cabeça de Porco's violent removal was the beginning of the "*Bota-Abaixo*" (knock it down) strategy followed by Pereira Passos (1902-1906), the mayor responsible for evicting around 20,000 people in Rio (Faulhaber & Azevedo, 2015). This cycle of spatializing social disparities, inherent in the urban modernization of the city, was intensified by the “Haussmanization of Rio” (Vaz, 2002) project an imitation of the large streets of Paris with urban gardens projected by the French urbanist. When the cortiços were being eradicated, the government did not implement a housing program for the displaced people. The restrictive and oppressive character of the cortiços law, described as “sanitary and hygienic despotism” (Magalhães, 2015, p.35), was the foreshadowing of the rules on the regularization of favelas, due to their close resemblance to cortiços. This process marks the origin of “racialized topography” (Ueland & Warf, 2010), with sociospatial precarity being one of the central aspects of Rio de Janeiro, as we will see in the next section.

The Passos reform ended up rendering the cortiços unfeasible as permanent housing and created difficulties for other formal housing options to emerge. Mayor Passos, seeking absolute space regulation, issued Decree No. 391 of 10 February 1903 restricting building, and setting up a series of technical, architectural, and legal regulations that were burdensome for the construction of new buildings. This prevented the establishment of displaced people from cortiços in the suburbs of the city. Ironically, such restrictions and control through this Decree created a governmental incentive for the construction of "rough sheds [...] on hills that did not yet have dwellings" (Vaz, 1994, p.592). The transition from cortiços to favelas can be defined as a process of urban rationalisation derived from a colonial and postcolonial lineage of urban production" (Tilley, Elias, & Rethel, 2019, p.81).

This period, according to Vaz (1994), can be considered as the birth of favelas due to the causal relationship that can be established between the proliferation of this new housing model and the state's (in) action. Paradoxically, the new type of housing that emerged as a consequence of Pereira Passos' hygienist urban reform, proved to be an 'accidentally' convenient alternative for the government that allowed the policy of eradication of the cortiços and the consequent liberation of the central areas of the city to the white urban elite. Favelas, then, enabled the growth of the city by maintaining the population close to the workplace, reducing the burden of housing and transportation factors on the cost of labour (Magalhães, 2015).

The favelas, thus, were born as a `temporary solution` for housing shortages and rising rents, not only for the poor and mainly black population but also from the hygienist perspective. Since hygienism prevailed at the time and its obsession with the cortiços, the favelas benefited from a certain 'invisibility', as they were located mainly on the hills of the city, presenting some advantages over the cortiços. According to Almeida (2016), their favourable geography, located in segregated areas away from the wealthiest population represented a lower risk of contagion; and because of their privileged location, they were supposed to enjoy better air circulation, an essential element in the maintenance of hygiene. So, from the hygienist's standpoint, there was little reason to worry about the shacks built

on the hills, in those distant places isolated from the city. In this period, the objective was to suppress the unhealthy accumulation of dwellings in the cortiços. Hence, the state was 'tolerant' of the favelas, as they represented an alternative to expansion of the city by relocating the poor population. In accommodating those affected by the racialized policy of eradicating cortiços, the favelas expanded with the collusion of the public authorities (Soares Gonçalves, 2006).

2.2 The Code of Works of 1937 and the institutionalization of favelas as a problem (1930-1960)

Favelas did not receive much attention from political authorities until the mid-1930s. There were no specific laws, institutions or governmental policies created to deal with favelas, and there was no interest by researchers in the subject, or, to borrow from Valladares (2005), the favela had not been *invented* yet. However, favelas emerged in the following decades as the focus of urban politics and academic debates (Almeida, 2016; Valladares, 2005; Soares Gonçalves, 2006). From the *Revolução de 1930* [6] (Revolution of 1930), the favelas came to be an object of political concern, made knowable, calculable, and thereby amenable to various strategies of intervention. This shift took place with the advent of the New Republic, founded by Getúlio Vargas, which sought to 'rehabilitate' the favela dwellers and guarantee their integration as workers into the nascent industrial society through the proletarianization of their labour force. This basically depended on the dismissal of the favelados' environment and "inappropriate" habits (Almeida, 2016) which could be achieved, first, through control and, when possible, eradication of favelas and resettlement of favela dwellers in proletarian villages; and, second, through 'education' and disciplinary practices, to produce subjectivities docile to the new labour demands.

[6] The 1930 Revolution was an armed movement, led by the states of Rio Grande do Sul, Minas Gerais and Paraíba, dissatisfied with the results of the presidential elections and which resulted in a coup d'état, called the 1930 Revolution. Getúlio Vargas then assumed the leadership of the "Provisional Government" on November 3, 1930. In 1937, Getúlio Vargas through a coup d'état established an authoritarian regime known as the Estado Novo.

Regarding the first step, there was a need to name the social reality of favelas and formalise them as a particular socio-spatial formation in Rio's urban life (Soares Gonçalves, 2013). The Code of Works 1937 represents a watershed in this direction as it provided a legal definition of favelas as "conglomerates of two or more habitats regularly disposed of or in disorder, built with improvised materials and in disagreement with the provisions of this decree" (Distrito Federal, Decree 6000/1937). In addition to stigmatising favelas as an urbanistic "aberration"(Cavalcanti, 2009, p. 72), the Code established their eradication as a rule, although not necessarily through direct removals. The eradication could take place through forms of controlled abandonment: the Code made it clear it was "absolutely forbidden to add or build new huts, carry out any work in the existing ones or make any construction" in the favelas (ibid, 1937). The preservation of shacks with precarious materials such as wood and zinc would facilitate the demolition process in the long run, according to this governmental rationality. Thus, if the houses were to be repaired, the decree allowed refurbishment only with the same materials the houses were constructed with. Thus, no resident could make any changes to their house, just sporadic repairs aimed at preserving the same precarious standards of construction that exposed them to all sorts of 'adversities'. These steps threw favelas into a "position of legal indeterminacy and ambiguity" (Krasniqi, 2019, p. 302) which lasted until the 1970s.

Although the Code of Works legitimized the eradication of the favelas by the public authorities (Valladares, 2005), it paradoxically enabled the favela dwellers to appropriate this state of 'in-betweenness' to improve their houses and consolidate themselves in the urban landscape, an unexpected effect of the Code. For example, despite restrictions on house reform, favela dwellers creatively circumvented this measure employing bricks and cement in their shacks when they did need to make some repairs in their homes (Almeida, 2016). The Code also recognized some of the rights of the favelados by making any displacements conditional on the existence of a housing policy to resettle

those evicted (Gonçalves, 2013).[7] As a consequence, the Code of Works was also used to block the practice of displacements that did not fulfil the requirement of providing alternative housing.

2.2.1 Urbanizing the favelados: the state and the forging of the modern urban subject

The second step in the transformation of favelas into a governmental object refers to the forging of favelados' subjectivity. To regulate, control and re-educate the *favelado*, there was a phase of subjectivation that included self-government technologies aimed at preparing blacks, freed from slavery, for the nascent labour market created by the Brazilian industrialization policy, as it was considered they "did not appreciate the freedom they had gained" (Zaluar & Alvito, 2006, p. 13).

The subjection of *favelados* to the modern pattern of the labour market, hygienic dwellings and the conjugal family came from the expectations of the *carioca's* (people from Rio) elite, influenced by a white, European and Christian model of an ideal modern and progressive society (Rolnik, 1989). To comply with the new aspirations, the major, Henrique Dodsworth launched the Program of Provisional Proletarian Parks in 1942,[8] aiming to solve the problem of the unhealthy conditions of the favelas, as well as to form new areas for urban expansion (Burgos, 2006). The proletarian parks were the first government housing policy for the favela population, but, as highlighted by Burgos (2006) and Almeida (2016), it was more than just a housing policy, it was a policy of population control underpinned by the hygienist and civilizational principles established by the *Estado Novo*.[9]

The parks program developed a series of techniques which included the study and classification of the residents, along with measures to 'domesticate' the favela dwellers, using the first census of favelas in 1948 as the criteria of classification. The introductory note of the Census of Favelas referred to *favelados* as "blacks and browns […] hereditarily backward, devoid of ambition and ill-adjusted to

[7] It is precise because of this aspect that the treatment conferred to the Code of Works to favelas differs from that one given to the *cortiços* at the turn of the century.
[8] According to Burgos (2006), until 1943 City Hall built three provisional social housing: *Gávea, Caju* and *Leblon*, to which were transferred about four thousand people.
[9] See footnote on page 30 for details.

modest social demands" (Zaluar & Alvito, 2006, p. 13). It was during this period that the idea of citizenship linked to the individual's occupation became consolidated. This "regulated citizenship", defined by Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos as "citizenship whose roots are found, not in a code of political values, but in a system of occupational stratification" (1993, p. 76), was legitimated by the presence of the *carteira de trabalho* (employee's record book). The immediate implication of this regulated citizenship is that all workers who were not part of the productive process were considered as 'pre-citizens'. This association between citizenship and work would provide the conditions for a later merger of the concepts of marginality and informality, adding an extra layer in the stigmatization of favelados.

With the Estado Novo, the favelado could leave the condition of marginality in society through the development of their potential as a worker. This would have a series of socio-spatial implications. First, the state planned and executed its measures by building the parks or offering assistance through the Social Service and Institute of Retirements and Pensions (Instituto de Aposentadorias e Previdência – IAPs).[10] Second, it was believed that through the identity of 'worker' the favelado could develop a discourse of self from a position recognized by the political community of which they could be part, either when showing the *carteira de trabalho* to the police, demanding recognition of their citizenship, or when making requests or demands for public authorities or to legitimize political and cultural associations (Almeida, 2016).

The worker's identity would confer on the favelados (at least potentially) social rights and, therefore, a position in which they could make claims to public power. However, there was a third consequence of this identification that contributed significantly to a new objectification of the favela and its movement to the centre of the national political debate. With the end of the Estado Novo in 1945 and the reestablishment of political rights, the proletarian identity of the favelado made the favela an area

[10] According to Almeida (2016), only formal workers could have access to the financing of social housing provided by the IAPs.

susceptible to communist agitation (Almeida, 2016). Even the organised favela became a potentially dangerous area where a force could rise that would trigger a proletarian revolution.

According to Burgos (2006), one of the implications of the interaction between the residents of the proletarian parks and the state was the emergence of embryonic forms of favela residents' organizations. The authoritarianism of civilizing pedagogy and the precariousness of the facilities of the proletarian parks generated non-conformities among favela dwellers, which triggered the emergence of the residents' commission as a response to the governmental plan for favela removals from the Federal District to the parks. New political possibilities opened up with the official recognition of the favela dweller as a worker. This enabled favelados to organize themselves to i) defend against the threat of removals due to urban land valuation and investments in urban infrastructure in that period and ii) to claim social rights, especially through the improvement or upgrading of the infrastructure of their area.

The favelados' potential for organizing themselves, in turn, raised suspicions of communist insurgencies amongst conservative sectors of the city,[11] especially the Catholic Church. To counteract this potential, in 1946, the Archdiocese of Rio de Janeiro and the Federal District founded the Leão XIII Foundation aiming to provide "material and moral assistance to the inhabitants of the hills and favelas of Rio de Janeiro" (Burgos, 2006, p.29). The Foundation's objective was to 'conquer' the favelas' territories and protect their inhabitants from communist influences. This was a turbulent conjuncture marked by the Cold War, the Brazilian democratization process, the rapid growth of favelas (almost 100% growth during the 1950s) and the perceived communist threat caused by the electoral success of the Brazilian Communist Party during the 1947 municipal elections. In response to this situation, a politics of precarious tolerance of favelas was in place (Soares Gonçalves, 2013), despite their formal condemnation in Article 349 of the 1937 Code of Works.

[11] Although the Constitution of 1946 prohibited the vote of illiterates which affected to large extent the political participation of the inhabitants of the favelas, the favelados began to emerge as political actors, which bothered urban elites of the time.

The slogan of that time that "we need to come up the hill before the communists come down" (Valladares, 2005, p. 76) portrays well the new interest aroused in knowing and controlling favela territories: official bodies began collecting, analysing and producing official data, using the censuses of 1948 and 1950 conducted by the Federal District and the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística – IBGE), respectively, making use of the maxim "know it to control it".[12] An important change brought by the 1950 Census was the generalization of the category of favela, technically called a "subnormal agglomerate", which referred to the set of precarious housing found throughout Brazil. As Valladares (2005, p. 51) notes, "the existence of places comparable to Rio's favelas in other cities in Brazil, a reality hitherto hidden and invisible on the political plane, became visible and measurable thanks to the statistical categories". Informed by a scientific approach, the 1950 Census contributed to an intense political debate headed by the Church and the media on the favelas' fate at the turn of the 1940s to the 1950s.

The politicization of the favela problem demanded the expansion of the state's power over the favela territories, beyond the removal policy that was being advocated. To this end, the Catholic Church instigated further initiatives under the São Sebastião Crusade in 1955 while the municipal government created the Special Service for the Recovery of Favelas and Unhygienic Housing [Serviço Especial de Recuperação de Favelas e Habitações Anti-higiênicas (SERFHA)] (Brum, 2011). For instance, Law 2874 of 1956 prohibited all expulsion of favelados for two years and granted credits to the São Sebastião Crusade for the urbanization of favelas which included construction of social housing. As Soares Gonçalves (2006) observes, what appeared to be a policy for defending the favelados, later became a way of legitimizing the removal policies of the 1960s and 1970s, as it created a precarious right of occupation that was not ad infinitum. According to this law, as soon as the state had built social housing, favelados had to leave their homes. Maintaining a fragile social peace, this law consolidated

[12] Unlike the 1950 Census, the 1948 Favela Census led by the Federal District was still guided by a racist and eugenic perspective, mirroring previous representations of favelas and also pointing to the monolitical solution: their eradication.

the legally precarious nature of the favelas and did not establish a legally coherent framework to deal with the complexity of the problem.

Therefore, despite the rhetoric on favelas urbanization and some *self-help* methods,[13] all these institutions (Leão XIII Foundation, São Sebastião Crusade and SERFHA) used disciplinary surveillance and inspection strategies to rule the favelas, which, according to Soares Gonçalves (2006, p.04), included: “measures to avoid the spread of shacks; to regularize sexual union; to put the child in school, the mother in the house and the father at work (and away from bars and *biroscas* [corner stores]); and to ensure hygienic order”. The many forms in which favelas and favelados became government targets prevented favela dwellers above all from acquiring full citizenship, by weakening them as political subjects. It also contributed to reinforcing a clientelist dynamic already existent which will result, as we will see in the next section, in a "pragmatic accommodation of the excluded to the opportunities existing in a context constrained by authoritarianism" (Burgos, 2006, p. 39)

2.3 Violence, authoritarianism, and the criminalization of favelas (1960-1980s)

If until the late 1950s the practices of state intervention were mainly focused on transforming favelas into an object of governmental concern (making them intelligible, calculable and thus suitable for various intervention strategies), from the 1960s, their eradication would become a more dominant repertoire when referring to the favela problem.

In the early 1960s, Brazil faced profound political instability due to the resignation of President Jânio Quadros and the success of the Cuban Revolution. The urban issue gained centrality in the national political scene due to basic reforms announced by the Goulart government and the attention given by

[13]SERFHA established the Project Mutirão initiative in 1961 in which favelados were encouraged to work with government bodies to make the necessary changes to the favela’s structural conditions.

the Alliance for Progress[14] to the problem of affordable housing. However, after the Military Coup of 1964, urban policy underwent a profound change due to the abandonment of the social projects formulated by the deposed president. The transfer of the Federal Capital from Rio de Janeiro to Brasília in 1960 also brought about serious socio-political changes in the city, due to the loss of political and economic influence.

Rio de Janeiro became the State of Guanabara, and during this time its first Constitution was written. According to Soares Gonçalves (2006), this Constitution strengthened the previous legal framework for favelas. In addition to the establishment of a public body charged with seeking solutions to the housing issue, the Constitution specified that the favelas should be provisionally funded and sanitized with the construction of urban infrastructure, excluding a category of "irrecoverable ones". The favelas were conceived as a provisional reality, but all undesirable favelas could be subjectively categorized as "irrecoverable" especially those located in the most valued South Zone neighbourhoods. In short, a legal system was established to legitimize the eradication policy (ibid, 2006). The implications of this could already be seen soon after the election of Guanabara's first governor, Carlos Lacerda, in 1960. During this time, 27 favelas were eradicated, and 41,958 residents moved to social housing through the Alliance for Progress support and, after 1964, the National Housing Bank [Banco Nacional de Habitação (BNH][15] (Valladares, 1978).

Meanwhile, the favela members continued to progress in their organizational structure. The establishment of the Federation of Favela Associations of the State of Guanabara [Federação das Associações de Favela do Estado da Guanabara (FAFEG)] was a landmark. The FAFEG was an

[14] The Alliance for Progress was a reformist initiative to fund welfare programs, initiated by President John F. Kennedy, to minimize communism's influence in Latin America. Housing acquired a major role in this anti-communist policy. For instance, according to Valladares (2005), the choice of *Borel* and *Jacarezinho* as the priority areas for the Alliance for Progress was not by chance, as *Borel* was the favela where the Union of Favelados Workers [União dos Trabalhadores Favelados (UTF)] was organized, and *Jacarezinho* was the largest favela in the city and had a large workforce.

[15] The BHN was created in 1964 during the Military Government in Brazil, aiming to reduce the Brazilian housing deficit at the time. The bank was part of the Housing Finance System [Sistema Finanaceiro de Habitação (SFH)] also created in the military period (V. F. De Oliveira, 2014).

expression of the opportunity for the political integration of favela dwellers into the political life of the city (Burgos, 2006). This organizational and articulative power drew the authoritarian state's attention. Concerned about the favelas' political development, the state created more stringent mechanisms for the political control of these territories. One of the key implications was the changes that took place in the structure of the Leão XIII Foundation, shifting from an organisation that was part of the church, to a state autocracy in 1963.

According to Burgos (2006, p.34), "with the coup of 1964, the necessary conditions for the removalist adventure were created". From then on, the favela was no longer a moral concern to be dealt with by 'soft' approaches, but it became a political question to be tackled through eradication policies. This reformulation of the image of the favela, as Burgos (2006) points out, contributed to the state's oppressive treatment, and its imperviousness to favelados' participation.

Due to the electoral power of the favelas (Machado da Silva, 1967), the state needed to control the activities of the residents' associations through the subversion of their representative nature, making them spokespersons for the state. Consequently, a decree (Decree 870 of 1967) was issued by the State of Guanabara, which subordinated residents' associations to the jurisdiction of the Social Services Secretariat. This deformation of the associations' role also resulted in preventing the democratization of internal relations within favelas, reproducing a more general system of domination there (Burgos, 2006).

The era from 1968 to 1975 is recognized as one of the most violent in the long history of state-led favela precarity. With the creation of the Coordination of Social Housing of the Greater Rio Metropolitan Area [Coordenação da Habitação de Interesse Social da Área Metropolitana do Grande Rio (CHISAM)] in 1968, the eradication of favelas became thoroughly institutionalized. According to Burgos, CHISAM defined the favelas as a deformed urban space inhabited by "a population alienated from the city because of housing that does not have the benefit of services for not being taxpayers" (ibid, 2006, p. 36). Given such a diagnosis of favelas, the solution proposed resembled that propagated

first in the 1940s: eradication. In a decade, 100,000 families were removed, and about 60 favelas destroyed (Burgos, 2006; Soares Gonçalves, 2006; Valladares, 2005).

The subordination of residents' associations to the state by Decree 870 of 1967, the disappearance of many favelas leaders and dwellers by the military regime and the terror created by the violent removals in the period, turned many residents' associations into the driving force behind removals, serving the state and not the favelas (Burgos, 2006). In her research in the Catacumba favela, Janice Perlman (1977) explains that many groups operated against the favelados' interests by preventing dwellers from repairing their houses, new inhabitants from settling, and investigating who entered and left the favela.

However, with the weakening of the military regime from 1975, removals began to lose strength. According to Burgos, there were three reasons for this. First, the removal policy faced resistance from favela residents, which, according to Burgos, was made clear by Carlos Lacerda's defeat in the 1965 elections. The residents of favelas who were politically organized and represented by the FAFEG, (which represented about 100 residents' associations), actively fought not to be removed, imposing high political and financial costs on the institutions responsible for conducting the resettlement policies. For instance, the favela dwellers resettled to social housing did not adhere to the new housing standard as a way to demonstrate their discontent, not only with the forced evictions but also with the poor quality of the houses offered by the BNH (Valladares, 1978).

Second, as a response to the non-payment of housing financing instalments by the favelados resettled to the social housing,[16] the government transferred the funds from the BNH to finance housing for the middle and upper classes, diminishing social housing programs, which meant a decline in the number of evictions that could be enacted. Finally, according to Burgos, the accomplishment of the military government's purpose of defeating favelas' political organization justified the growing abandonment

[16] According to Valladares (1978), this form of refusal represented an alternative resistance strategy in the face of the conditions imposed by the forced resettlement of favelados to the social housing complex.

of the removals policy and with it, the consequent possibility of resistance. Consequently, the period between 1975 and 1982 can be regarded as a void for favelas in terms of active public policies. They were abandoned to some degree by the state authorities, which enabled the birth of a new figure in the favelas: the drug dealers.

Many favelas were privatized by parastatal groups[17] (ibid, 2006), which flourished with the withdrawal of the state and its lack of legitimacy in those territories. Against this context, the revaluation of the favela problem underwent new changes, with the triggering factor of urban violence. Through the following decades, *'os donos do morro'* (the owners of the hill), as they are widely called, became a counter-hegemonic power across those territories, less because of their authority concerning favela dwellers and more because of the excessive use of violence not only against rival factions but also against favela inhabitants.[18] Violence would become Rio de Janeiro's main problem, greatly altering both the political authorities' discourses and practices. Favelas and their inhabitants would continue to be described as the 'other' of the city, but at this time in a register marked by fear and uncertainty. The city's correlation between urban violence and the presence of favelas figured as a constant threat to the carioca's social order.

This link between favelas and urban violence led to the expansion of state control and surveillance systems to the detriment of a policy of social inclusion (Telles, 2010). As we will see in Chapter 5, from

[17] Privatized means here that those paramilitary groups begin to control the provision of some services in the dominated territories, charging fees to the residents for the illegal provision of services.

[18] According to Lima (2001), their roots date back to the 1970s, when urban guerrilla members who fought against the military regime were held in the same cells as 'proletarian prisoners' also under the National Security Law. This state practice aimed at dishonoring political prisoners. Popular inmates learnt guerrilla tactics there and formed the Comando Vermelho (Red Command) faction, a criminal enterprise that would dominate the bulk of Rio's favelas in the coming decades. During the 80s and 90s, internal disputes within the Comando Vermelho faction created rival factions, notably the Terceiro Comando (Third Command) and Amigos dos Amigos (Friends of Friends). This power structure dominated by drug retailing only started to be challenged in the mid-2000s by other 'militarized forces', as a new form of city dominance emerged: the militias. Such organizations, which act as police officers and other state agents, started occupying neighbourhoods previously dominated by drug traffickers.Traders and residents have in many cases been forced to pay a monthly fee in exchange for the "protection" that they offered. The severity of the duty varies from favela to favela, creating a spectrum varying from the direct threat to the lives of those who declined to pay to less violent cases in which only a hint of payment exists.

the 2000s onwards some other favela management activities were updated, as will be the case with the Pacifying Police Units [Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP)] implemented in 2008. In addition to being exposed to the very difficulties of a long history of governmental precarisation, favelados started facing a routine of severe brutality which has inevitably brought a new dimension of precarity to certain favela territories: the exposure to police truculence and violent death.

2.4 Rearranging the chairs on Titanic's deck: Brazilian redemocratization and the precarious social pact on favelas (1980-2000s)

With the gradual weakening of the military regime from 1975, removal policies were also losing strength due to their growing rejection by the favela population, after the traumatic experiences of favela clearance in the previous decade and their political costs at the ballot box after the revaluation of the vote. As Burgos (2006, p. 40) points out, "a demonstration that the trauma of 'remocionismo' [removal policy] was well understood by the authorities is that, when returning to the favela problem through Promorar,[19] the federal government would opt for an urbanization program". Promorar, launched by the BNH in 1979, suggested that the division between removal and urbanization had become obsolete and that the cycle of redemocratization (1975-1985) created a favourable environment for debating the possibility of integrating favelas into the city (Burgos, 2006).

Given all the political and social changes, removals were de facto halted in 1977 when the effort to eliminate Vidigal favela was unsuccessful. The Pastoral of Favelas[20] was also established during this time and played a vital role in the resistance of Vidigal against removals. At the end of 1977, after the height of the removal campaign had passed, employees of the Leão XIII Foundation visited the Vidigal favela, situated on Avenida Niemeyer, one of the city's wealthiest regions, warning of the

[19] Promorar, a sub-housing eradication program, financed by BNH, was created in 1979 and aimed to carry out urbanization in several favelas in the city.
[20] As we will see in detail in Chapter 7.

displacement because of the risk of landslides (Brum, 2005). However, the dwellers knew that the city's mayor, Marcos Tamoio, wanted to make way for more oceanfront apartment towers on Vidigal's hill and was pushing for speedy removal of the favela to facilitate a lucrative real-estate deal. Residents of Vidigal mobilized other local residents with the support of activists of Pastoral de Favelas to resist the attempt (McCann, 2014). The resistance movement in Vidigal is considered the point of departure for Pastoral de Favelas, an office of the Archdiocese of Rio de Janeiro. As we will see in detail in Chapter 7, Pastoral de Favelas plays an important role for the community movement in the favelas of Rio.

Simultaneously, the favela residents' associations began to regain their political dynamism especially when a dissident movement supported by the Pastoral de Favelas and leftist movements emerged within the Federation of the Residents' Associations of the State of Rio [Federação de Favelas do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (FAFERJ)], in 1979, to oppose the Federation's right-wing direction during the central years of the military regime.

However, the most marked paradigm shift in the governmental approach to Rio's favelas took place when the Socialist candidate Leonel Brizola won the election in the state of Rio, in 1982, based largely on his cultivation of favelado support. Brizola brought favela leaders into leadership positions in his party, Partido Democrático Trabalhista (PDT, Democratic Labour Party), and into state administration, overturning decades of practice that had consigned favelados to the role of humble supplicants before political power. Favelados were first called into political power through local assemblies and elected leaders, enabling local influence over public rights and services such as free education, community policing, and participation in urbanization initiatives (McCann, 2013).

The favelas' political influence grew considerably throughout the 1980s and 1990s, with favela leaders fighting for territorial improvement through urbanization and land regularization (Brum, 2013). This process was also reinforced with the Federal Constitution of 1988 and the Statute of Cities, established in 2001, which sets out, as basic principles for urban policy: i) participatory planning, ii) the social role

of property and the principle of non-removal.[21] The building of the City Master Plan of Rio de Janeiro in 1992, a requirement of the 1988 Constitution, consolidated the urbanization of favelas as a function of its urban policy. One important example is the Favela-Bairro program that sought to transform favelas into officially recognized *bairros* (neighbourhoods) through physical upgrading, followed by the Morar Carioca launched in 2012, seen as a sort of policy upgrade of Favela-Bairro (Landesman, 2016). While Favela-Bairro was mainly interested in 'upgrading' the favelas until they resembled or met some criteria to qualify as a 'real' neighbourhood of the *asfalto* (formal city), the Morar Carioca innovated by recognizing the long existence of favelas as neighbourhoods and legitimate urban space.

However, as sharply highlighted by Ananya Roy (2005, p.150) "the provision of services and upgrading, while perhaps well-meaning, is a bit like rearranging the chairs on the deck of the Titanic", as favelas remain a place laden with stigmas. This suggests that the limitations of urban upgrading and, more recently, urban integration, are the limitations of spatial ideology (ibid, 2005), in which space is seen as an objective entity, stripped of its social content. What is improved in such policy approaches is the space, its materiality, the physical environment rather than favelados' representations and livelihoods. This "aestheticization of poverty" (Roy, 2004) promoted by programs like Favela-Bairro and Morar Carioca, associates upgrading and integration with aesthetic, infrastructural and material upgrading rather than the upgrading of recognition, livelihoods, and political capacities. In this way, "favela integration fits into pre-existing and historic hegemony that for decades delegitimized favela neighbourhoods as malevolent urban blight as well as exposing residual revanchist politics embedded in state interventions" (Landesman, 2016, p.68). Again, the chairs on the deck of the Titanic were rearranged without changing the course of history.

The "apparent victory" of the favelas (Machado, 2002) therefore did not eliminate the fact that favelados are bearers of a racialized, restricted, hierarchical, and fragmented citizenship, a consequence of a long process of state-led precarity fuelled by norms of exclusion at the heart of

[21] These principles will be discussed in the next section.

favelas' recognizability. This 'apparent victory' of the favela occurred at the expense of the constitution of a subaltern social category, whose intervention in the public scene did not affect their urban sociability pattern, or even their relative position in the social stratification and their role as a social force (ibid, 2002). On the contrary, a legal-institutional order has historically played a crucial role in the expansion, consolidation, and subsequent removal of favelas, which hinders their recognizability as an integral part of the city, thereby perpetually re-establishing the logic of their displacement.

2.4.1 Normalising the exception: the erosion of the principle of non-removal

To understand how all the legal-institutional framework established in the post-military regime was not sufficient to guarantee the permanence of favelas in the urban landscape, I present here the series of 'exceptions' and 'de-exceptions' undertaken, with environmental risk, as a central element in the discourses and practices favourable to the resumption of the removal policy. For that reason, this subsection does not follow the chronologically linear approach of the previous ones. As we saw previously, the 1988 Brazilian Federal Constitution marked a radical change in the Brazilian legal landscape regulating property and housing. In this period, an urban policy aimed to "order the full development of the social functions of the city and ensure the well-being of its inhabitants" (Article 183, Federal Constitution). The Constitution then established some instruments of urban policy that, according to Gonçalves (2006), were novel because they removed all generalized allusion about the illegality of favelas and prohibited any policy of displacements. For example, Article 234 of the State Constitution of Rio de Janeiro establishes that:

> In the establishment of guidelines and norms related to urban development, the State and Municipalities shall ensure: I - urbanization, land regularization and titling of the favela and low-income areas, without removal of residents, except when the physical conditions of the area impose a risk to the lives of their inhabitants.

With this mechanism, the removal of favelas began to appear as an exceptional measure allowed only in case of risk, being established as a rule for public policy. Urbanization, land regularization and titling became an inseparable triad in the implementation of any public policy for favelas (Magalhães, 2016). In the wake of the State Constitution, the Municipal Organic Law (Lei Orgânica) reproduces the same requirements from the Federal Constitution of 1988, making favela removals an exception only permitted in the face of environmental risk. In Article 429, on procedures to be observed in case of the removal, it is established that

> the municipality must a) present a technical report of the responsible body; b) to ensure the participation of the community of interest and representative entities in the analysis and definition of solutions, and c) guarantee settlement in localities near the places of housing or work if removal is necessary.

It can be inferred from this legislation that removal, beyond an exceptional measure, can only be admitted if technically defensible, and shall comply with principles such as the proximity of the residents to be relocated. Also, it is up to those who carry out the removals to obtain the resources for their execution, as well as to ensure the participatory and transparent process of negotiation with those affected by the exceptional measure (Magalhães, 2016).

The Decennial Master Plan of the City of Rio de Janeiro, launched in 1992, not only ratified the principle of non-removal but also added the principle of "insertion of irregular favelas and squatters in the planning of the city with a view to their transformation into neighbourhoods or integration with the neighbourhoods in which they are located" (Article 44, IV). The Plan elected for integration as a policy guideline for the favelas. These principles and guidelines were reinforced by the launching of the City Statute in 2001 by the Ministry of Cities of the Federal Government. The statute has contributed to defining policies for favelas whose purpose is to achieve their consolidation, improvement, and deployment of infrastructure, as well as the establishment of proper regulation in the function of those interventions.

However, as well noted by Magalhães (2016), hidden within its apparent pursuit of integration, the Master Plan also expanded the reach of some of the devices for the normalization of the exception (favela removal). In Article 44 of the Master Plan, the expansion of conditions for favela displacement includes, besides the presence of risk areas, marginal areas of surface water protection, areas for the protection of mains and high voltage electrical networks, areas near roads, areas of environmental interest or environmental conservation units, along with areas that cannot be equipped with minimum conditions of urbanization and basic sanitation.

In addition to expanding the conditions that could lead to removals, the Master Plan also extends the Organic Law provisions concerning resettlements in areas close to a favela's original location. According to the Master Plan the people removed may be resettled in areas with sanitary and mobility infrastructure as well as in housing programs. According to Magalhães, despite the tentative nature of the Master Plan to complement, improve or even systematize the devices present in the Organic Law, it can be seen as attempting to undermine the principle of non-removal by converting it into a dead letter.

Another factor that makes the principle of non-removal precarious are the powers contained within the 1965 Forest Code regarding permanent preservation areas, which can be used to justify the clearance of dwellings. Permanent Preservation Areas (Áreas de Proteção Permanente – APPs) are those protected areas under the terms of Articles 2 and 3 of the Forest Code with the environmental function of preserving water resources, landscape, geological stability, biodiversity, gene flow of fauna and flora, protecting the soil and ensuring the well-being of human populations (Ministério do Meio Ambiente, MMA, 2011).

Taking into account the geographical characteristics of Rio de Janeiro (relief, climate, vegetation and hydrogeology) and, as we have seen in the previous sections, the historical pattern of occupation of vulnerable areas by favelas, these powers, if carried out, can render the principle of non-removal ineffective for a considerable number of favelas and any kind of settlements that are on slopes or the

banks of rivers, canals, streams and lagoons. Therefore, the principle of non-removal was born with the marks of 'redundancy', inconsistency, and obsolescence; a law made to be broken.

The conflict between environmental and housing norms can be illustrated by Article 462 of the Organic Law, which permits the creation of environmental conservation units and the disposal of property through employing a simple discretionary act of the municipal executive based exclusively on the supposed technical and scientific criteria, without any discussion with the legislature or representatives of civil society.[22] This discretion makes it clear that the environmental bureaucracy takes upon itself the power to regulate land use in these areas –some of it occupied by favelas – arbitrarily determining the fate of their residents. Beneath the conflict between housing rights and environmental concerns, there is a more fundamental problem: the (re) actualization of favelas as anti-nature, anti-ecological (Moraes, 2013) at-risk areas, as we will see in Chapter 5. In an era of environmental appeal, this discourse of preserving lives against the disastrous consequences of climate change seems the perfect alibi for the resumption of the removals policy.

One of the most significant examples of this refers to a series of bills proposed by the municipal government to make the city's slopes suitable for the construction of residential condominiums for the middle and upper classes. The argument used by City Hall to change the city's zoning was to better preserve the environment and combat the favelisation of the city since the implementation of condominiums would be based on urban parameters that would guarantee low density, soil permeability and maintenance of green areas, theoretically, the opposite of favelas considered as anti-ecological (Moraes, 2013) and anti-aesthetical.

In an interview with the newspaper *O Globo* on June 19, 1998, Mayor Luís Paulo Conde declares that "the bill is a way to combat the slopes' favelisation [...] I prefer Joatinga to a favela" (*O Globo*, 19/06/1998). Joatinga is a small beach located in one of the most luxurious neighbourhoods of Rio de

[22] According to Compans (2007), the Municipal Secretariat of Environment [Secretaria Municipal de Meio Ambiente(SMAC)], established in 1994, instituted thirty-one protected areas, of which twenty-four were created by decree.

Janeiro's West Zone, with the highest per capita income in the city and the most expensive land value per square metre among the neighbourhoods of the West Zone. The mayor left no doubt about what was at stake at that moment: the principle of non-removal. The city's hillside areas, once despised by the state and the real estate market, began to look appealing.

The undermining of the principle of non-removal by political, environmental and economic forces exposed the precariousness of the social pact established in the post-88 period, in which the recognition of favelas as territories of permanent transition, conferred on them fragile land rights, but also played a decisive role in the (re) production of a racially segregated city, despite the increasing recognition of these rights. This made it more viable for the removalist project that would be underway from 2009/2010, as will be analysed in detail in Chapter 5.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has addressed the genealogy of favelas with a specific focus on the modes of state-led precarisation and the consequences for the normalization of favela displacement. Attention has been given to the inauguration of favelas as a governmental object and how particular ways of tackling the 'favela problem' were based on racialized and exclusionary representations of those territories which somehow regulate what and who will be recognised and what and who will not be integrated into the city. I have traced the history of favelas at the turn of the twentieth century, from cortiços and hygienic removals to the current period in which the formation of a precarious social contract concerning favelas, even after so many advances with the return to democracy, left a loophole for the resumption of their removal.

This historical analysis evidences that the depiction of favelas through hygienism, proletarianism, urban developmentalism and, recently, environmentalism, have been built on the racialized idea of favelas as the 'Other to the city'. Exclusionary norms that constitute scenes of recognition (Willig, 2012) are implicitly invoked whenever there is an interest at stake. As we have seen, these have

historically been forged from the idea of a favela as a 'liminal space', marked to be eradicated when there is no longer public interest in its permanence. This condition of permanent transience (Rolnik, 2015) gives favelas fewer rights than to the asfalto, making them even more vulnerable to all kinds of risks, including the removals themselves.

Without an explicit understanding of how favelas' precarity has been built, and without acknowledging its racialized nature, we cannot fully understand the cyclical resumption of favela displacement, especially in post-authoritarian Brazil. For that reason, while maybe appearing only contextual, the chapter has made an important contribution to the main purpose of this thesis by unravelling the "sedimented crystallisation of earlier patterns of social interaction" (Brenner, 2004, p.75) that shaped the potentials and constraints of favela precarity and their influence in the recent removal policies on which the rest of the thesis focuses. Despite focusing on resistance in Chapters 7 and 8, this chapter also showed that despite state-led precarity having a history, so does resistance.

The next chapter introduces concepts and debates required to address my research questions concerning the precarisation of favela territories and risk-induced displacement. I also develop a conceptual framework focused on urban biopolitics and precariousness to examine the resumption of the displacement of favelas.

Chapter 3 – Concepts and Theoretical Framework

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I outline the key conceptual frameworks employed throughout the thesis and how they interconnect to underpin my analysis of how environmental risk has been mobilised to justify their clearance; and how favela dwellers have responded to forms of life made even more precarious by displacements enabled by the risk technologies for DRRM.

Drawing on interdisciplinary literature on biopolitics, vulnerability and precarity, I propose a framework to examine how urban environmental risks (landslides and floods) have been mobilized to justify the clearance of favelas; and how favela dwellers have responded to the precarizing forms of life that have been made possible by this type of emergency policy. Moreover, given that the crux of the study's argument is that the vulnerability of favelas is a bio-politically regulated condition that is actively produced and reiterated by the state at all levels to subjugate those territories and bodies, the articulation of urban biopolitics, vulnerability and precarity open up a promising space to expand approaches to urban vulnerability and resilience in the light of contemporary debates.[23]

There is a multiplicity of theoretical approaches that emphasise how power relations and subject production arising from risk/resilience discourses and practices are shaping urban governance, including those from environmental justice and political ecology (Ajibade & McBean, 2014; Bahadur & Tanner, 2014; Coates & Garmany, 2017; T. Collins, 2008; Heck, 2016; Maantay & Maroko, 2009; Ranganathan & Bratman, 2019; Walker, Whittle, Medd, & Watson, 2010), Science and Technology Studies (STS) (Fraser, 2014; Heck 2016) and governmentality (Boyd, Ensor, Broto, & Juhola, 2014; Fraser, 2017; Heck, 2016; Zeiderman, 2012).

[23] For details on vulnerability approaches, see Fraser (2014).

Despite the relevance of such studies in showing how risk discourses and practices embody the underlying nature of social relations and disputes over the established social order (Bankoff and Hilhorst, 2009), there is still a need, as suggested by Cutter (2006), to investigate how vulnerability, particularly within marginalized groups, is socially (and politically) induced; as well as how vulnerable groups respond to such forms of state-led precarization. Given this particular interest, I have chosen the Butlerian concept of precarity to inform my analysis. Precarity is understood as the social and political organisation of people's precariousness in particular concrete and historically delimited ways.

Moreover, to examine how biopolitical strivings to reduce the vulnerability of an existential precariousness by way of specific techniques of risk governmentality have been producing other forms of vulnerability in favelas, I opted for the concept of 'administrative violence', which will be fully presented in Chapter 6. The pairing of the literature on urban biopolitics and forms of violence administered by the state brings the 'dark side' of biopolitical management of risk in favelas to the foreground.

The concepts of biopolitics and precarity are therefore central here because, first, they articulate the issue of the conditions for recognition (or recognizability – as posed by Butler) with the issue of favela's displacement, as discussed in Chapter 2, laying down the grounds on which this study develops. Second, they enable us to situate risk and vulnerability within the larger historical shifts and power structures; and third, they make noticeable the forms of agency and resistance entailed by historically instantiated modes of vulnerability, particularly related to precarity.

This chapter is structured in four sections. Section 3.2 situates the condition of induced precarity experienced by favelas within the biopolitics of displacement, showing how risk can be taken by city authorities as a framework that enables the resumption and normalization of what used to be considered an exception, that is displacement. Section 3.3 reviews the concept of precarity within the field of feminist and postcolonial studies, drawing from Butler (2009), Butler and Spivak (2010) and Lorey (2015) and proposes that Lorey's concept of governmental precarization, with some

adjustments from urban geography, further explicates the effects of precarity induced by the state action on favela territories. Section 3.4 is separated from Section 3.3 for conceptual clarity but should be read together as building a theoretical framework to understand favela precarity and the potential for resistance against disaster risk displacements. I return to the debate on precarity to delve more deeply into one of its main aspects: vulnerability. I examine how it is produced, materially and discursively, and how the mainstream understanding of it is contested by feminist scholars. Finally, in Section 3.5 I review how rethinking favelas through the lens of state-led precarity and its frame of risk leads to a productive conceptualisation of displacements as biopolitical management of territories assigned as the Other of the city.

3.2 Displacing to make live or to let die? Biopolitical displacements and technologies of risk management

> "Biopolitically, that which is not meet, becomes meat" (Dillon & Neal, 2008, p.167).

In this section, having the work of Foucault as a starting point, I engage with the literature on urban biopolitics and risk governmentality to examine how 'high-risk areas' have become a governmental category legitimizing displacement, and a biopolitical technology to manage Rio's favelas. I am also interested in the forms of precarity and vulnerability that "biopolitical removals" (Naback, 2015) engender or foreclose, I further my theoretical toolbox to include the discussion on "the dark side of biopolitics" (Foucault, 1979), and how the frames of risk mobilized to categorise favelas as 'high-risk areas' are racialized. However, first, it is necessary to briefly describe how concepts of biopolitics and governmentality are interrelated, and then explain how I am using them in relation to the analysis in the urban context of risk-induced displacements.

Michel Foucault (2007) identified the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as times of rapid growth for towns, as well as poverty, unemployment, crime, and epidemics. In one of his first lectures on

biopolitics, which took place in Rio de Janeiro, he used the genealogical method to analyse how medicinal biopower arose as a form of state knowledge to improve public health in Paris, France.

In a period of intense urbanization, poverty became an object of biopower. Slums were claimed as a source of new urban health problems and epidemics in Paris; a centralized system of administration and production of knowledge for the new urban form was created, inspired by disciplinary power, but now oriented to the power over life, which sought to control the putative causes of medical problems in France.

The grammar of urban medicine during this period was led by the notion of "salubrity, [the]material and social basis capable of ensuring the best possible health for individuals" (Foucault, 2001, p.150). Along with the concept of public health [*hygiène publique*], salubrity became "a technique for controlling and modifying those elements of the environment which might promote that health or, on the contrary, harm it" (ibid.).

Authorized by the specialized knowledge of urban planners, the slums of Paris were demolished by municipal officials, with the aim of opening avenues and improving health through the melioration of the circulation of air in the city. Those interventions would not have been possible without fields of expertise accompanied by their techniques such as urban planning, public health, and political economy. Together, these expert forms of knowledge and population management – named by Foucault as "security apparatuses" – engaged people as a biological population and configured the role of government as the fostering of human populations as living organisms (Souza & Gloeckner, 2016). Security apparatuses appear when the centralized state falls into crisis, and state governmentalization takes place, heading towards a system of population control focused on notions of risk and danger that will direct mechanisms of security. Unlike disciplinary power that acts through a prescriptive normalization strategy, the security strategy operates through a 'norm' that reflects an account of what is 'normal' and 'abnormal' in the population (Spivakovsky, 2016).

The security strategy of normalization takes form by particular tactics of plotting population distribution; identifying natural differences in normality; and creating a 'realistic' model, opposed to an optimal model. As well observed by Spivakovsky (2009, p. 49) “this suggests that the positions of racialized people in society – as marginalized, over-represented, disempowered and so on – are related to the tactics and strategies of power” which are a product of governmentality.

Governmentality refers to a “set consisting of institutions, procedures, analysis and reflections, calculations and the tactics that make it possible to exercise this very specific, though complex, form of power that has the population as its main target” (Foucault 2008b, p. 143). Governmentality reproduces, at the state level, the ‘arts of government’, whose end is the conquest and power over the territory and population. Governmentality does not refer to the replacement of the forms of control developed until then, such as disciplinary power, or even the denial of the power of sovereignty that materializes in legal regimes. In governmentality, “we have a triangle of sovereignty, discipline, and governmental management, which has a population as its main target and the apparatuses of security as its essential mechanism” (Foucault, 2009, p.143). According to Miller and Rose (2009 cited by Spivakovsky, 2016, p. 49-50), these diffuse forms of intervention can be derived from the political logic of how to rule a population — including who should be governed, in what ways and by whom — and from the governmental technologies that give rise to government aspirations.

As we saw in Chapter 2, governmental technologies based on public health were also implemented in Latin American cities like Rio de Janeiro from the second half of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century (Brum, 2011; Soares Gonçalves, 2006; Souza & Gloeckner, 2016; Valladares, 2000; Zaluar & Alvito, 2006). The biopolitical interventions of the early 1900s in Rio were aimed at preventing diseases like yellow fever, tuberculosis, and smallpox. The cortiços, similar to the slums of Paris, became an urban blight to be eliminated by the performance of medical health officers in Rio invested in the ‘mission’ to remedy the city of their ills, which in practice meant the black, poor and migrant bodies and their forms of dwelling (Rolnik, 1989).

Looking at the recent events in Rio de Janeiro, it can be said that in the face of the contemporary milieu of climate change and its related disruption, favelas, once classified as an urban biopolitical public health problem are now also seen as an environmental risk, while still remaining the 'Other of the city' and the object of biopower. Risk, in Rio's context, is projected in the biopolitical control of the favela population if we consider its overall effects: the displacement of favelados.

With environment and risk issues as a contemporary problem of biopower, knowledge and practices from the field of private insurance have been imported, and DRRM and resilience have brought risk into the public administration. As we will see in Chapter 5, this will have practical effects on the production of urban space, with the proliferation of security apparatuses in the management of urban risks and crises through a broad range of techniques: probability calculations, methods of observation, geographical information systems (GIS), statistics, risk maps, governmental agencies, etc. (Marchezini, 2015). However, given the fundamentally mutable and uncertain object of these techniques of risks, we must, as Zeiderman (2012) asserts, reconsider how risk is understood. To this purpose, we need to analyse not only "the emergence of risk as a technique of urban planning and governance" (ibid p.1585) but also of the continuous efforts made by governments to render the uncertain future a continuous object of interventions.

Saying this, what kind of future can be portrayed by such politics of removals given that removals have historically been constituted as a way of biopolitically control black, poor, and migrant populations as we saw in Chapter 2? Considering that removals rely on fundamentally racialized definitions of risk, therefore, we must attend to how racialized urban space is (re-)produced through biopolitical practices. This will be discussed further in Chapters 5 and 6.

3.2.1 The "dark side of biopolitics": race and forms of killing in the legal grey zone

When investigating risk as a technique of urban planning and governance, we must not lose sight of the fact that instruments of biopolitical governance aimed to foster the well-being of a population can

be transformed into a "potential source of vulnerability" (Collier & Lakoff 2015, p.03). This is the fundamental paradox of biopower that I am interested in here.

As documented in Chapter 2, the promised biopolitical logic of just 'making life live' cannot be fulfilled because of the simultaneous production of certain "killable" forms of life, those that are considered abnormal, dangerous, degenerate, risky. In the name of population safety, new technologies for maintaining health and expulsion of "biologically inferior life" (Foucault, 2010, p.216) are created, and racism becomes the metric that separates the lives to be neglected from the lives to be protected.

Nevertheless, unlike the visible racial difference of the taxonomic and eugenic science and the scientific racism which was predominant between the eighteenth and early twentieth centuries (Sheehi, 2020), the racial difference practised by contemporary biopolitics can be situated in what Foucault (2005, p.215) calls "biological caesura". This cut of racism is not made only through disciplinary categories of race but, more perniciously, through political rationalities and governing technologies, which "are nothing but a vast ensemble of life-sorting and life-adjudicating devices"(Dillon & Neal, 2008, p. 07). For instance, the technologies of risk that assign certain populations in Rio as 'at-risk', can be seen as sorting mechanisms based on race. This reconceptualization of race is central to the continued functioning of biopolitics in contemporary politics and provides a measure for evaluating social norms, through which 'deviant' and 'abnormal' individuals may be targeted and eliminated.

As Foucault (2005) theorised in his Collège de France seminar, *"Society Must Be Defended"*, racism serves an important function in the routine exercise of biopower, determining "the break between what must live and what must die" (ibid, p. 254). The state no longer kills to punish; in the era of biopower, it does so to make life for everyone else better. This "biological caesura" enables the biopower, then, to determine who needs to be protected and who must be left to die. The act of 'letting die' – as distinct from the act of the sovereignty's power to 'make die' (or, a direct form of

killing) – constitutes passive forms of letting bodies deteriorate and die through neglect, abandonment, or insufficient care. In Foucault's words,

> When I say 'killing,' I obviously do not mean simply murder as such, but also every form of indirect murder: the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection, and so on. (2005, p.256)

According to Lemke (2011), racism not only allows for a hierarchization of those who are worthy of living but also situates the life of one person in a direct relationship with the disappearance of another. In his words, "it furnishes the ideological foundation for identifying, excluding, combating, and even murdering others, all in the name of improving life" (ibid, p. 42).

Mbembe (2003), who is particularly concerned with the issue of race in the contemporary forms of subjugation of life to the power of death (Gressgård, 2019, p.11), introduces the concept of 'necropolitics'. Mbembe's conceptualization of necropolitics expands Foucault's notion of biopower, asserting that there are forces of killing that exceed the governmental task of fostering life. For Mbembe, race, a central category of colonialism, is where the power of death – the sovereign right to kill – becomes vital to the power of life. As Davies, Isakjee, and Dhesi (2017, p. 1268) highlight, "despite the prefix 'necro', necropolitics can apply outside of outright death, as well as beyond historic spaces of the colony".

Expanding Foucault's accounts on race and the forms of killing it enables, Mbembe argues that, based on Agamben's theory of the state of exception, the colonies are the location *par excellence* where the violence of the state of exception is deemed to operate in the service of 'civilization' (Mbembe, 2003, p. 23). However, as well observed by Gressgård (2019, p.16), "not all colonial death-politics involves violence of an extra-legal nature". Mbembe's allusion to sovereignty's exceptionality does not consider forms of "death-worlds" (Davies, 2019) production that "might entail playing with the law, thereby making room for exceptional death-politics within the purview of legal norms" (ibid, p.15).

Gressgård brings the example of Israeli development of subtle forms of killing by restricting the flow of life-sustaining infrastructure in Palestine. As he highlights, “working on the margins of the law is one way to expand them; violence might have the power to legislate when it is applied in the indeterminate zone between the obvious violation and possible legality” (ibid, p. 15). Through this example of mundane production of death-worlds, the author highlights that this “peculiar form of killing or ‘letting die’ that operates in a legal grey zone” (ibid), takes place because of “the capacity of law to insufficiently prevent such sovereign decisions and their consequent actions’ (Dean, 2007, p. 184 cited by Gressgård, 2019).

Still referring to Dean’s critique of Mbembe, Gressgård asserts that ‘exception’ denotes more than a state of emergency in which law is suspended and emergency powers are enforced: “the term exception can cover not only declared or undeclared emergencies but also the entire mass of exceptions to what is construed as the normal forms of life in contemporary liberal democracy” (Dean, 2007, pp. 188–189 cited by Gressgård, 2019). This proves particularly insightful to understand how the ‘de-exceptionalization of the removals as an exception’ has enabled the municipality to use the grey zone between an explicit violation of the favelados’ legal right to housing, established by the Federal, State and Municipal Constitutions (as discussed in Chapter 2), and legality posed by the duty to safeguard citizens’ life, to expand the room to resume displacements as lawful action, as will be discussed in Chapter 5 and 6. This “inclusive exclusion” (Agamben, 1998), p.23), or abandonment illustrates the condition of many favelados’ lives.

Considering the Foucauldian account of the racist essence of biopolitical power, we can argue that race is intimately tied up with the biopolitical logic of letting die, subsumed in the politics of risk induced displacements. As shown in Chapter 2, socio-spatial relations in Rio de Janeiro, historically characterized by geographies of stigmatization and inequalities in which “the darker the skin colour, the higher the likelihood of occupying places of urban precarity” (Alves, 2018), make black and poor

bodies disposable and disproportionately exposed to direct and indirect forms of violence and premature death.

Taking Ruth Wilson Gilmore's definition of racism as "state-sanctioned and/or extra-legal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerabilities to premature death" (Gilmore, 2007, p. 28), we can understand the importance of the discussion of race and "legal grey zones" (Gressgård, 2019) to understand the designation of favelas, exclusively favelas as we will see Chapter 5, as risky areas, once the forms of management and control of favela territory (as well documented in Chapter 2), are intimately related to production and management of these zones of indeterminacy.

Bringing Stuart Hall (1975, p. 340) observation on race and class to the context of favelas, I would provocatively argue that the structures through which black landscapes are reproduced are not simply 'coloured' by race; they work through race. In other words, at each level of their (re) production, race – although not explicitly – enters to shape the territories of favelas.

As I will argue in Chapter 6, racialized frames of risk have contributed to forms of invisible disaster that drag on for years after the enactment of the first favela displacements post 2010. The social devaluations were not produced by the disaster itself; they were enacted by a collection of postcolonial/racialized biopolitical state institutions (ibid, 2015) which has created disaster after disaster (Schuller, 2008) in the name of making life live.

This standpoint allows us to argue that in contemporary Rio, the politics of displacement that helps to perpetuate the protracted logic of induced precarity have been mediated by racialized frames of risk. As Colette (2016) argues, the way risk is framed shapes our understanding of the event and the attribution of cause and responsibility. Risk, then, is understood here as racialized and updated biopolitical discourse which recalls a long history of housing dispossession and removal policies in Rio's favelas (Marchezini, 2015). This racialized frame of risk will be presented in the next section.

3.2.2 Risk and uncertainty as a racialized technology of government

The discussion so far helps not only to sow the seeds that allow me to frame risk as a technology of urban biopolitical management (Zeiderman, 2012) but also to understand the implications of racialized frames of risk for how favelas have been governed. As suggested by Zeiderman, the point is not to evaluate whether the risk-based procedures are accurate or fair, but rather to analyse the specific characteristics of this way of governing uncertain future events. As Smith and Vasudevan (2017, p.211) assert, to analyse the impact of governing uncertain futures, racialized future imaginaries are central to presenting biopolitical operations through risk.

Risk as a biopolitical mode of governing introduces calculations, assessments and maps for the management and regulation of populations and, as some commentators pose, their territories.[24] Zeiderman's ethnographic analysis of how climate- and earthquake-induced landslide risk has become a government tool for reconfiguring and resettling urban slums in Bogotá will serve as inspiration here for undertaking my analysis of favela removal in Rio.

Through the investigation of the urban risk governance as a Foucauldian technique of power, Zeiderman illustrates how the making of disaster risk 'zones' in informal urban areas, in order to contain a future threat, was made possible through probabilistic calculations and mappings. This encompasses, he argues, a new form of urban 'biopolitical' rule. Through the analysis of the historical emergence of risk as a government concern, Zeiderman could understand how risk, its particular forms of expertise and system of risk governance, comes to embody particular frames and discursive constructions (Zeiderman 2012; Fraser, 2014).

The particular engagement with Foucauldian thought in Zeiderman's analysis allows us to understand "forms of reasoning and practices with which experts bring threats into frameworks of technical

[24] As discussed by Braun (2000), the problem of population and its improvement also brought the state directly into contact with its territory – and more precisely, with the qualities of this territory. The territory also enters into this kind of political rationality preconized by governmentality and biopolitics.

intervention" (ibid, 2012, p.1575), and, critically, what these practices entail. For that reason, his dynamic and relational interpretation of the process by which "risk-making" (Fraser, 2014) shapes 'favelas-making` is quite relevant for my research purpose.

Additionally, I rely on Heck's (2016) drawing on Zeiderman's study to analyse the role of risk mapping to the practice of urban risk governance, and the relations between power, knowledge, and visual representations of the favela territory favela of Santa Marta. Rooting his analysis in the articulation of conservation areas with risk area management in, Rio de Janeiro, he analyses the emergence of risk mapping as the central technology of risk management in Rio, which I will also scrutinize in Chapter 5.

Despite displacement being nothing new in the history of favelas, the shift towards displacement as risk management in the late 2000s reflects a change in favelas' ruling, when urban resilience and DRRM began to gain traction. At that time the discourse, technologies, frameworks of knowledge and language of DRRM were being developed that could legitimize the Rio's claims of categorical and predictable characteristics of environmental risk, on the one hand, and adequate responses to and validation of risk's (unpredictable) nature on the other, justifying displacements as preventive measures for disaster risk.

The entry of environmental risk as a government technology has two important implications for biopolitical management of favela territories. The first concerns how government practices that arise from and constitute the discursive field of geotechnical risk assessment come to be linked to already existent forms of intelligibility on favelas as risky territories, in a process of "reactivation and transformation" (Zeiderman, 2012, p. 1574). The emergence of the technologies of risk management will add another layer – an authoritative one – to representations of favelas as dangerous and risky.

The second refers to the context in which knowledge is construed. According to Fraser (2014, p. 65) knowledge constructions must be seen as partly re-shaped contextually, not simply as given 'instruments' of power. This implies that risk not only enables but mobilises new ways of governing

territories. Then, by understanding how risk comes into being that it is possible to make sense of the contradictory effects in risk management: to make life, risk management ends up disallowing it.

A thoughtful and critical path for understanding risk as racialized technology of government is given by Legg's (2007) study of Delhi's colonial urban governmentalities. Legg considers 'othering' features, such as race, as one of several artefacts of governance, and used this to identify hierarchical ordering and discursive knowledge formations which were part of New Delhi's control apparatus, primarily in the way it was related to residential segregation. Legg's analysis of colonial governmentalities in Delhi offers an interesting path to investigate the specific manifestations of governmentality being helpful in creating a path for examination of risk management in Rio. Legg aims to "provide not only a 'thick description' of government but also a critical analysis, revealing disjuncture between governmentalities and practices within a complex topography of rule" (Legg, 2007, p. 19), which encompasses the "continued presence of non-liberal power relations of sovereignty, discipline and biopolitics" (ibid, p. 19).

One of my claims in this thesis is that risk and its discursive formations of knowledge work as a new facet of masqueraded racism documented through the longstanding politics of favela displacement. For that reason, looking at ideas and practices of sameness and difference in the colonial past of Rio de Janeiro, as presented in Chapter 2, can help us to comprehend the episteme informing the regime of the production of favelas as landscapes of risk in contemporary Rio.

3.3. Induced precarity as a way of governing

Despite the great prominence of the concept of precarity to describe the precariat "class-in-the-making" (Banki, 2013), beyond the description of it as an unstable and insecure work condition, the term comprises "a more general existential state, understood at once as a source of political subjection, of economic exploitation and of opportunities to be grasped" (Neilson & Rossiter, 2008, p.52). Issues of housing and homelessness (Banki, 2013b; Lancione, 2019b), welfare provision (Lorey,

2015), climate change adaptation (Natarajan, Brickell, & Parsons, 2019), and migration (Paret & Gleeson, 2016), have been discussed through the lens of precarity (Banki, 2013a; Cole, 2016; Hinkson, 2017; Joronen, 2017; Joronen & Griffiths, 2019a, 2019b; Lancione, 2019a, 2019b; Natarajan et al., 2019; Nowicki, 2017; Paret & Gleeson, 2016; Philo, Parr, & Söderström, 2019; Richardson, 2018) .

Given the broad range in the understandings of precarity, what is the value of this concept for urban analysis, especially for the study of the risk of displacement for favelas? What does it provide that similar terms such as dispossession and vulnerability do not? I argue that the central significance of the concept of precarity lies in the way in which it connects the micro and the macro, situating experiences of unpredictability, uncertainty, and vulnerability within historically and geographically specific contexts. The concept of precarity allows us to be simultaneously attentive to factors that contribute to understanding not only protracted forms of favela precarization but also the immediate politics of its unfolding, through the analysis of risk displacements; and on the possibility of forms of resistance attempting to envision a radical urban future: the permanence of favelas in the urban landscape (whose aspect is discussed in Section 3.4).

For these purposes, I follow feminists and postcolonial geographies of precarity built on Butler's definition (Butler, 2009a; Butler & Athanasiou, 2013; Butler & Spivak, 2007), to incorporate its elements to the analysis of the risk-induced displacement of favelas. Thus, precarity is defined as a biopolitically regulated condition actively produced and reiterated by the state, often by governments, although not exclusively (Butler & Spivak, 2007; LLoyd, 2015). However, precisely because of this reiterative unfolding of precarity, possibilities of contestation emerge.

Precarity is construed in terms of historically instantiated modes of vulnerability by the state which would produce certain populations as exposed; whose bodies – an assemblage of the precarious – would be bio-politically constituted as (at) risk, becoming, then, "a fundamental governmental instrument of governing through 'an ordering category of othering'" (Lorey, 2015, p.41).

Lorey (2015) argues this liberal mode of governing, produces precarity through systematic categorizations and hierarchizations. This governmental dynamic involves attempts to control the precariousness shared among all by striating and positioning dangerous 'others' as the precarious ones at the 'margins'. This issue of systematic categorizations and hierarchization can be translated into what Lloyd (2015) refers to as the recognition/ recognizability nexus present in Butler's discussion on precarity. Simply put, while recognition is understood as an act undertaken by at least two subjects that "constitutes a reciprocal action", recognisability refers to "those general conditions on the basis of which recognition can and does take place" (Butler, 2009a, p. 06). Hence, "norms of recognizability prepare the way for recognition" (ibid, p. 07). This nexus recognition/recognizability is closely related to precarity, that is, the allocation of differential precarity is directly related to the distribution of norms of recognition (Butler in Butler & Athanasiou, 2013, p. 89).

These theoretical debates are especially insightful when we look at the ways that favelados have been historically recognized – usually as a source of pathologies, political insurgence, violence, and environmental threat, which have defined specific modes of governmental intervention that generally involve removals. For instance, the 1937 Code of Works normalized favelas as a space marked to live imposing a precarious status on them (see Chapter 2).

This ordering category (or norm of recognizability) of favelas as a temporary solution to the housing issue in the city was normalized at a structural level and has thus become a fundamental governmental instrument of governing that predominates until the current day. These norms of favela recognition, explained in Chapter 2, are fundamental to understanding how the condition of precariousness shared by the favelado, the historical 'Other of the city', is appropriated by the political authorities and unevenly distributed through discourse, norms and practices of governmental precarization to normalize favela displacement. It is imperative to differentiate between precariousness and precarity, two concepts that although related are not synonymous. Regarding this, Butler is clear:

> Precariousness and precarity are intersecting concepts. Lives are by definition precarious: they can be expunged at will or by accident; their persistence is in no sense guaranteed. In some sense, this is a feature of all life, and there is no thinking of life that is not precarious—except, of course, in fantasy, and in military fantasies in particular. Political orders, including economic and social institutions, are designed to address those very needs without which the risk of mortality is heightened. Precarity designates that politically induced condition in which certain populations suffer from failing social and economic networks of support and become differentially exposed to injury, violence, and death. (ibid, 2009a, p.25)

On this distinction between precarity and precariousness, Butler builds a political analysis in which she argues that despite precariousness being shared by all it can be amplified and made more acute under certain social policies. Precarity thus refers to "the differential condition whereby some lives are rendered more insecure, unequal, or destitute than others" (Lloyd, 2015, p.215). As Lloyd observes, Butler's understanding of precarity comes close to the Foucauldian notion of biopolitics, in that it emphasizes the role of "those powers that organize life" in the establishment of a set of measures for the differential valuation of life itself (ibid, p. 215). The "process of acclimatizing a population to insecurity"(Lloyd, 2015, p.215), precarisation, can be understood as an aspect of biopolitics as it involves the social and political organization of precariousness in particular, concrete and historically delimited ways (ibid, 2015). Lorey refers to precarity as the missing aspect of governmentality and proposes the aforementioned concept of governmental precarization. According to Lorey, "understanding precarization as governmental makes it possible to problematize the complex interactions of an instrument of governing with conditions of economic exploitation and modes of subjectivation in their ambivalence between subjugation and self-empowerment" (Lorey, 2015, p. 13).

While precariousness as social-ontology of lives and bodies, and precarity as "the hierarchization of being-with that accompanies the processes of othering" (ibid, p.12) emphasizes the aspects of exposure and victimization, precarization presents a decidedly productive analytical function. As an

instrument of governing and self-governing, it does not only imply subjugation but also presents a potential for empowerment. This perspective on precarisation allows us not only to consider the oppressive, striating forms of precarity to which favelados are subject but also to consider the productive moments provided by this condition of precarity. Central to this ambivalent aspect of precarity is the concept of vulnerability. As will be explained further in Section 3.4, vulnerability, understood as 'an exposure to power', highlights an overlooked causality to disaster risk in marginalized communities: the biopower operations. This poststructural and feminist account of precarity as a political concept enables us, above all, to comprehend how structures of power, represented by the confluence between urban policies and risk reduction, have differently and unevenly encouraged and augmented the precariousness of already dispossessed groups (Butler, 2009). Such a perspective relies on Butler's accounts of corporeal vulnerability which argues in favour of no longer considering shared common precariousness only as a threat and a mechanism of production of hierarchical protected differences, but instead recognizing existential vulnerability and considering it as an affirmative basis for policy. For Butler, precarity in its different extensions, is the point of departure for political alliances against a logic of protection and security for some, at the expense of many others (Lorey, 2015).

Since governmental precarization is both a circumstance and an effect of governing by uncertainty, designed to make individuals governable, Lorey argues that a one-sided emphasis on danger and threat will fail to acknowledge the immanent potential of the concept of precarity that emerges through permanent and singular refusals, the small sabotages and resistances of precarious everyday life.

All of this discussion on precariousness, precarity and governmental precarization, however, does not specify how we ought to understand how the spatialization of precarity through urban interventions takes place, especially when it comes to cities and their marginalized spaces. To do so, we need to further the debate presented in the current section by attending to the generative and co-constitutive

relationship between precarity and spatiality (Ferreri, Dawson, & Vasudevan, 2017); and this is the purpose of the sub-section that follows.

3.3.1 Permanent transience, informality, and uncertainty in the making of urban precarity

To understand the role of precarity "as spatially generative and co-constitutive of urban life" (Ferreri, Dawson, & Vasudevan, 2017, p. 247), especially when it comes to marginalized territories within the city, I rely on the works of Roy (2005), Rolnik (2015), Vasudevan (2015), Ferreri, Dawson and Vasudevan (2017) and Lencione (2019), to build my framework for the analysis of how the politics of displacements have been not only the product but also the producer (Lancione, 2019) of favela precarity.

My argument is that whether and how the city and its elites formulate 'the problem favela', how they address and articulate political interventions, depend upon a certain perception of favelas that has already been established (see Chapter 2).

As a producer of precarity, displacements (as will be shown in Chapter 6) have exposed the resettled and those left behind to further risks. To this, the concept of precarization, and its governmental feature, is expanded here to incorporate Ferreri, Dawson and Vasudevan's (2017, p.249) definition as a "spatial process that generates and sustains varied geography of insecurity, flexibility and temporariness, at once intensifying and normalising precarity". This framework informed by precarity also allows me to understand how the favelados' embodied experience of it, enabled by their uprooting, has constituted sites for the emergence of political subjects, as will be conceptually discussed in the Section 3.4 and empirically presented in Chapters 7 and 8.

Permanent transience

Concerning informal settlements, attempts have emerged within urban studies to better address the issues precarity also attempts to understand. One important contribution concerns the idea of

“permanent transience”, defined by Rolnik (2015, p. 185-186) as territorial stigma marked by an indefinite border condition between legal and illegal, formal and informal, planned and unplanned experienced by those living in informal settlements. As presented in Chapter 2, “this condition of permanent transience can be related to discourses, norms and practices responsible to define and represent ‘favelas as a problem’” (L. Valladares, 2000) to the aspirations of the modern city. This mode of intelligibility (or recognizability), I argue throughout the thesis, is responsible to confer on favelas “a state of permanent temporariness; concurrently tolerated and condemned, perpetually waiting ‘to be corrected’” (Yiftachel, 2009, p.251), which would imply a series of socio-spatial effects as, for example, a condition of displaceability (Yiftachel, 2017). This condition refers to “the susceptibility of people, groups and developments to be removed, expelled or prevented from exercising their right to the city” (ibid, p.03).

The representation of favelas as “a problem” (Valladares, 2015) results in delimiting a restricted set of possibilities about their control, having forms of precarisation both as a condition and prescription. This territorial stigma makes it difficult to know whether to invest in the improvement of the territory originally marked to leave. Rolnik (2015) was also inspired by Yiftachel's (2009a) analysis of the struggle of Bedouin Arabs in the Beersheba metropolitan region of Israel/Palestine, which invokes the concept of ‘gray spacing’ to describe “the practice of indefinitely positioning populations between the ‘lightness’ of legality, safety and full membership, and the ‘darkness’ of eviction, destruction and death” (ibid, p.247).

The explanatory power of the concept of permanent transience to elucidate a longstanding persistence of displacements as a governmental response to the ‘the problem favela’ (as we saw in Chapter 2) relies on its potential to disclose the problematic representation of favelas in this way. This representation pushes favelas to a liminal space between recognition and exclusion in an intermittent way. The “stubborn informality” (Yiftachel, 2009a) resulting from this process is usually handled through a range of delegitimizing and criminalizing discourses, regulations, and practices, including displacements.

Informality

Informality is another way in which precarity has come to be understood in the literature. This perspective is mainly from the work of Roy and AlSayyad (2004) for whom, urban informality constitutes "an organizing logic, or, a system of norms that governs the process of urban transformation itself" (cited by Roy, 2005, p.148). Against the standard dichotomy of two sectors, formal and informal, Roy suggests that informality is not a separate sector but rather a mode of urbanization. According to this perspective, informality must be understood not as the object of state regulation but rather as produced by the state itself.

Based on Giorgio Agamben's state of exception, Roy asserts that informality can be seen as the expression of such sovereignty. The planning and legal apparatus of the state have the power to determine what is informal and what is not, including "which forms of informality will thrive and which will disappear" (Roy, 2005, p.149). This capacity to construct and reconstruct categories of legitimacy and illegitimacy is not a simple bureaucratic or technical problem, as we will see in Chapter 5, but rather a complex political struggle. This differentiated informality points to

> a complex continuum of legality and illegality, where squatter settlements [or favelas] formed through land invasion and self-help housing can exist alongside upscale informal subdivisions formed through legal ownership and market transaction but in violation of land use regulations. (ibid, p. 149)

Although informality can be found in every aspect of urban contemporary life when it comes to informal settlements, the ways the sovereign power deals with this are different. State authorities tend to see the informality of the poor as a negative aspect of urban life, reflecting a lack of progress and development and hence as something that needs to be eradicated. "The divide here is not between formality and informality but rather a differentiation within informality" (ibid). This form of undesired informality within the marginal areas of the city is presented in parallel to the idea of precarity.

Despite precariousness being also found in every aspect of urban life, it is its differentiated (re) production and distribution that constitutes the precarity of some groups in relation to others. Linked as it is to differentiated conditions distributed within urban life, a constant struggle for survival and self-development, the concept of urban informality offers a constructive foundation for understanding urban precarity and how it is characterized throughout the thesis.

Uncertainty

Lancione (2019) study on "embodied urban precarity" explores how conditions of precarity arising from forced evictions and homelessness of Roma people in Bucharest, Romania, are 'made' and 'unmade' in the unfolding of displacements. Urban precarity is understood as a process in the making, instantiated at the level of the body through the breakdown of Roma homes. Lancione provides interesting insights on precarity that I take as inspiration here. The scholar proposes the understanding of urban precarity through the lenses of evictions, understood not as merely physical removal, but a realignment of social relations in which their material and affective dimensions "generates conditions of fragility that are felt through the emotions, trauma, and the painstaking labour necessary to make ends meet at the urban margins" (ibid, p.182). In this situation, precarity is made and lived through instability.

Other important contributions to this perspective on precarity as uncertainty come from Joronen and Griffiths (2019a) study on the anticipatory affective dimensions of precarity induced by house demolitions in Palestine. Drawing on fieldwork in the West Bank, they analyse what they call 'affectual demolition', referring to the anticipatory affect related to the violent future of house demolition. The authors show how 'affectual demolition', triggered by futures that are rendered uncertain, play out on the level of the body (fears, threats, and anxieties). One of the contributions to the literature on displacements is the "focus on demolition as a future threat – as a relationship between affects of anticipated loss and the politics of material destruction" (ibid, p.04). What this body of literature on urban precarity has in common is that it not only focuses on the undesirable experiences of precarity

lived by those people in marginalized conditions in the cities but also in how the resoluteness to act on and against forms of exclusion, inequality and violence emerges from situations of vulnerability and insecurities.

What the urban precarity literature has shown that I take as part of my analytical framework, is that it works at the meeting point between two connecting bodies of literature. On the one hand, there are the bodies of literature that speak to the unjust structure of dispossession, exclusion and violence that define and shape the experience of many of the world's urban dwellers as conditions of permanent transience, informality, and uncertainty. On the other hand, there is the scholarship that points to the possibility of extending, improving, and sustaining life in settings of pervasive marginality. This body of work that frames it beyond an enduring state of material and social insecurity (Joronen & Griffiths, 2019a; Lancione, 2019b; Simone, 2010; Vasudevan, 2015), is particularly interested in the emergence of new political subjectivities through contemporary forms of urban precarization and can help to shed light on the particular forms of agency and resistance that emerge from precarious conditions found in the cities. For instance, Vasudevan (2015, p.338), by examining the precarious everyday geographies of squatting, has developed "a modest theory of 'urban combats'" to account for the complexity and provisionality of squatting as an informal set of practices and a precarious form of inhabiting the city. Through the analysis of squatting, Vasudevan seeks to connect radical forms of urban insurgency to attempts to secure and sustain housing, albeit precarious and provisional.

Taking it into account, I will focus on how precarious futures delineated by the dual experience of disaster (environmental catastrophe and displacements) not only evoke violence but also affirm favelados' life and agency to resist the violence of the removals. To better understand how precarity, as discussed by this later body of literature, can be translated into resistance in the context of risk displacements, and how the side effects of politics to make life live can be resisted, I mobilize the concept of vulnerability, which constitutes the bridge between precarity and resistance.

3.4 Resistance in vulnerability: the emergence of political subjects through precarity

Vulnerability has been studied across multiple disciplines and studies such as disaster risk (Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon, & Davis, 2003; Oliver-Smith, 1996), livelihoods and poverty (Bohle, Downing, & Watts, 1994; Chambers, 1989; Sen, 1983) and climate change (Barnett & Adger, 2003; Bohle et al., 1994; Brooks, Adger, & Kelly, 2005; Füssel & Klein, 2006).

While there is little consensus about vulnerability's precise meaning, there is basic agreement that vulnerability denotes susceptibility to harm, and is composed of exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity (Ford et al., 2018). In the field of DRRM and climate change, vulnerability analysis remains influential but has been increasingly critiqued in recent years, with some challenging the potential of vulnerability approaches to capture the nuances of the dynamics of climate-society, which has opened up space for resilience studies (ibid).

Vulnerability research typically explores the identification and understanding of causal factors that put people and places at risk and decrease the ability to respond to threats (Cutter 2003). Such approaches emphasize what makes societies unsafe, a condition that relies largely on the social order and the relative position of advantage or disadvantage within a specific category (Hewitt, 1997). Those most at risk are vulnerable, not just because they are exposed to a threat, but because of a condition of marginality that renders their lives a "permanent emergency" (Bankoff, 2001, p.25). In turn, this marginality is defined by the intersection between class, gender, race/ethnicity, age and/or disability that affects the entitlements and empowerment of individuals. Despite such valuable contributions of vulnerability research, few studies, as emphasized by Cutter (2006), have focused on how vulnerability, particularly within marginalized groups, is socially (and politically) induced. Such critique is corroborated by Ford et al (2018) in their study on the uses of vulnerability in the climate field. According to the authors, vulnerability research is usually critiqued for neglecting how vulnerable conditions are produced and evolves over time. That said, this section aims to propose a radical reading of vulnerability based on feminist scholarship, which consists of explaining the particular

contribution of the state in the production of vulnerability and the resistance and mobilisation of favelados, which responds to this latter call for a more profound take on vulnerability.

Vulnerability, then, is understood here as a state that can both generate a deliberate exposure to power and manifest political resistance. This standpoint implies an attempt to untangle common assumptions made by urban planners, public authorities, and vulnerability scholars about areas deemed 'at risk' as having some kind of lack, deficiency or incapacity, usually attributed to the absence of the state, which would explain even further interventions. This limited understanding of vulnerability and the state of affairs it ends up feeding fails to comprehend the contradictions in urban policies aimed at reducing risk, and their definitions and parameters of vulnerability, which end up generating more vulnerability. Therefore, the perspective on vulnerability then follows the definition offered by Butler, Gambetti, and Sabsay (2016) in the volume Vulnerability in Resistance, in which vulnerability is taken as a condition of "exposure to power" (ibid, 2016).

Bringing these reflections to the analysis of the literature on favela displacements, analysts' insistence on a lack of state institutions as one of the drivers of vulnerability in informal areas seems to ignore the fact that socio-spatial vulnerability can also arise from an *excess* of state regulation of those territories aiming to maintain the general condition of abandonment and precarity. Precarity exposes the concatenation of the disciplinary, biopolitical and necropolitical power of state institutions which are deeply implicated in the production and reproduction of vulnerabilities of those bodies and space. To analyse, then, governmental practices that designate favelados as 'in need of protection' – through both the denial of their capacity to act politically and also as a way to expand biopolitical forms of regulation and control, this vulnerability, as suggested by has to be understood as politically produced, unequally distributed through and by differential operation of power (Butler, 2009).

Feminist accounts of vulnerability track the way that power operates to establish the disenfranchised as 'vulnerable populations'. This also opens space to critically examine the logic of disavowal by which vulnerability becomes projected and distanced from prevailing ideas of agency and mastery (Butler, 2016, p. 3-4). This feminist approach to vulnerability claims a relational subjectivity, opposed to the

liberal and individualist forms implicated in the capitalist and masculinist concepts of self-interest and sovereign mastery (ibid, p. 3). It cannot be reduced to either an effect of power or an ontological condition. Instead, it "emerges as part of social relations, even as a feature of social relations" (ibid, p. 06) and depends on the context of specific social and historical relations, which need to be analysed concretely.

This Butlerian understanding of vulnerability relies on a dual dimension of performativity, in which we, as subjects, are invariably acted upon and acting on, which could explain the impossibility to reduce subjects to the idea of free, individual sovereignty central to (neo) liberal reasoning. As Butler (2014, p. 14) explains well, categories and ascriptions that precede us make us vulnerable to and affected by discourses that we never chose. Butler takes vulnerability as a political problem and this makes visible the forms of agency and resistance vulnerability encompasses. Here, we can establish a parallel between vulnerable people and what Butler calls the ungrievable. In Frames of War, Butler took grievability as a category of analysis defining it as a condition "that precedes and makes possible the apprehension of the living being as living" (2009a, p. 15). A grievable life would be a recognised life. Conversely, a life that is not recognised as a life is "ungrievable or dispensable" (Butler 2012, p. 11). The notion of 'grievability', asserts Lloyd (2015) would function in Butler's thought as a way to differentiate between lives that are eligible for rights, support, and recognition (grievable lives) and those that are not (ungrievable lives).

As Lloyd (2015, p. 221) asserts, "while the ungrievable may be excluded from established and legitimate political structures, that is while they may be unrecognisable as 'subjects', they are not *ipso facto* excluded from politics per se". This, according to her, would explain Butler's preference for Foucault's biopolitical account to Agamben's discussion of 'bare life'[25]. Butler claims not only that a

[25] Homo sacer, a Roman law figure, refers to a person who can be killed by anyone, but who cannot be sacrificed in any sort of ritual; this is a life destined to die with utter impunity. This mode of life is inferred negatively in government because it has been excluded from the politico-legal community and reduced to the status of its physical nature, or bare life, "which is considered to be marginal and seems to be furthest from the political, proves to be the solid basis of a political body, which makes the life and death of a human being the object of a sovereign decision" (Lemke 2011, p.55).

life without rights is still "within the sphere of the political", and that, far from being "bare", the lives of stateless, evicted and disenfranchised people are actually "mired" in power (Butler 2010 cited in Lloyd, 2015, p.223). This formulation will be quite important to understand the claims we will see in Chapters 7 and 8. Unlike the impossibility of political subjectivities in the condition of emergency politics, as implicit in Agamben formulation of 'bare life', this possibility for the "ungrievable" to claim the public sphere is crucial to apprehend the possibility of the political agency for precarious lives. When referring to Arendt's concepts of "the right to have rights" (cited by Butler, 2004), Butler states that this right comes into existence through its exercise by people to whom the claimed right is denied.

However, according to Butler, how would vulnerability enter into political agency? Resistance in vulnerability is made manifest by forms of embodied political interventions and modes of an alliance that are marked by interdependency and public action. For Butler, embodiment is understood "as both performative and relational, where relationality includes a dependency on infrastructural conditions and legacies of discourse and institutional power that precede and condition our existence" (Butler, 2014, p. 11).

Vulnerability, reconceived as bodily exposure, is therefore part of the very meaning and practice of resistance. Construing bodily vulnerability as induced by social and material relations of dependency, the forms of resistance encompassed by the vulnerable enact the demand to end precarity by exposing their vulnerability to failing infrastructural conditions (Butler in Butler, Gambetti, & Sabsay, 2016, p. 8). In Butler words:

> Vulnerability is not a subjective disposition, but a relation to a field of objects, forces, and passions that impinge upon or affect us in some way. As a way of being related to what is not me and not fully masterable, vulnerability is a kind of relationship that belongs to that ambiguous region in which receptivity and responsiveness are not clearly separable from one another, and not distinguished as separate moments in a sequence. (Butler, 2014, p. 18)

Butler, then, suggests that vulnerability is neither fully passive nor fully active, but operates in an intermediate region, being a constituent feature of human subjects, both acting on and against power. Although these subjects can be devoid of legal protection and forms of security; they are not, therefore, reduced to some sort of bare life, as discussed earlier in this section. There is no sovereign power abandoning the subject outside the domain of the political, rather, there is a renewal of sovereignty outside of, and against, the terms of state sovereignty power, one that involves a concerted and corporeal form of exposure and resistance (ibid, 2014).

Butler's assertion on vulnerability calls our attention, then, to both senses of resistance: resistance to vulnerability that belongs to certain projects of thought and certain formations of politics organized by sovereign mastery to subjugate disenfranchised and marginalised groups; and resistance in vulnerability which implies its mobilization as part of the very exercise of power against unjust and violent regimes (ibid, p. 26).

This feminist approach to vulnerability and precarity also contributes to the strengthening of my option here for the concept of governmental precarization, presented previously. First, because governmental practices are seen here as attempting to manage precariousness shared by all, through attempts to manage precariousness and vulnerability of favelas and their dwellers by "striating the dangerous 'others' and positioning them as precarious at the 'peripheries'" (Lorey, 2011, p. 04). Second, because the meaning of vulnerability goes beyond the understanding of it as a debilitating characteristic and a condition of governmental exploitation to also encompass the decidedly productive dimension of governmental precarization as "a not only subjugating [form of] self-government but also as a simultaneously incalculable and potentially empowering" one (ibid, p. 05).

3.5 – Conclusion

This chapter presented two separate but related theoretical frames through which I will analyse the phenomenon of risk displacements of favelas in Rio de Janeiro and their contestations by favela

dwellers. The first refers to urban biopolitics and its technologies of risk. Examining favela displacements through the lenses of biopolitics reveals how the management of favela populations through disaster risk displacements has become a "violent form of second modernity being invented in Southern cities" (Alvarez & Cardenas, 2019, p.232), replacing (or adding another layer to), ideologies of modernity such as the salubrity, as saw in Chapter 2, predominant in the management of cortiços of Rio de Janeiro in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. By claiming that the purpose of such policies is the preservation of the lives of favela dwellers, DRRM obscures protracted forms of precarity and exclusionary socio-spatial relations, rendering the conflicts over the right to the favela and the city, depoliticized and distant.

However, acknowledging the limits of the biopolitical approach to the full exploration of meanings, practices and power relations that lie behind the city's responses to risk, I use a second approach based on feminist accounts to precarity and vulnerability. As the experiences in the field revealed, I must grapple with the undeniable fact that the population of favelas "do not sit still while techniques of risk management are applied to them" (Zeiderman, 2012, p. 1586). On the contrary, the 'ordinary', 'daily life' aspects of this mode of government in Rio have provided the basis for the formation of political subjects who reject those frames of risk imposed on them. For such reasons, I have placed together feminist theories of vulnerability and precarity to the biopolitical approach to risk to develop my understanding of favelados contestation to state practice of displacement as risk management.

Both approaches on urban biopolitics and vulnerability as precarity can be useful to comprehend how the forms-of-life precluded by technopolitical forms of risk management can be exacerbated by the 'remedy', or threat, of (future) displacements and can also catalyse and affirm political agencies, capacities and resistance.

Chapter 4 – Methodology

4.1 Introduction

This thesis aims to explore how environmental risk and resilience is being employed to bring about controversial interventions in Rio de Janeiro's favelas, and how these governmental efforts are being contested by favela dwellers. This chapter outlines the methodological approach chosen to address this overall aim and provides an overview of the empirical context of the research. However, before starting to describe my methodological path, I want to clarify my position as a researcher. Instead of discussing favelas as a mere object of urban development, I prefer to do so from my lived experience there, taking as my object of study the urban politics that created some notions of the modern city that have become the measure of all possible plans for urban development; also, without forgetting that local histories of favelas are interconnected by global designs of risk and urban development designed elsewhere.

Saying this means that I did not want to reproduce the same logic, by speaking for or representing the people of favelas. Instead, my aim was not only to listen to the favelados but also "to learn to speak to" this historically silenced subject of the non-elite (Spivak, 1988, p. 271). And what did they want from me? Support for their activism, have their stories listened to and their claims resonated through different audiences. Because of this, my study approaches feminist standpoint theory in which trajectories and forms of marginalised urban life that have been actively produced as backward, subaltern, dangerous, risky by hegemonic forms of understanding 'the urban' become politically visible (Santos et. al. 2007) through involvement in "collective political struggle"(Phillips, 2014).

For that reason, I carried out the experiences of being politically engaged in the favela's movements, discussed further in Section 4.5.2, not as my 'research object' to be scrutinized and presented as findings, but as a normative standpoint, once I'm advocating for a specific route for enquiry that privileges favela dwellers perspective on disaster risk, precarity and vulnerability. This route begins

“from standpoints emerging from the shared political struggle within marginalized lives” (ibid, p. 01). I assume, then, this study is socially situated, with a particular focus on power relations embedded in the government of risk and removals, privileging the standpoint of the favelados. Standpoint is then understood as a “historically shared, group-based experiences”(P. H. Collins, 1997).

This chapter is developed as follows. Section 4.2 explains the research design and case selection, 4.3 lays out the methods of data gathering while 4.4 presents the method of data analysis. Section 4.5 discusses the challenges encountered, including issues related to research ethics and positionality, as I ended up engaging politically with the favelado movements against removals. Section 4.6 then presents the background to the research context, which frames the analysis of the following chapters.

4.2 Research Design and Case selection

4.2.1 Case study

A qualitative multisite case study approach was used because it allowed for an "in-depth definition and analysis of a bounded system" (Merriam, 2014, p. 39) with recourse to multiple examples of the phenomenon of interest. Grappling with a series of processes that cannot be accounted for by a single site of intensive examination, the study involves a more fragmented and comparative approach to investigating varied instantiations of the phenomenon of disaster risk displacements. For this reason, this method of research involves gathering and examining data from several cases and can be differentiated from a single case study that might include subunits or subcases.

In addition to this central motivation, a qualitative multi-site case study as a methodological approach was chosen for further reasons – broadly rooted in Merriam (2014) and Yin (2009). First, it is most appropriate for investigating the real-life cases of different favelas’ experiences. Second, it is an appropriate methodological choice when the context (favelas) cannot be separated from the phenomenon of interest (disaster risk displacements). Third, it is an appropriate methodology when referring to spatially striated cases, allowing details to be revealed that can contribute to a better understanding of the phenomena under investigation and what they could mean on a broader scale.

A case study can be taken as “an instance in action” (Chadderton & Torrance 2001) which allows the use of multiple methods and data sources to explore and interrogate “what is this a case of?” (Ragin & Becker 2000). It can help us to accomplish a “thick description” (Geertz, 1973 cited by Chadderton & Torrance 2001) of a phenomenon to capture interviewees’ standpoint. A multisite approach can also “strengthen the precision, the validity, and the stability of the findings” (Miles & Huberman, 1994 cited by Merriam, 2014, p.50) which is particularly problematic in a single-case study. However, what makes multisite case study advantageous can also become a challenge due to the huge amount of diverse data to manage. This was indeed one of my main problems with this approach, especially in the phase of analysis, as I will discuss later.

An important issue highlighted by the literature on case studies refers to the boundaries of the study. Here, I draw on Ragin (2000), who argues that “strong preconceptions [on what is the case] are likely to hamper conceptual development” (ibid, p. 06). For that reason, the cases’ boundaries coalesced gradually, stepping from the preliminary fieldwork to the fieldwork, to the data analysis, (re)visioning of the conceptual framework and the process of writing up the thesis. In sum, the issues posed by the research questions can be accommodated by the assemblage of methods chosen, given that they played an important role in helping me to delineate the precarious frontiers of the research.

4.2.2 Selection of cases

The starting point for delimiting the boundaries of my case study took place in 2016 during two months of preliminary fieldwork (from November to December) driven by my interest in the Ecolimites project developed in 2009 by Rio’s municipality, which aimed to build walls around 11 favelas of the South Zone of Rio (Figure 4.1). With their construction, the intention was to prevent the horizontal spatial expansion of these communities and thus protect the natural environment from individuals living in those areas. The containment takes place through ‘blind’ concrete walls which can reach up to 3.5 meters in height.

Figure 4-1: Ecolimit barrier locate in Santa Marta favela
Source: *Gazeta do Povo* (04/04/2009).

Unlike the hygienist justification for favela intervention very common in the last century, as noted in Chapter 2, the Ecolimites project finds its justification in the environmental appeal, that is, in the discourse that the favelas are expanding over the Atlantic Forest reserves of the city. With this initial goal in mind, I chose to live in one of the favelas of the project, Santa Marta. However, I started to problematize my initial goal when I met the first participant in the field, the owner of the hostel, and one of the founders of favela tourism in Santa Marta, where I lived during my preliminary fieldwork.

After spending more than 24 hours travelling from Lancaster, I arrived in the Santa Marta favela. But I did not get up the hill right away. I had arranged with Miro, the owner of the hostel located at the top of the Santa Marta where I would stay, that as soon as I arrived I would look for him at the "Favela Top Tour" kiosk on São Clemente street, in Botafogo. After three hours of waiting, we finally met. As he was already late because of the delay of the tour that he was doing with a group of South American tourists, he asked me if I would like to go with him to pick up his wife and son who were in another favela nearby, Ladeira dos Tabajaras, also in Botafogo, where he maintains a laundry. Already during

this first informal conversation, Miro made clear that the Ecolimites barriers were only an embryo of a policy that was already being formulated by the state: forced displacements of favelados due to the apparent risk of disaster. On the way back to Santa Marta, we passed nearby the São João Batista cemetery. Miro then pointed to the Estradinha community, which is above the cemetery, commenting that the community had undergone a recent process of removals because of landslide risk. When briefly narrating the case, he spoke of the conflicts and injustices resulting from the removals.

From then, I began to delimit the case and the potential sites of research where the discourse and practice of disaster risk displacements were taking place, or, alternatively, where displacements were being contested and resisted. Acknowledging that as a researcher of socio-environmental conflicts, I had the responsibility for identifying and mapping what Little (2007) calls "multiple fractal connections", in this case, similar but irregular networks involving the disaster risk displacements of favelas, the main criteria of articulation for my multisite case study was established by the dynamics present 'in the doing' of environmental risk in the Rio context.

During this preliminary phase of data collection, the cases began presenting the first contours while I was tracing informants across several sites that were potentially significant in light of my emerging research questions. In this sense, I had to deal with "fuzzy fields "without clear boundaries concerning many dimensions (Nadai & Maeder, 2013, p.04) and challenges, as will be discussed in Section 4.5. For that reason, the number of favelas selected reflects those fuzzy fields, intertwined by a series of limitations, spatially and temporally imposed. For instance, as I discuss in Sections 4.5.1 (on over-researched sites) and 4.5.4 (on risks encountered in the field), difficulties in accessing certain sites ended up being an important aspect in the final selection of the cases.

For the above-mentioned reasons, the preliminary fieldwork carried out between November and December 2016 was central to my first efforts to delimit the cases. First, for enabling me to get more clarity about my research goal, especially because of my limited prior knowledge of those to be researched and their settings (Siwale, 2015). Even being Brazilian and being familiar with many of our

issues, I had a very limited understanding of the processes involving the environmental politics geared towards favelas in Rio. While the benefits of doing preliminary fieldwork are not new to ethnographers, they are "under-discussed and to some extent under-utilized" in other fields of qualitative research (Sampson, 2004, p. 383). Even not being able to predict all the problems that I would have to face during the data collection, as I will discuss in Section 4.6, the preliminary fieldwork was advantageous for allowing me to consider broader and highly significant issues such as the viability of my initial research proposal, the definition of the sites to be researched, the degrees of participants' engagement with my research, besides research validity, ethics and representation (Turner, 2005; Sampson, 2004; Van Teijlingen, Rennie, Hundley, & Graham, 2001).

Because of obstacles encountered to recruit participants, difficulties of commuting from one place to another and also the lack of information on some cases, I gradually focused on the sites to be researched. From the several settlements I visited (Alto da Boa Vista, Cantagalo, Estradinha, Horto, Indiana, Maré, Laboriaux (Rocinha), Vale Encantado, Vidigal, Vila Hípica and Vila Autódromo), I decided to focus on: Estradinha, Horto, Indiana, Santa Marta and Vila Autódromo. These sites represent multiple manifestations of the phenomenon under consideration here: favelado displacements triggered by DRRM formulated at various scales of government and carried out by City Hall. Figure 4.2 presents the location of the five favelas, and a brief description of each case is provided in the following sub-sections.



Figure 4-2 – Map of the location of the researched sites
Source: Elaborated by Eder Nestor at the request of the author

4.2.2.1 Estradinha

The favela, Estradinha is located above the São João Batista Cemetery, in the Botafogo neighbourhood, one of the wealthiest areas in the city of Rio de Janeiro (Figure 4.3). According to the 2010 Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística – IBGE) census, in 2010 the Estradinha favela had 1049 residents and 325 households. As stated by the participants, the first residents arrived in the area in 1952, where 19 families of employees of the São João Batista cemetery were settled with the support of the Santa Casa de Misericórdia – a charity responsible for managing the cemetery since the 19th century – to avoid long dislocation between the suburbs and the workplace.



Figure 4-3: Estradinha
Source: Geo-Rio (2010)

In 1986, Mayor Saturnino Braga allowed an additional 42 families to settle in Estradinha, donating lots and 'construction kits' to residents that did not have the resources to build their homes. Over the years, even though Estradinha did not register a significant horizontal expansion of its territory, the favela grew vertically, mostly due to the vertical expansion of homes by family members that migrated from the North and Northeast of Brazil in search of a better life. Between late 2009 and 2010, rumours began in the community about the total removal of houses, especially after the announcement in 2009

by City Hall of a list of 119 favelas to be removed, as noted in Chapter 1. Shortly after the heavy rains in April 2010, there was a visit by some officials from Geo-Rio without any further explanation to the dwellers. After this, City Hall announced that Estradinha was in a high geological and geotechnical risk area. The removal process that lasted six years, removed 250 families, and 100 households remained after an intense process of resistance as we will see in Chapters 7 and 8.

4.2.2.2 Horto

Horto Florestal is a community formed by approximately 621 households, located on the border of one of the most famous parts of Rio de Janeiro: the Jardim Botânico (Botanical Garden). The Horto households are distributed over 11 locations: Caxinguelê, Chácara do Algodão, Clube dos Macacos, Dona Castorina, Grotão, Hortão, Mayor Rubens Vaz, Morro das Margaridas, Pacheco Leão, Solar da Imperatriz and Vila São Jorge (Gouveia, 2018).

The occupation of the Horto Florestal area, now belonging to the federal government, officially dates from the first decade of the nineteenth century. However, the inhabitants date their roots back to the colonial period when the site was home to a sugarcane mill, Engenho D'El Rey, built in 1596 (L. O. C. de Souza, 2013).

In 1950 the Jardim Botânico allowed their workers to build houses closer to work to avoid the long time spent in commuting, and many residents of the area surrounding the Solar da Imperatriz (Empress Manor) and the so-called Hortão moved to the locality adjacent to the boundaries of the Jardim Botânico, the area called Caxinguelê. To meet the needs of the residents of Horto, the Julia Kubitschek Municipal School, founded by President Juscelino Kubitschek, was erected and was one of the frontier landmarks.

With the arrival of Rede Globo[26] in the 1980s, the areas surrounding the Jardim Botânico began to be occupied by mansions. At the same time, the newly created residents' association of the Jardim

[26] Rede Globo is a Brazilian free-to-air TV network founded in 1965. It is owned by the business company Grupo Globo

Botânico (Associação de Moradores e Amigos do Jardim Botânico – AMAJB), created to represent those new wealthy residents, began to report and put pressure on the residents of the Horto. The federal government then filed a lawsuit seeking the reinstatement of the land tenure, calling for the removal of 120 of Horto's 620 families.

Figure 4-4: Banner at Horto
Source: author's photograph

Since the Jardim Botânico became a research institute in the 1990s, the attempts to expand the arboretum towards the community began. As a consequence of this process of expansion, the Jardim Botânico was given possession of the Solar da Imperatriz to establish the National School of Botany. From there, the institute started to affirm that the houses located between the Solar da Imperatriz and the arboretum were within the limits of the park. Such intent to enclose the Horto area show the Jardim Botânico's attempts to erase the community and its black history from the surrounding white and wealthiest neighbourhood. The last act in this process was the classification of the community as a high-risk area in the aftermath of the 2010 disasters. Horto was among the 119 favelas that would disappear because of the claimed level of environmental risk.

4.2.2.3 Indiana

Indiana – a small low-lying favela at the foot of Morro do Borel in Tijuca, North Zone of the city – was established in 1957. According to the 2010 IBGE census, in 2010 Indiana had 889 residents and 298 households.

Figure 4-5 – Indiana
Source: Author's photograph

Originally known as Irmãos Coragem, Indiana was officially named at the request of Dona Clara, a community leader. Indiana has developed with relatively little state intervention over the last 50 years to become home to over 600 families. However, rumours of possible removals have occurred over the decades.

In 2009, these threats became reality. The SMH announced the complete removal of Indiana to clear the area on the banks of the Maracanã river to then be regenerated and transformed into a square. Residents would be moved to the housing from the Minha Casa Minha Vida Program (PMCMV), a federal public housing programme, to be built in the area. Six months later, in January 2010, City Hall

included Indiana in communities targeted to be removed by 2012. However, the houses demolitions took place only in January 2012. From approximately 600 households, 110 were removed from Indiana, most of them for apartments in Bairro Carioca, in Triagem.

4.2.2.4 Santa Marta

The favela Santa Marta is located in Botafogo – one of the wealthiest neighbourhoods in the South Zone of the city. The name 'Santa Marta' is often heard in combination with, or instead of, 'Dona Marta'. Santa Marta has 3908 residents and 1176 households (IBGE, 2010). The first inhabitants occupied the highest part of the hill, now called Pico, and then the middle of the slope. This form of occupation protected the residents from the vigilance of the forest guardians (fiscal) who from below would not be able to see the shacks among the trees.

For many years, the population of the favela lived in peace, 'untouched' by politicians, who were not interested in it. Until the mid-1950s, most residents were of African descendent from the plantations in the interior of Rio state. Between the early 1950s and the late 1960s, many *nordestinos* (people from the North-Eastern states of Brazil), attracted by the job opportunities created by the emergence of the middle-class condominiums in the city, arrived in Santa Marta and became the majority through the migratory process (Groves, 2015).

During the mid-1960s, noticeable changes included the disappearance of backyards to give birth to new housing construction. Although there was an initiative to prohibit favela dwellers from making improvements in their houses (see Chapter 2), such as replacing stucco with bricks, the newly created residents' association, founded in 1965, turned a blind eye to the law and permitted the home improvements made by residents.

Figure 4-6 - Santa Marta
Source: author's photograph

In 1966/67, there was a landslide that destroyed many houses and killed three people. As a result of this and other modifications, many people moved out of the community. In 1988, another event close to the same area killed eight people. The houses at the time were built on top of a garbage dump, whose thickness reached four meters deep. After a historical storm in that year, a landslide swept the upper east part of the favela.

Figure 4-7 – Area affected by a landslide in 1988 where 8 people died.
Source: Geo-Rio.

Figure 4-8 – Area affected by the landslide today (highlighted in red)
Source: Fotos públicas[27]

[27] https://fotospublicas.com/projeto-tudo-de-cor-morro-santa-marta-em-botafogo-rio-de-janeiro/

Although the landslide reached large proportions, the construction of social housing affected by the disaster began only in 2003, when the state government invested 38 million reais to build 105 houses and improve another 211. Despite the urbanization plan – which included the housing units – had been initiated in 1999, by a committee of residents, the upgrading works were only delivered in 2008.

City Hall and Rio de Janeiro State Government reached a partnership for the execution of the urbanization works. However, the works were discontinued due to the end of the agreement in 2001. In 2003, the urbanization works resumed and resulted in the connection of approximately 1,500 houses to the sewage and water network, the construction of stairways, access roads and leisure areas. Again, the work was paralyzed by an embargo by the Public Prosecutor's Office, which alleged that the nursery, which was planned to be built at the top of the community, was threatening an area of environmental preservation.

Concomitantly with the upgrading works, the state government and the municipality began to implement a series of initiatives to control the territory of Santa Marta favela, not only physically but socially. The two 'milestones' of this urban control were the construction of the Ecolimites barrier (as discussed earlier) and the establishment of the state's first Pacifying Police Unit [Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP)].

In 2008, the first attempt to establish a new public security policy in the state through the UPP took place in Santa Marta. The UPPs emerges as an attempt to disrupt the logic of the 'war on drugs'. The old strategy of periodic police invasions of the favelas - which often resulted in armed confrontations – was being replaced by the continued presence of a fixed police contingent, the UPP. Under the allegation that residents were to be removed from the area because they were in areas of risk, the state began the process of removing 52 families from the area. As stated earlier, Pico had been the first area to be occupied by residents. The Pico is known for the neglect by both the state and the residents' association itself. Residents living there always suffered from a lack of resources and work

for the area, and repeatedly have had to deal with the violence of armed conflict involving factions and the police. This is because the area is at the junction between the neighbourhood of Laranjeiras, the National Park of Tijuca and Botafogo.

Figure 4-9 - The Pico area
Source: author's photograph

According to a project presented by City Hall, but hardly discussed with the residents, the area would be destined for the restoration of the vegetation, being reintegrated to the Tijuca National Park. After the mobilization of residents from Pico, the removals were suspended. However, as we will see in Chapter 8, another area, Santa Martinha, an old dump where there are around 30 households, was made invisible by such struggles over the territory of Santa Marta.

4.2.2.5 Vila Autódromo

The Vila Autódromo is a consolidated favela located in the Baixada de Jacarepaguá. According to the 2010 IBGE census, it had 1252 residents and 256 households. Originally a fishing village, Vila Autódromo became, in the 1970s, an opportunity for the housing of hundreds of migrant and informal

workers who arrived in the region for the building of the Jacarepaguá race track, the subway and the new real estate developments that were emerging in the West Zone, one of the largest expansion vectors of the city of Rio de Janeiro. Vila Autódromo 'protracted uncertainty' (Horst & Grabska, 2015) began in the early 1990s during the administration of Mayor César Maia (1993-1996), when the then sub-mayor of Barra da Tijuca, Eduardo Paes declared Vila Autódromo a flood risk area after heavy rains that flooded it and affected the whole city in 1993. However, like much of the area occupied by residences in Barra da Tijuca, Vila Autódromo is located in a lowland area and, despite drainage problems found in some parts of the favela, residents contested the risk assessment made by City Hall at that time, causing the city to retreat on its classification.

When Rio de Janeiro was chosen to host the 2016 Olympics, the ghost of removals came up again. The plan of City Hall consisted of demolishing the old racetrack of Jacarepaguá to build the Olympic Park. According to the argument present in the Urban and Environmental Legacy Plan[28] for the games, the Vila Autódromo area would be sacrificed for the expansion of Abelardo Bueno and Salvador Allende Avenues. Pointing to the same logic of removal, the Strategic Plan 2009-2012 foresaw among its goals "a 3.5% reduction in areas occupied by favelas in Rio" (Prefeitura do Município do Rio de Janeiro, 2012). Vila Autódromo was included in the list of 119 favelas to be completely removed by 2012. With the release of the list, Mayor Eduardo Paes went on, once more, to claim that the Vila Autódromo would be at risk of flooding and therefore it would have to be removed.

[28] The Urban and Environmental Legacy Plan Rio2016 was created to meet a demand by the Brazilian Olympic Committee, in 2008, to present an urban legacy proposal for the candidacy of Rio de Janeiro to host the Olympic Games in 2016.

Figure 4-10 - Vila Autódromo before removals

Figure 4-11 – Vila Autódromo after removals
Source: (Autódromo, 2018)

4.3 Data collection

As noted in Section 4.2, one of the strengths of the multisite case study design is the use of multiple sources of evidence beyond what might be used in other qualitative methodologies. For this study, a combination of different methods for data collection was used: semi-structured interviews with policymakers of the Rio de Janeiro municipality, in-depth interviews with favela dwellers, community leaders and activists, extended periods and instances of participant observation and archival research.

The data gathering was divided into two phases: the preliminary fieldwork, and the main phase of data collection, which was carried out between July 2017 and January 2018, focussing on five favelas. The technique for participants' recruitment consisted of snowball sampling in which the researcher recruits a few participants, representative of the target group to be studied, and asks this participant to provide the information needed to locate other important participants for the research. In each case, I was able to get access to a gatekeeper, who would then introduce me or give me the contacts of others belonging to the same group. Moreover, in each of the cases, it was possible to identify a 'leader' for each case[29]: Miro for Santa Marta; Murilo and Agenor for Indiana; Eduarda for Horto; Penha for Vila Autódromo and Fernanda (Coletivo Técnico) for Estradinha. Through the contact with them, I was able, not only to get the contacts of others but also to identify key agents who I should interview. This process, however, is never-ending, as new interviewees always mention new actors and so on and so forth. In this research, I decided to stop the interviews once new narratives began to add minimal details that were not substantially changing my knowledge about the cases.

4.3.1 Participant Observation

Having in mind the complexities of following the cases of removal politics that targeted 119 favelas in a city like Rio de Janeiro with a population exceeding six million, 22% of which is spread over 763 favelas (IBGE, 2010; Cavallieri & Vial, 2012), my strategy for conducting participant observations followed the 'multi-sited ethnography' approach, defined by Marcus (2005). The ethnographer

[29] Anonymised names.

suggests that we follow the object that is most significant to our research: metaphor, person, conflict, life or biography, plot, migration, etc. In my case, I opted to follow the elements that suggest a cleavage between the socio-spatial process (Landesman, 2016) of forced displacements and the making of landscapes of risk across the City. As I was interested in the various ways in which 'at risk' places are both materially and discursively produced and contested, I categorize the multiples sites of participant observation as spaces of *governmental practices*, spaces of *contestation* and spaces of *representation*. To this end, the category of space mobilised, and implicit here, is not a static one where social relations and behaviours manifest, but, a performative one. Glass and Rose-Redwood's (2014) understanding of performative space asserts that the material and discursive production of social space is an effect of performative practices or particular power relations. Because of the iterative nature of spaces, there is always the possibility of disruptions or slippages or that the biopower regimes which regulate them might fail.

The first category of participant observation, the spaces of governmental practice refers to both the various favelas in Rio de Janeiro which suffered or were suffering from removals, as well as the administrative spaces (City Hall, Geo-Rio, COR, Civil Defence) where the policies were designed and planned. In cases where the conflict was still ongoing, I was thus able to follow and observe several activities (such as workshops, film exhibition, community's meetings, demonstrations) organized by the favela dwellers, their supporters and state officials regarding those territories, such as in Indiana and Horto. Regarding the other sites where the removals have ceased, at the time of my fieldwork, I tried to make sense of the governmental practices through studying some of the after-effects of what happened in the territories and the impacts of such interventions in the social and spatial configuration of favelas.

Regarding institutional spaces, I tried to attend as many events and meetings as I could to observe the everyday functioning of relevant actors in the ascription of favelas as 'at-risk areas' such as the SMH, the Civil Defence Coordination and the Rio Operations Centre (Centro de Operações Rio, COR), which is the headquarters of crisis management in the city. I attended the latter twice, to interview a

representative of Rio Resilient (see Chapter 5) and one of the coordinators of Geo-Rio. Both departments work in the same building. After the interviews, I was invited by both participants to visit the COR facilities. From the mezzanine, I could see a huge screen, with about 80 monitors operated by 20 operators, showing real-time traffic, weather, and data for basic services.

The second category of sites of participant observation, spaces of contestation, involved participating in demonstrations, and community meetings coordinated and attended by favela dwellers and organisations such as Conselho Popular, Pastoral de Favelas[30] and universities directly linked to state

Figure 4-12 - Public hearing at the City Council for discussion of the City's proposal for removal of Rio das Pedras, in the West Zone of Rio de Janeiro due to flooding risks and aesthetic issues.
Source: author's photograph

interventions and the removal politics or, more generally, connected to housing rights and social justice. I encountered activists, leaders and other participants by meeting up, marching and attending

[30] For more information on such organizations see Chapter 7.

debates (at one stage being involved in drawing the manifesto against removals with favela members, representatives of the Conselho Popular, Nucleus of Lands and Housing [Núcleo de Terras e Habitação (NUTH)], Public Defence and Pastoral de Favelas which have been used in the 'Journey against removals')[31].

These moments led to conversations and debates that I would later document in Evernote or as audio recordings. These encounters also rendered further introductions to new connections that often led to semi-structured interviews. For instance, this was the case for one of the members of the Coletivo Técnico that I met during regular meetings of the Conselho Popular.

The third category of the site of participant observation were spaces of representation, such as intellectual, artistic, and cultural debates and events. In Rio de Janeiro, the state interventions and socio-spatial reconfigurations driven by removals are both an object and subject of extensive debates, such as roundtables, art exhibitions and workshops, as well as subaltern interventions as museums, favela tours (Providência, Santa Marta, Horto, Indiana and Vila Autódromo), arts interventions, etc.

I looked for social projects headed by favela's residents or their supporters across the city which either showed favelas as (environmentally) integrated, such as the Favela Verde (Green Favela) in Babilônia, the projects that incentivise the use of solar panels in Santa Marta and Babilônia, the 'Garbage Project' proposed by the NUTH in Indiana, or ones that made an explicit critique of the politics of removals through the experiences of museums, tours, demonstrations, urban interventions or artistic exhibitions (which became the particular focus of parts of Chapter 8).

Again, I took notes during these participant observations, using Evernote, which also allowed me to take pictures and audio record my notes when I could not write them, noting details that could inform the analysis.

4.3.2 Interviews

[31] See details in sub-section 4.5.1

During the early stages of the preliminary study, I adopted an informal interviewing style. This format of the interview is typically done as part of the process of observing a social setting of interest that is still vague, allowing me to narrow the boundaries of my research. Through the process of informal interviewing and observation, I was able to understand the setting and build rapport, as well as uncover new topics of interest which may have been overlooked in the secondary sources, I had accessed before undertaking field research.

To the extent that I went into becoming more familiar with the research sites and participants, I expanded my strategy through conducting two forms of interviews. The first forms were unstructured from the unplanned everyday interactions and discussions I had with residents during my visits to the favelas or at regular meetings at the Conselho Popular, Pastoral de Favelas, and residents' associations. My field notes both reflected and shaped this sort of conversation. This interview style is an excellent technique to learn how members of a particular social group perceive the state and its interventions, such as those under scrutiny in this study. This detailed information about a person's perspective and position can provide context to other data collection methods, offering a complete picture of what happens in the spaces of intervention and why (Boyce & Neale, 2006).

The second sort of interview was semi-structured. In total, I interviewed 36 people across the five case studies. The complete list of interviewees for each case, as well as their institutional connections, is described in Appendix A. For interviewing participants, I made formal appointments with each one, asking them questions I had planned through an interview schedule, adapted to their position and role (see a sample in Appendix B). The interviews were audio-recorded, and always conducted and recorded with the participants' signed consent. I provided each participant with a hard copy of both the research information sheet and the research consent. To secure the rights, protection, and anonymity of the participants I use pseudonyms throughout the thesis. All the interviews were undertaken in Portuguese then fully transcribed in Portuguese allowing me to listen to them in depth.

The transcripts were then imported into Atlas. ti 8 for coding, which will be explained in the next section. They were only translated from Portuguese to English when needed for quoting.

Despite following these steps with representatives of all groups (from state officials to favela dwellers), the way of conducting the interviews changed slightly according to each group. With institutional representatives (Civil Defence, Geo-Rio, Rio Resilient, NUTH and Coletivo Técnico), the interviews were more focused on a list of topics that I wanted to be covered. The questions were designed to get the participants talking about specific topics according to their expertise and role. To avoid diversions, I wrote some prompts to help me to keep track of the issues I was interested in, especially when I was interviewing institutional representatives. The main purpose of those interviews was to explore the formal and informal mechanisms through which state institutions sought to manage risk and vulnerability through the resumption of removals in different parts of the city, and how their understandings are affecting and being affected by favelas – the main target of the forced displacements policies. Such interviews lasted between 50 and 90 minutes.

When it came to favela dwellers, my strategy was to use a loose structure to give participants the greatest scope for revealing their experience with the removal process. Therefore, participants were not asked direct questions but a narrative interview approach was taken, in which participants were asked to talk about their history and how their favela came to be a target for removal and to reflect on how removal had unfolded over time relative to their standpoint. Acknowledging that the interview process encompasses inter-exchanges and co-creation of viewpoints, participants were encouraged to formulate questions and share their stories, guiding the pace of the interview, enabling their voices to prevail. During the interviews, respondents were invited to reflect on what they believed to have been the motives for the removals and what would be a better alternative based on their own lived experiences. This culminated in a diverse range of responses that reflected both what the participants felt was the right way to resolve risk issues as claimed by the city; what they felt were the reasons behind the removals; and how they had responded to it. For this reason, the interviews were longer

than with the institutional representatives' group – usually lasting between 80 and 120 minutes. The aim was to comprehend the processes driving risk and vulnerability in these locations, especially the local perspectives on risk and responses to the state-led risk reduction practices.

4.3.3 Archival research

Archival research was a third source of data collection. I gathered as many relevant documents from different sources for each case as I could. This included the principal participants' archives, institutions, movements, and government bodies (Table 4.1). I also compiled articles online and other publicly accessible documents, including reports, audios and video recordings of public hearings, legislation, rules, and judicial rulings. I took pictures and videos, while also gathering photographs and videos online as well. Such documents were arranged by type of organization and material within my laptop, protected by a password. The table below showcases some examples of the kinds of material included in the dataset**.**

Table 4-1: List of documents

Types	**Examples of documents**
Official documents/ Political and state websites/Legislation	Rio de Janeiro Strategic Plannings Rio Resilient Program and diagnosis Technical plannings for favela intervention (Morar Carioca and PAC-favelas) Rio's Municipal Policy on Climate Change Rio's Contingency Plan Rio de Janeiro Climate Change Adaptation Plan Geo-Rio – Risk Management Plan Geo-Rio Risk Mapping Geological-Geotechnical Risk Assessment Documents from Civil Defense SMH website Legislation on the topic
Documents produced by activists/ grassroots movements/Universities	Counter-reports (Coletivo Técnico) Vila Autódromo Popular Plan Dossier mega-events

	Research reports
Documents provided by favela dwellers	Photographs, Maps, Videos, Flyers, Court Lawsuits

4.4 Data analysis

The method of analysis chosen for this study draws on the hybrid thematic analysis outlined by Fereday and Muir-Cochrane(2006) and Swain (2018) given that it merges both the inductive and deductive approach to research. The reasons behind this choice for hybrid thematic analysis follows the recommendation of St. Pierre and Jackson (2014), to use theory to determine, first, what counts as data and, second, what counts as 'good' or appropriate data.

The process began with the use of Atlas ti 8 software to organize and compare findings across data. The initial codes were then combined into broader, interpretive themes. Through the thematic analysis, I identified, analysed, and reported recurrences within the data corpus. This allowed me to organise and describe the data corpus in detail, as well as interpret various aspects of the research topic (Boyatzis, 1998).

Mostly, I started reading the interview transcripts, documents and media reports related to the topic, and looking at and reflecting on the photos taken during the fieldwork. This process was repeated several times until I became familiar with the data corpus. Impressions and initial ideas were noted down in the form of memos for further examination. The notes assisted the analysis phase. Coding is one of the important steps to analyse qualitative data. It was also the most time-consuming process in this empirical study. This study followed the suggestions of experienced qualitative analysts to separate the coding process into two phases: open coding and focused coding (Saldaña, 2010).

During the open coding, any discourses that were worth analysing were noted and labelled. However, too many (around 400) codes were produced in the first stage of my research. As expected, the result was not good enough for analysis. However, it suggested the labelling of discourses and directions for the second coding phase.

The thematic analysis proceeded through both a deductive and inductive logic, informed by research questions, objectives, and conceptual tools, that led me to group the themes into categories. After merging and dropping out codes for which I did not have enough data, I came up with 41 themes, in 5 categories: Risk & Resilience; Displacements; Vulnerability/Precarity; Resistance; and Right to the Favela/City, as indicated in table 4.2 below.

Table 4-2: Themes emerged according to the research categories

Categories	**Themes**
Risk & Resilience	Favelas as high-risk areas
	Resilience as a response to crises and emergencies post-2010 disasters
	Role of risk knowledge to legitimize removals
	Racialization of favelas through discourses on risk and vulnerability
	State and *Asfalto* (Formal City) environmental discourses against favelas
	Meanings of resilience
	Climate change discourses
	Environmental risk as legitimizing discourse of removals
	DRRM and Management (actions and instruments)
Displacements	Gentrification of favelas
	Social housing
	Housing struggles
	Disaster risk displacements
	Post-removals
	Normalization of exception (removals)
	Judicialization of removals
	Removal strategies engendered by the city
	Epistemic violence
Vulnerability/Precarity	State-led forms of precarity production

	Informal infrastructures
	Forms of exposure to risk
	Vulnerability as agential capacity
	Parallel power and the houses reoccupation
Resistance	Counter-narratives on high-risk areas
	Forms of Resistance developed by the favelados (see detail in Table 4.3)
	Urban and land title regularization
	Obstacles to resistance
	Favelados' environmental counter-discourse
	Claims of social justice
	Resisting narratives on favelas through memory and trauma
	Visibility and recognition claims
	Vulnerability in resistance
Right to the Favela/ City	Urban and land title regularization
	Differentiated informality
	Instrumentos Urbanísticos - Landscaping tools
	Environmental protection for what?
	Favela as a solution to the housing issue
	Claims of the Right to the favela/city
	Asfalto-favela relationship
	Favelas' occupation history

For each category, I related a list of themes, codes, and sub-codes, according to the sample on category 'resistance' shown in Table 4.3 below. With this, I could organize a large number of codes without losing track of the rich data set.

Table 4-3: Sample of the theme 'Resistance'

Themes (4)	Codes (25)	Sub-codes
Forms of resistance	Legal and political actions	Demonstrations
		Legal actions
		"Troca de favores" - Political bargain
	Resistance network	Exchange of experiences among favelas
		Coletivo Técnico
		NUTH
		Pastoral de Favelas
		Local universities
		ITERJ (Land Institute of the State of Rio de Janeiro)
	Temporal resistance	Favela Museum
		Memory as a way to rescue the collective spirit of the favela
		Traumatic experiences
		Re-signifying favela history
		"Memória não se remove" (Memory is not removed)
	Material resistance	Self-construction
		Rebuilding/Reoccupation of houses
		Barricades
		Routine maintenance in a hostile environment
		Café com bobagem - Silly Coffee
	Affective resistance	Caring amidst residents
		Café com bobagem - Silly Coffee
		"We did not use the same weapons as the Mayor"
		Anger as a means of transformation and empowerment
	Epistemic resistance	Counter-experts (Coletivo Técnico)
		Favela as the 'Other' of the city
		"This is not a risk area; it is a rich area"
		Counter-narrative on risks
		Counter narratives on environmental protection
		Alternative urbanization project proposed by residents
		Favelados' embodied and historical knowledge of the territory
Visibility and recognition claims	Campaigns	#HortoFica
		#OccupyVilaAutódromo
		#Urbaniza Já (Vila Autódromo)
	Favela Não Se Cala	
	The right to have rights	Rebuilding/Reoccupation of houses
		Self-demolition
		Payment of governmental taxes
	Demonstrations	Journey against removals
		"A Estradinha esteve aqui!" ("Estradinha were here!")
		Occupy acts
	On the margin of the margin	
	Fight for housing as a form of recognition	
	"We are not resilient, we are resistant"	

Obstacles to resistance	City's strategies for removals or 'administrative violence'	Indulgence of community members
		The transformation of favelas into a hostile environment
		Rumours and misleading information
		City official's threats
		Divide to conquer
		"False census in the community"
	Contradictions in the performance of the Public Defender's Office	
	Judicialization of the struggle against removals	
	Disillusionment about permanence	
	Clientelistic behaviour of community members	Housing struggles as demagoguery
	Collision between the right to housing and the right to environment	
	Stigmatization of favelados	Favelados seen as environmental threat
		Favelados treated as criminals
		Favelados' claim to the favela as populist demagoguery
Vulnerability in resistance	Strong sense of collectivity	
	"We are resistent, not resilient"	
	Favela as the driver of some efforts of the public power	
	Coletivo Técnico	
	"Comissão de Moradores" (Residents' Comission)	
	"Eu era apenas uma Dona de casa" (I was just a housewife)	
	"Enchi a casa de crianças" (I filled the house with children)	
	"O dia da derrubada" (The day of the overthrow)	
	Birth of a community leadership	

Although presented as a linear, step-by-step procedure, the data analysis was an iterative, reflective, and reflexive process, moving from the design phase to the ethnographical one to the analytical phase, back and forth among them. It means that the inductive process of coding was continuously interchanged with deductive reasoning. Simultaneously to the coding process, writing memos and research insights inspired by the conceptual tools that I had in mind was a common analytic stance toward the analysis. I wrote memos after interviews, added insights to these memos during transcription, and wrote a draft describing my interpretation of data using interview data and these memos. This attempt to make sense of the data through codes, memos and insights is part of this

deductive reasoning of the analysis. I often returned to the memos while coding the interviews and when theoretical concepts coalesced with participants' narratives.



Figure 4-13: Sample of an analytical memo on Atlas. ti 8

Many codes generated carried an implicit or sometimes explicit relationship with the concepts and theories that I had in mind (like precarity and biopolitics) and, in many ways, have informed my approach in the fieldwork. This relationship was crucial in helping to cut down the huge data corpus and focus on themes and codes that helped me to respond to my research questions. For this, the categorization of themes based on my research purpose was crucial.

4.5 Reflecting on the research process

4.5.1 - Why 'politically engaged research'?

Here I would like to discuss my political engagement with favelados activism against removals and how it manifested during the fieldwork while I was attending meetings organized by the Conselho

Popular and Pastoral de Favelas. First, my political engagement in favela movements like Pastoral de Favelas and Conselho Popular implied some normative positioning. Such position, underpinned by feminist theories, is manifested, first, through the understanding that forms in which power relations inflect knowledge need not be interpreted as a subjectivity that undermines objectivity; rather, socially situated knowledge can be properly objective. Second, through the commitment to the feminist claim that certain social places, especially oppressed places, are epistemically superior in that they provide previously unrecognized epistemic privileges, "thereby correcting falsehoods and revealing previously suppressed truths" (Phillips, 2014, p. 03). Such "interpretive framework […] is central to explicating how knowledge remains central to maintaining and changing unjust systems of power" (Collins, 1997, p.375). It precisely began in a meeting of Conselho Popular to discuss the favela dwellers' concerns about the launch of the Strategic Plan 2017-2020 by the administration of Marcello Crivella in July 2017, which established, among other things, the removal of around 14,000 households living in high-risk areas. At that meeting, I was invited to collaborate with the wording of the letter for the Conselho to send it to the Mayor, summoning him for dialogue. As I was becoming known in the group as a researcher interested in disaster risk displacements, the Pastoral de Favelas' lawyer, and also the mediator of the meetings in the Conselho Popular, suggested my name to take part in a commission that was under formation and would be responsible for writing the letter. From this moment onwards, I was getting increasingly active in the events of the Conselho.

Figure 4-14: Conselho Popular meeting for the organization of the 'Journey against removals'
Source: author's photograph

One of my most important roles in the commission was collaborating with the organization of 'The Journey against removals' of favelas, a series of acts encompassing political actions like occupy acts, demonstrations and lobbying for the cancellation of removal, in both the City Council and City Hall. This was marked by four different acts: walking from the Cidade de Deus to the Mayor's residence with a frustrated attempt of occupying the mayor's house entrance, in a luxurious condominium in Barra da Tijuca, due to the low uptake of the members of Conselho, the complex logistic and risk of police violence.

Figure 4-15: First act of the 'Journey against removals' with the 'Occupy Península'
Source: author's photograph

The other three were marked by occupying acts and demonstrations: 'Occupy City Palace' – occupation of the building from where the Mayor usually dispatches orders; and 'Occupy City Hall' – occupation of the administrative centre of Rio. The last act was marked by the 'ceia dos pobres' (supper of the poor) on Christmas Eve in front of City Hall. Through the four different acts, we were trying to produce spaces of contestation, denunciation, and negotiation of the recurrent policy of removals performed by City Hall against favelas. We were also trying to bring the removals and the

dilemmas experienced by the favela dwellers in the post-Olympic city to visibility, as they had fallen by the wayside after the mega-events despite remaining on the city's political agenda.

The ‘accidental’ and provisional engagement in the Conselho ended up being a form of compensation for the valuable contribution of its members to my research. This active role also helped me to respond to my concerns regarding the strong discourse against ’extractive research ethics’ posed by the participants and favelados, in general. It was also a strategy to overcome the limitations imposed by the escalation of violence in some of the favelas investigated, as will be discussed in the next sub-section, and to negotiate access to the participants' spaces of political struggles. Finally, and most relevant, this active role was also a way that I found to commit to the favelados’ struggles, which resonate with my personal beliefs and values.

When I arrived in the field, one of the first things that I noticed was the complexities and implications to research the everyday life of people who feels ‘commodified’ by researchers. Amid the most common complaints made by residents, one thing was clear to me, those people were feeling used by researchers come and go without even providing a word about their findings, without truly listening to what the favelados have to say, even if they were using qualitative methods of data collection. This finding reminds me of the article by Spivak, “Can the subaltern speak?”, but differently I would ask “Can the favelados be heard?”. There is no doubt favelados can indeed speak, but many researchers do not ‘hear’ what they have to say.

The people knew better about the things that I wanted to discuss, they were and still are living the dilemmas which I am interested in. Why should my claims as a researcher be more valuable or authoritative than theirs? How could I pretend to give them voices, voices that know very well how to speak for themselves, their (mis)fortunes? As Mignolo (2009, p. 162) pointed out:

> the knower [researcher] is always implicated, geo- and body-politically, in the known, although modern epistemology (e.g. the hubris of the zero point) managed to conceal both and created the figure of the detached observer, a neutral seeker of truth and objectivity

> who at the same time controls the disciplinary rules and puts himself or herself in a privileged position to evaluate and dictate.

I would not like to be this detached observer, or the 'knower', or even worse, the 'researcher saviour' just because I was engaged in the favelas' grassroots movements against risk-displacements. Wearing this kind of carapace is easy in times of buzzwords as 'militant research'. Recognizing my positionality as a Brazilian woman of colour, from the working-class, who also lived in a favela when I was a teenager, a PhD student at an overseas, Anglophone and white university, interested in bordering topic that intersects housing, disaster risk, justice and displacements — opened me up to learn with them, with their account of the reality where they were implicated, but at the same time did not erase my standpoint. This position as an "outsider within", brilliantly defined by Patricia Hill Collins, implied, then normative, and ethical position. And make part of such engagements is part of such position.

Moreover, in pragmatic terms, as I was dealing with over-researched sites, my performance depended the success of the engagement with them. It signalled how committed I was with their claims if I could understand it and translate them into practices that mattered to them. I know there is a problem with translation, since the subaltern discourse is not translatable to the dominant episteme as Spivak, (2000) insightfully pointed out. This power-knowledge relationship shaped by the dominant episteme is unable to hear the actual voice of the subaltern. The subaltern cannot speak, not because they are lacking (or 'stupid' or 'ignorant'), but because their voices do not count as speech in the dominant episteme of power (Adhikary, 2014), and part of the research findings, especially on epistemic resistance and memory, respectively, Chapters 7 and 8, shows this.

Engaging in such activities was a way not only to respond to their expectation about how beneficial I could be to them but also to compensate them for the time and knowledge they were sharing with me. I learned incredibly this way. Living in two favelas, Santa Marta and Babilônia, made a lot of difference in this relationship as well. From an outsider, I was becoming an insider out, but I would never claim that I became an insider. Even if all these experiences have created more proximity, I

would never be able to be their voices or represent their worlds. And here finishes my role as 'engaged' researcher.

Here, political engagement was a way to interact with participants in a meaningful way and shows a series of political choices as well. The "geo-body politics of knowledge" (Mignolo, 2009; Mignolo & Tlostanova, 2006), can be an interesting translation of this experience. As a response against every form of biopolitics, we can perform this geo-body politics of knowledge as a way to acknowledge and understand the world. It means not only to locate the knowing subject geo-historically but also the epistemological relation with sensing bodies, perceiving the world from local people's perspectives and struggles based on their history of dispossession. Through such forms of mundane engagements, I could observe other forms of everyday resistance, through actions being taken in the subaltern daily lives that seems, from an outside standpoint, intriguing, meaningless, humble, naïve, but that hide so many senses behind, as forms of radical opposition to the status quo posed by the biopolitical management of such lives and spaces.

While the research alignment with favelados political struggle can "occupy a space of profoundly generative scholarly understanding", it does not come without a set of contradictions, making the carrying out of the study more difficult, but also potentially generative of insights that would be impossible to achieve otherwise. For instance, despite the research findings being obtained through a dialogue among politically situated actors, including my political alignment with favelados struggle, it did not preclude me from understanding the dynamics of risk management in the city by interviewing state actors and analysing official discourse displayed in official documents. To understand the "double-check rhetoric" (Yarina, 2018) about the City's risk-induced discourses and practices, especially the aspects left in the shadows by resilience-building strategies[32], I prioritised a methodological openness to policies and practices of the state actors to which the criticisms of the favelas' movements were addressed. This required distance has helped me to integrate dissonant

[32] See Chapter 5.

voices, voices from subjects rendered invisible within the resistance initiatives, whose voices will be included in Chapter 8.

The multisite case study methodology has enabled me to follow webs of power involved in the reproduction and contestation of danger, enabling me to preserve my autonomy as a researcher, attentive to the inconsistencies, contingencies, and complexities implicated in politically engaged research. As well illustrated by Hale (2006, p.105), "such dual loyalties to an organized group in struggle and rigorous academic analysis often are not fully compatible with one another. They stand in tension, and at times, the tension turns to outright contradiction. At the same time, such tension is often highly productive". Embracing such tensions, in turn, offers an often-unacknowledged foundation for theoretical innovation and analytical understanding (ibid), as my theoretical approach proposed in Chapter 3.

4.5.2 "If I were you, I wouldn't go there": risk, fear, and the limits of the fieldwork

One of the biggest challenges of my fieldwork was to live with the possibility of imminent exchanges of gunfire or other difficult encounters with traffickers or police in the area where I was doing participant observation and recruiting participants for my research. The occurrence of some episodes of intimidation and visible tensions compromised some steps of my data collection and imposed some changes in my initial plan.

The year, 2017, marked an important change in the way favelas and the asfalto (formal city) relate to each other since the implementation of the UPPs. All the claims of integration and negotiated peace attributed to the presence of UPPs in favelas have fallen apart. With the end of mega-events as Olympics 2016, would also end this false sensation of peace marked out by the presence of the UPPs. In 2007, the government decreed the bankruptcy of the UPPs, resulting in the return of guns to the drug trafficking kept discreetly at bay while police occupations lasted, and, consequently the 'war' between rival gangs, and between them and the police, began to become commonplace in the

quotidian of the favelas target of the UPPs[9]. After almost a year of my pilot fieldwork, in 2016, the conditions of safety in favelas like Babilônia and Santa Marta changed dramatically. Those favelas are now at the epicentre of conflicts between rival factions, and/or between factions and police, which means that at any time of the day an exchange of gunfire can happen.

Less than one year before, in November 2016, when I was living in Santa Marta, the scenario was completely different: I could walk through Santa Marta favela with the confidence of a resident. Even knowing that the drug trafficking had never left the favela, only changed its dynamics, and due to the correlation of forces between counter-hegemonic groups there, there was a relative sense of security.

The situation in Babilônia, where I lived for 7 months during the second phase of my data collection, was much more complex than in Santa Marta because the areas at risk coincided with the conflict zones between rival factions from Babilônia and Chapéu Mangueira. Shootings in areas such as Caixa D'água, Mirante, Poço, and Vila do Sossêgo were frequent. Vila do Sossêgo, for example, was located on the border of the two favelas, becoming a route of both invasion and escape. The shootings were constant there, since the Amigos dos Amigos faction, responsible for controlling Chapéu Mangueira, was at war with the Comando Vermelho, a faction that controlled Babilônia, to take control of the two favelas. Despite I was living in a relatively safe part of the favela, close to the Ladeira Ary Barroso, where the 'favela's middle class' used to live and "where shootings never arrived" (Fieldnote, 07/08/2017), I could listen to the shootings, that seemed to happen in my front door.

The realisation of the changes in the scenery raised a series of new questions to me. What counts as risk and resilience to these communities? Environmental risk and resilience for whom? How can the traps of reinforcing stigmas so present in the narratives about favelas be avoided? Was I asking the right questions? More pragmatically, how to take care of my safety, including in the context of the

[9] 38 favelas had UPPs between 2008 and 2016.

university requirement for assessing the risks of carrying out research? These were issues that I had tried to engage with since the fieldwork began.

Doing research in this context was a great challenge. The traumatic experiences lived by the favelados from Santa Martinha and Pico (Santa Marta) and Vila do Sôssego (Babilônia) made many of the participants reserved and distant, unwilling to share their time and their experiences with me. For these reasons, there were limits to interviewing participants and doing participant observation in delicate settings like those ones that I met in the field. On the other hand, many possibilities could arise in such contexts, many groups opened up while others retreated (de Souza Santos, 2018).

As I gained ground in the field, other risks began to emerge - keeping pace with the rapidly changing favelas. As Sluka (1990, p.114), highlighted: “danger is probably inherent in anthropological fieldwork if only because of the possibility of cultural misunderstandings”. Fieldwork dangers increase beyond this inherent uncertainty in sites in which violence, conflict or political upheaval are present and when research topics are considered sensitive or taboo (Wilson, 2018).

For instance, while I was interviewing the first dweller from Santa Martinha (an elderly lady who had migrated from the Northeast of Brazil to Santa Marta 25 years ago and, for lack of opportunities to have a decent home, had built her own house on the dump), sitting at her doorway, two young men came to ask me why I was there. They asked several questions in an inquisitive tone. Asking me to wait for them while they would do something near there, they promised to return to "know more details" (Fieldnote, 26/08/2017) about my research. The interviewee, realizing the risk I might be running, soon changed the tone of the conversation, giving me the shortest interview of my fieldwork, about 15 minutes. It was possible to see her nervousness, and eagerness to send me away. Noticing the danger, I said goodbye to her and headed for another resident's house, with whom I had already scheduled an interview. But, determined to continue, and relying on the fact that being with a resident would safeguard me from possible problems with such men, I decided to carry on with my interview

with the second participant from Santa Martinha. I went to her house, and for while I was unreachable to the eyes attentive to the movements in the favela.

As Wilson (2018) advised, adopting research methods to mitigate risk and to navigate spaces of conflict, mistrust and distress can be crucial in creating and maintaining ethical relationships between the researcher, residents from Santa Marta and Babilônia and research participants. A combination of different interviews approaches, engaged participant observation and collaboration in community projects, have the potential to reduce risks in different ways. First, regular research across varied areas of Santa Marta and Babilônia, and the fact that I lived in both during the two phases of my fieldwork, increased my visibility and the transparency of my research. Second, and as a result of this, lasting and deep engagement with favela residents built rapport between me and the community, increasing accessibility and allowing me to demonstrate that the research was not simply extractive, even though the small benefits from such interactions with the community should not be overstated (ibid, 2018).

Third, the maintenance of close contact with the residents, participation in WhatsApp groups created specifically to warn about moments of tension in the favela, whether due to conflicts between factions or the presence of the police, made the fieldwork possible after the first episodes of estrangement, risk and fear experienced in the field.

Due to such a context of unpredictability and insecurity, I was discouraged from visiting certain areas by the President of the Babilônia Resident's Association. In one of our discussions about the situation in those places, he told me, "If I were you, I wouldn't go there." That situation placed restrictions on my data collection, in particular, compromising the access to particular areas of interest for my research, that is, the most environmentally vulnerable areas, where there is usually a constant presence of traffickers and thus armed conflicts. For this reason, I had to adjust my strategy for recruiting participants, from people living in high-risk areas to primarily favelas leaders and grassroots movement activists, limiting perspectives and experiences for such communities. While I was able to interview people living in high-risk areas mapped out by Geo-Rio before the aggravation of violent

conflicts in September 2017, my findings are focused primarily on views mediated by favela leaders and members of grassroots movements. Despite this apparent limitation, the research purpose was not compromised due to the diversity of methods used for data collection, which allowed multiple voices to stand out, ensuring the breadth and depth of the analysis.

4.6 Conclusion

I have described in this chapter the methods used in this research to achieve the goals outlined in Chapter 1. I explained the reasonings behind the initial design, a multisite case study, as well as the selection criteria for the five favelas studied. I also discussed the methods used to collect data and the methodology used for the analysis. Last, I presented the challenges of doing research in risky places either because of the local violence, the distrust of the residents traumatized by the continuous threats of removal, or because of the suspicion regarding researchers. Especially this last challenge impelled me to engage politically with favelas' movements not to describe them, but as a privileged standpoint to understand the conflicts posed by disaster risk displacement.

The data collected, organized, and analysed according to the methods mentioned here will be discussed in the three empirical chapters which follow. Chapter 5 examines the city's DRRM through its main instrument, the risk assessment, and how it has been used as an administrative technology for governing favelas through removals as a preventive measure. Chapter 6 examines how disaster risk displacements takes place in practice and its effects on favelas' protracted precarity. Chapter 7 examines how favelados have responded to those ascriptions of favelas as risk areas through the analysis of vulnerability and its potential for the agency through the formation of epistemic networks. Chapter 8 examines affective, temporal, and material forms of resistance in response to favelas' risk management

Chapter 5 – DRRM and resilience as the new frontier for favelas removals

5.1 Introduction

As we have seen in Chapter 2, Rio de Janeiro's favelas have long been the targets of upgrading or removal policies, within the broader project of 'modernisation'. Since the 2010 disaster, the promises of modernisation have been rearticulated through a resilience lens and the broadening of urban interventions to respond to shocks and chronic stresses affecting the city. This 'imported' mode of urban governance has 'risk' as its central category, which has been mobilized to justify the demolition and removal of favelas in areas identified as 'high-risk'.

In this chapter, I will interrogate, informed by the concepts of biopolitics and precarity presented in Chapter 3, the relationship between DRRM, the city authorities' resilience discourse and the urban interventions that have been implemented in contemporary Rio to explain the socio-spatial implications of the intersection of these agendas for favelas and favelados. I will argue that since environment and risk have entered to the grammar of public administration in contemporary Rio – through a broad range of techniques such as probability calculations, methods of observation, geographical information systems (GIS), statistics, risk maps, governmental agencies, etc. (Marchezini, 2015) – it will have practical effects on the production of urban space, especially of favelas.

Favelas, which historically have not been fitting the template of bio politicised life and its ways of making life live, have been the special targets of the biopower (Dillon & Neal, 2008), which not necessarily implies make the favelados life liveable. Said that this chapter addresses the following question:

- How have discourses on DRRM, resilience and its technologies of risk been mobilized to bring about interventions like removals in Rio's favelas?

By exploring how DRRM and resilience are being interpreted and pursued, I examine how certain understandings of risk have gained legitimacy and power while others have not. The objective is to understand how favelas are rendered vulnerable and precarious through contemporary technologies of emergency governance (Anderson, Grove, Rickards, & Kearnes, 2019), and how such emergency politics have contributed to validating the resumption of favela removals.

The chapter sets out the findings from the analysis of the set of policies adopted by City Hall since the 2010 disaster and the introduction of DRRM and resilience building. Considering that Rio's aspiration of resilience not only offers an integrated view of its management but also defines its future aspirations, my analysis offers an analytical perspective to understand how interventions in the favelas unfold and also the meanings attributed to them.

The chapter is, then, organized as follows. Section 5.2 contextualizes the emergence and consolidation of a risk-based resilience agenda in the city-making practices of Rio, via the examination of the urban imaginaries elicited through the Rio Resilient Program. I proceed with an analysis of how these urban imaginaries are mobilised and consolidated through discursive practices around risk, vulnerability, and related moral categorisations of favelas. Section 5.3 examines how technologies of risk have been deployed to ascribe favelas as risky areas. In Section 5.4 I present how the formulations of risk discussed in the previous sections have (re) shaped unjust landscapes of precarity in the city through the idea of risk acceptability.

5.2 Resilience and DRRM in the aftermath of 2010 heavy rain

The date is April 2010. Heavy rainfalls followed by successive landslides killed 67 peoples in the city. In just the Morro dos Prazeres, in Santa Teresa, an avalanche of mud and debris killed as many as 38 people (Burgos, 2017). According to statements by Mayor Eduardo Paes to a major newspaper, the time had come "to end the demagogy and remove the houses in risky areas" (O Globo, 2010). This event was used as an opportunity for the city authorities to act on its ongoing plans to remove favelas

in particular from near to affluent areas in the city. Accordingly, the Mayor seized the opportunity to announce that he would launch a "large package of removals". "We will not do works of R $ 3 million to ensure some houses stay in place. It would be better to give an apartment in Barra for each one, which is cheaper, and no one dies. The removals will continue in my government and soon we will announce a large package of removals [of houses] in risk areas" (Eduardo Paes, in *O Globo*, 2010)

When Eduardo Paes declared that "we will not do works of R $ 3 million to ensure some houses stay in place" he was signalling an important shift from an infrastructure-centric approach in the management of natural hazards to a removal-centric approach, as will be evidenced in the next section. Containment works realised by the Geo-Rio Foundation had been prevalent since the 1970s, with more than 3000 thousand containment works realised, designed to prevent the occurrence of landslides on the slopes of the city.

Moreover, in declaring that "soon we will announce a large package of removals in risk areas", Eduardo Paes established a moral imperative posed not only by the climatic and geotechnical disaster that hit the city but also by the political emergency that had been built since the early 2000s, as noted in Chapter 2. As a result, there is a future imperative (with removals as the target) that neglects the temporality of both past and present needs claimed by favela dwellers (Compton, 2018), namely, their right to stay put as will be discussed in Chapters 7 and 8.

To accomplish (and justify) this future imperative, Eduardo Paes promised to take decisive action to prevent future catastrophes, which "reinforced the urgency of developing resilience in the city of Rio" (Prefeitura do Município do Rio de Janeiro, 2014b). To do so, he declared it was necessary to transform the city's management through a culture of resilience. Rio's DRRM would therefore face a portentous turn.

On December 23, 2010, the Rio Operations Centre (Centro de Operações Rio – COR) was officially established by a Municipal Decree to increase the resilience of the city. The Decree sets out its duty to monitor the day-to-day activities of the city, to integrate many departments involved in the routine

management of Rio, and to handle crisis and emergencies (Prefeitura do Rio de Janeiro, 2016). In a visit to the Rio Operations Centre (Centro de Operações Rio – COR), a member of the resilience team informed me that since the disaster, the mayor had felt a great need to monitor everything in an integrated way, so within six months 33 units were working together within one operations centre.

The COR was initially developed for risk management and prevention, although it soon became apparent that it was also a strategic tool for urban mobility management and large-scale event coordination. According to the above informant, the COR fosters an ideal environment for long-term urban planning that incorporates the management of recurrent city risks. The COR is divided into three main rooms: the control room, the centre of the project, where 200 controllers track the city in real-time through a 60 square metre video wall which consists of 80, 46-inch monitors, receiving images from more than 900 cameras (see Figure 5.1), via 30 km of fibre optic cable, in three 24/7 shifts; the Crisis Room is used to conduct emergency meetings with multiple departments, related to two other small crisis rooms, one at the official residence of the mayor and one at the Civil Defense Service; and the Press Room is where media representatives regularly issue updates to the public.

Figure 5-1: Operations Centre Rio (COR)
Source: author's photograph

In 2010, City Hall acquired a new weather radar to improve predictability in detecting adverse weather events. Besides, the municipality has invested in water containment works in risky areas, in the

installation of evacuation systems in more than one hundred favelas susceptible to landslides, as well as investments in improving the drainage capacity of the city.

Reproducing the DRRM model and rhetoric sanctioned by the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA),[33] City Hall and the Civil Defense launched the document 'Rio de Janeiro in search of resilience to heavy rains' in 2013, which summarizes the actions that have been adopted to respond to the disaster risk in the aftermath of the 2010 events. Based on the priorities set in the HFA, each action adopted is related to specific priorities (see Table 5.1). The analysis of the city's actions taken to reduce disaster risk and build resilience to heavy rains contemplates "resettlement of residents of high-risk areas as a measure to reduce risks" (Defesa Civil, 2013, n.p).

Table 5-1: Actions taken by the municipal government according to the Hyogo Protocol

Priorities defined by the Hyogo Protocol	Actions by the municipality
1) Prioritize disaster reduction	• Acquisition of a New Weather Radar • Strengthening of Civil Defense and other organs of the System • Deployment of an Operation Centre Implementation of the Flood Prevention Plan of Praça da Bandeira
2) Know the Risk and take action	• Mapping of Geological Risk Areas • Implementation of the Community Alert and Alarm System
3) Build understanding and awareness	• Formation of Community Civil Defense Centres • Performance in Schools (events and simulations)
4) Reduce risk	• Legal and physical delimitation of risk and environmental preservation areas • Continuous conservation and cleaning actions • **Resettlement of residents in high-risk areas** • Reforestation • Infrastructure works and slope stabilization
5) Being prepared and ready to act	• Definition of roles and responsibilities (Emergency Plan) • Community, Civil Society and Government Mobilized • Emergency Community Evacuations and Simulation

Source: the author based on the document 'Rio de Janeiro in search of resilience to heavy rains' published by the Civil Defense of Rio de Janeiro.

[33] The HFA was a 10-year plan to reduce natural hazards adopted by 168 governments in January 2005 at World Conference on Disaster Reduction, held in Hyogo, Japan. This plan was succeeded by the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030.

In 2013, Rio was selected to integrate the first group of the 100 Resilient Cities Network, a Rockefeller Foundation project.[34] To bring the resilience imaginaries to the administrative sectors of the municipality, the Rio Resilient Strategy began to be formulated. The Rio Resilience Strategy emerged with a focus on two main challenges faced by the municipality at that time: the climate risk and the Olympics. To respond to these challenges, the strategies follow the usual mantra of resilience rhetoric: the promise is that a resilient city would have the ability to survive, adapt and grow regardless of "the chronic stresses and acute shocks" (Prefeitura do Rio de Janeiro, 2016) it experiences. It would also have the ability, after a shock, to return not just to the previous position, but to a better one. The Rio Resilience Strategy has the goal of institutionally reorganizing the measures that the municipality has already taken to "bounce back better" (ibid, 2016). The key emphasis is on the response to shocks and chronic stresses, which can interrupt the city's daily life, or 'the normalcy' of the city, in the language of resilience. According to the Chief Executive of Resilience and Operations, the Rio Resilience Programme:

> despite not presenting any innovative content in itself, it brings as a novelty in the management of crises and emergencies, an integrated vision of incorporating diverse disciplines to address and respond to chronic and unforeseen shocks, so that, increasingly, society and governments consider aggregating forces to overcome existing challenges and those which have not yet arrived. (Junqueira, 2015, p.57 - translated by the author).

The "integrated vision" for the management of crises and emergencies has mainly focused on "those [challenges] which have not yet arrived". Key to this strategy is the emphasis on preparedness for "unlikely or unknown risks" (Prefeitura do Município do Rio de Janeiro, 2014b) – that is, rare and /or unpredictable disruptive events like the heavy rains and landslides that affected the city in 2010.

[34] The Rockefeller Foundation was founded in the USA in 1913 to encourage philanthropy abroad in five main subject areas: i) public health; ii) agricultural and natural sciences; iii) arts and humanities; iv) social sciences and v) international relations.

Especially with global warming, “the climate is expected to act in an irregular and extreme manner”, which means that, according to the new vision for city planning, “too much reliance on historical data can lead to mistaken predictions that do not take into account the unpredictability of nature and human actions” (ibid).

This future orientation towards crisis is a distinctive ingredient of the strategy, as we will see in Chapter 8. The vulnerability to events in an unknown future that could once have been handled by dealing with familiar statistical probabilities and DRRM practices, such as containment walls, is now replaced by a way of governing the city focused on unexpected traumatic events that disturb the current modalities of uncertainty and future management. For instance, in the diagnosis made for the adoption of the Rio Resilience Strategy, the municipal government highlights how the uncertainty posed by climate change requires another approach to risk:

> Climate change is subverting much of what is known about climate, making historical climate data unreliable. The extremes are becoming more and more normal. The only predictions we present are climate projections for the coming decades, as they have a strong scientific basis. Even so, these projections only point to trends with a significant degree of uncertainty. Events related to economics, finance, domestic and foreign policy, and social movements are intrinsically difficult to predict, as they are composed of several variables, many of which are unknown. For this reason, we minimize analyses related to the frequency and focus on impacts and on how to neutralize, mitigate or take advantage of them as opportunities. The focus, therefore, is not on the possible frequency of events, which are increasingly dynamic or unexpected, but on their consequences and what can be done about them. (Prefeitura do Município do Rio de Janeiro, 2014, p.18)

For this purpose, the municipality proposes a new approach to identify risk, framing it according to the matrix for risk assessment presented in the document ‘Rio Resiliente: Diagnóstico e Áreas de foco’ [Rio Resilient: Diagnosis and Focus Areas].

Figure 5-2: Risk assessment matrix developed by the Rio Resilient team
Source: Prefeitura do Município do Rio de Janeiro (2014a, p.19)

According to this matrix, risks, both abrupt shocks and chronic stresses, are classified as i) recurring risk, the probability of which can be estimated, due to the existence of a historical basis; ii) plausible risk, with a potential for catastrophe but very unlikely, and therefore quite difficult to calculate its probability of occurrence; iii) speculative risk with the potential for unknown catastrophe (ibid). Based on such risk categories, the city defined the scope for interventions and the application of resources. Although landslides and floods are classified as recurring risks, the plan assumes the possibility of framing such occurrences as speculative risk, since

> with global warming, the climate is expected to act irregularly and extremely. the next natural tragedy may be of even greater dimensions than the greatest that has ever been. [...] In that case, too much confidence in historical data can generate misleading predictions, which do not consider the unpredictability of nature and human actions. (ibid, p. 20).

This kind of perspective inaugurates a "new future crisis" (Zeiderman, Kaker, Silver, Wood, & Ramakrishnan, 2017; Ramalho, 2019), whose core tenet, the reconfiguration of the 'politics of cities',

is imperative to rule the present in expectation of a future catastrophe. To manage what City Hall allege cannot be confidently foreseen, the municipal government presents the resilience rhetoric to orient itself and Rio's population to an emergency politics (Honig, 2009). This emergency governance encompasses discourses of fear, urgency and catastrophe forging a "popular consensus" about urban interventions taken as a 'taboo' (as we saw in Chapter 2): the favelas' removals. The sense of crisis mobilized by these discourses demands a rapid and effective response that cannot allow for lengthy and unnecessary political debate, and thus provides an incentive for conservatism to revert to itself (Sánchez & Broudehoux, 2013). As noted by Butler & Athanasiou (2013, p.168), in this "biopolitical moment of crisis-management […] normative governmentality interweaves with the sovereign decree, and the disciplinary ordinariness of life-affirming welfare protection is coextensive with the selective suspension of the law and the lethal disposability of bodies".

Urban resilience, then, is undertaken around "imaginaries of a desirable future opposed to the undesirable dystopic alternatives rooted in present realities" (Ramalho, 2019, p. 24). The desirable future would be represented by the "Olympic opportunity" (Prefeitura do Rio de Janeiro, 2015) with great potential to reinsert the city as a 'global' one. As stated by the municipal government, the Olympics represented an opportunity to break with the past of loss of political and economic prestige,[35] representing an important turning point in the city's self-esteem and aspirations (Prefeitura do Rio de Janeiro, 2017).

As Sánchez and Broudehoux, (2013) point out, mega-events, including world exhibitions, international conferences or Sporting events such as the World Cup and the Olympic Games, have become a lifeline by many city governments to catalyse their development in an era of neoliberal adjustments. Hosting high-profile events could bring back the prestige lost in the past as it was a rare opportunity for city branding, helping to boost international reach through media coverage and advertising, but at the

[35] The transfer of the capital from Rio de Janeiro to Brasilia in the 1960s had a major political and economic impact on the city, which lost its status as a Federal District.

expense of purging the 'Other of the city' from the aspirations of the future city once it "endangers life's biopoliticisation" (Foucault, 2003 cited by Dillon & Neal, 2008, p.167).

As I argue in the sections that follow, the most powerful way to get rid of the obstacles to achieve the (neo) liberal urban future is through emergency politics (Honig, 2009). Emergency here is not seen as "a state of exception" (ibid, 2009), but rather "a form of life structured through biopolitical techniques and mechanisms of racialization that delimit what lives can and should be exposed to banal forms of exceptional violence" (Anderson et al, 2019, p.05). As we partially saw in Chapter 2 and will see in Chapter 6, these techniques and mechanisms have already been forged through a longstanding state-led-precarization of favela space and favelados' bodies. What the evocation of emergency in this context does is 'de-exceptionalise exceptions', reverting the achievements, in terms of rights, conquered by favelados in the post-authoritarian period, as discussed in Chapter 2. In this way, we must interrogate what counts as an emergency when the line between exceptional and everyday events becomes blurred. Then, the undesirable dystopic future would be represented by the current present in which favelas are treated as 'non-removable'. Instead of creating exceptionalities, the emergency brings them within the field of normalcy. Resuming favelas' removals, would then be the 'adaptive response' to the unpredictable threats posed by climate change and to enabling the desired future of a (mega) event-city.

5.3 Making favelas intelligible through risk: paving the way for their displacements

As I briefly highlighted previously, the shift in the approach to responding to disaster risk is centred on the way that City Hall handles risk. As the declarations of Eduardo Paes made clear, favelas in high-risk areas, usually subject to containment works are now no longer eligible to remain because of the governmental claims on the climate threats that made disaster forecast unpredictable. What was once seen as a 'calculable risk', is now understood as "unlikely risks or unknown risks" (Prefeitura do Município do Rio de Janeiro, 2014b), opening up the possibility of emergency politics driven by the

normalization of an exception: the removals. How have DRRM and resilience policy contributed to emergency politics based on removals?

To address this question, this section illustrates how historically, shifts in DRRM and its technologies of risk governance in Rio, since its inception in the 1960s, have been shaped by and shaped the ways favelas are governed by the city. This focuses on how the forms of knowledge DRRM and resilience contribute to making risk 'visible' as a key component of the production of space in the city, especially in the favelas.

The risk knowledge formation and its "calculative practices" (Ghertner, 2010) draw attention to the diverse forms in which knowledge is consolidated and used to create intelligibility about the city that establishes the 'asfalto' (formal city) as having a tolerable pattern of risk and favelas as an unacceptable one. In this section, I am interested in how DRRM and resilience-building use carefully selected metrics to assess and assign values and meanings to the favelas to legitimize their displacements. To this purpose, I would like to draw attention to what Collete (2006, p.43) calls a "need for more textured analyses of vulnerability to understand how risk is framed and how the framing articulates with [the] rationale for risk reduction solutions".

The story begins in 1966 when the Geotechnical Institute of the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro, currently the Geo-Rio Foundation, the organ of the Municipal Secretariat of Works of the City, was created. The Institute was born as a result of heavy rains that hit the city in January that year, when landslides resulted in 70 deaths and more than 500 injured, leaving the city in a state of public calamity for several days, a fact that generated strong national and international repercussions. Among the various legal attributions that the new body had at the time, the most important were the elaboration of emergency and long-term plans for the protection of the slopes, and the execution of slope containment works. For the first time, a scientifically rational and 'accurate' body of geotechnical expertise was formally created to survey the city's geophysical territory, defining the city's risk governmentalization, particularly, the favelas. The risk mapping was the main technology that enabled

this overall form of risk governmentality in which the latest form is resilience, as discussed in the previous section.

The first risk mapping of the city was completed in 1984, prompted by a landslide and garbage slipping that had occurred in December 1983 in the Cantagalo and Pavão-Pavãozinho favelas, causing the deaths of six people. Due to the tragedy, the state government provided resources not only for the stabilization of the slopes in those particular favelas but also resources for the city's first landslide risk mapping to be prepared.

Favelas, therefore, begin to be made visible in the cartography of the city. As a kind of "unconquered territory, a *terrae incognitae*, favelas had been silenced on many of Rio de Janeiro's maps over the last century" (Novaes, 2014, p. 201). However, when they began to be mapped by the governmental agencies, and converted to *terrae cognitae*, this was with the intent of making them legible for intervention, and, not accidentally, they became legible through the lens of risk.

Following further heavy rains in 1988 that contributed to hundreds of accidents on the city's slopes and the deaths of dozens of people, the Geotechnical Institute made a significant change in the city's DRRM philosophy. A preventive works program was implemented for the first time in the city, and risk mapping was also carried out, based on a systematic geological-geotechnical study, to direct subsidies to reorganize the disorderly occupation of the favelas. For the first time, a Recommended Land Use Map (see Figure 5.3 for an example) was proposed, indicating areas suitable for urbanization (U), areas of restricted urbanization (UR), areas for environmental preservation (P) and high-risk areas (R).



Figure 5-3: Recommended Land Use Map of Vidigal favela
Source: D'orsi (2006)

Risk mapping was undertaken with the logic of optimizing the allocation of public resources to different areas depending on their assessed level of risk. The categorisation of areas into low, moderate, and high-risk zones entered into the urban grammar being used by Geo-Rio technicians to classify the physical territory of the occupied slopes. In a document produced by one of Geo-Rio's coordinators, the author states that at that time "there was still an attempt to associate 'high risk' with situations in which the execution of stabilization work was not recommended due to the cost-benefit ratio, and consequently the areas in question would be considered as 'non *aedificandi*'" (D'Orsi, 2006 - translated by author). By the end of the 1980s, Geo-Rio had consolidated its risk mapping methodology and were able to launch the first landslide susceptibility map, on a 1:25,000 scale for the entire municipality (Campos, 2016), as shown below.



Figure 5-4: Landslide Risk Map of the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro, completed in June 1991. The colours white, green, yellow, and red represent, respectively, no risk, low risk, moderate risk, and high risk.
Source: D'Orsi (2006)

In response to further torrential rains in 1996, which killed 56 people, Geo-Rio underwent another new phase of development. In addition to further efforts to develop containment works to protect areas from landslides, geological-geotechnical methodologies and risk mapping on detailed scales were tested and applied; physical demarcations of risk areas such as those defined by the Ecolimite's barrier, as we saw in Chapter 4, were implemented; and the city could count on a pioneering warning system of heavy rainfall and landslides, the Rio Alert System.

The Rio Alert System was developed through the hiring of three private geotechnical companies, at a time of transition from a 'managerial' to an 'entrepreneurial model' of urban governance with the first strategic plan of the city. This plan was introduced in 1995 under the César Maia administration. There, the idea of building a modern, competitive, and global Rio de Janeiro appears for the first time. Significant reforms were made to consolidate a form of management free from state restrictions, the neoliberal urbanism of the city (Faulhaber & Azevedo, 2015). It is not accidentally that this new urban

mode of governance reflected the "'responsibilization' of the threatened subject [the city], who is 'programmed' to act out security in a fashion that internalizes neoliberal values" (Kaufmann, 2016, p.99). The seeds of resilient urbanism were beginning to be sown and "Eduardo Paes, one of Cesar Maia's little boys" was the one to harvest them (Fernanda, informant from the Coletivo Técnico).

A new governor's "hegemonic power bloc" and core business interests, including real estate, emerged (Richmond & Garmany, 2016). This coalition was key to the mobilization of an urban emergency debate through several semi-legal jurisdictions to legally enshrine its right to suspend legal norms and enforce a policy that privileges a few (Vainer, 2011 cited by Richmond & Garmany, 2016).

In the 2000s, an important further innovation was the introduction of a single parameter for comparing risk situations. This took the form of a Quantitative Risk Index [Índice Quantitativo de Risco (IQR)], allocated to sectors of inhabited slopes for which there is georeferenced information, including the development of software (GEO RISQ) for this purpose.

With the IQR, it was argued that it was possible, for example, to hierarchize a large number of risk situations located on different slopes and, consequently, to better direct resources towards risk mitigation/elimination, which, according to Geo-Rio (2010), had become crucial in a sector often marked by precarious resources for risk prevention. One of the biggest innovations of the IQR, according to Geo-Rio, was its generalizing power concerning the hierarchy of risk, which started to be used in the mapping of all favelas in the city. Although all these technologies were available in 2005, the risk analysis model was applied only to a relatively small number of locations (45), apparently due to insufficient resources (Campos, 2016). As we will see in more detail in the next section, this methodology will be crucial to legitimating the removal of favelas after the 2010 disasters.

In summary, the gradual development of risk assessment and risk mapping techniques, catalysed repeatedly by specific disaster events, led to a set of calculative practices for governing the slopes of the city (Ghertner, 2010). These calculative practices not only established the technical requirements for favelas' governance but also form a "calculative foundation of rule" (ibid, 2010) which refers to

the “scientifically rational and ‘accurate’ description of the territory and population” (ibid, p.04) of favelas, enabling rule by the sovereign power. The next sub-section shows how the epistemological basis on which information was gathered, knowledge assembled and ‘truths’ verified has enabled the management of favela territories and populations.

5.3.1 The risk is political: risk assessment and the production of a mass of undifferentiated victims

As was shown in the previous section, the development of a “calculative foundation of rule” on which favelas’ risk vulnerability has been made quantifiable, rendered favelas’ risks measurable, generic, and visible, thus contributing to legitimizing the discourse of favelas as risk areas. To show the contradictions inherited in this methodology and how it has been employed to drive governmental interventions in favelas, this sub-section is focused on the contradictions and interests behind the use of particular technologies of risk, put in another way, the politicization of the calculative practices of risk.

Shortly after the heavy rains of 2009/2010, City Hall immediately announced the release of a list of 119 favelas in ‘high-risk areas’, even before announcing that Geo-Rio would carry out new studies to map the city’s risk areas. The official news about the city's plan to equate high-risk categorisation with the necessity of favela removal was released on January 8, 2010, and appeared as a cover story from the newspaper *O Globo*, under the title "Rio will remove 119 favelas” (Figure 5.5).

Sexta-feira, 8 de janeiro de 2010 O GLOBO 13

RIO

Prefeitura removerá 119 favelas

Pelo menos 12.196 imóveis construídos em áreas de risco serão demolidos até 2012

Isabela Bastos e Selma Schmidt

A Secretaria municipal de Habitação já relacionou 119 favelas que serão removidas integralmente pela prefeitura até o fim de 2012, por estarem em locais de risco de deslizamento ou inundação, de proteção ambiental ou destinados a logradouros públicos. Com pelo menos 12.196 domicílios, essas comunidades ocupam 2,34 milhões de metros quadrados — uma área maior do que o bairro do Leblon. O secretário Jorge Bittar informou que trechos não urbanizáveis de outras favelas, que ainda estão sendo levantados, também serão desocupados.

Entre as favelas que vão desaparecer estão a do Horto (Jardim Botânico), a Indiana (Tijuca), a da CCPL (Benfica), a do Metrô (Maracanã), a Vila Autódromo (Barra) e a Vila Taboinhas (Vargem Grande). É o caso também da pequena Matinha, num trecho de floresta atrás do Clep Ayrton Senna e na vizinhança da Rocinha.

Embora a quantidade de casas construídas irregularmente ainda precise ser atualizada, a favela Rio Piraquê, em Guaratiba, é a maior a ser reassentada totalmente (1.068 casas, pelo censo de 2000 do IBGE), seguida da Santa Anastácia, em Jacarepaguá (381 habitações em 2000) e do Rio Morto, na Barra (303 imóveis em 2000).

— Os reassentamentos serão feitos num processo de amplo diálogo com as comunidades. Nada será feito de

Gabriel de Paiva/ 13-5-2009

A FAVELA DO RIO PIRAQUÊ, em Guaratiba, a que terá a maior quantidade de casas demolidas pela prefeitura: pelo menos 1.068, segundo o censo 2000 do IBGE

Gerlson Araújo/ 20-8-2008

Figure 5-5 “City Hall will remove 119 favelas: At least 12,196 properties built in risk areas will be demolished up by 2012”
Source: *O Globo*, 08 Jan 2010.

In the same report, the mayor said that it was necessary to end “the demagoguery" around the subject of removals in risk areas:

> It will be done with dignity, dialogue, compensation, and social rent. Let's not admi t that, in any rain, the mayor cannot sleep thinking that someone can die in landslides. You have to stop the demagoguery and remove [favelas]. We will not do works of millions to hold some houses in their place. (Eduardo Paes, *O Globo*, 08/01/2010)

When Eduardo Paes refers to the historical claims of favela dwellers to the right to stay put as “demagoguery”, he is delivering a clear message: the removals should be reinserted as urban policy. In fact, despite all the technologies implemented to DRRM after 2010, when it came to favelas, the main alternative offered was removal. In this speech, he not only criticises the historic achievements of the favela housing movement but also blames those who are fighting for the right to the favela.

However, he also denies the past contribution of the public authorities to the precaritization of the favelas. For example, if we analyse the resources for the containment of slopes and drainage works, which could have limited the magnitude of the tragedy, we can see that for more than a decade City Hall had been allocating few resources to Geo-Rio, the body responsible for the works and interventions carried out in favelas.

According to a survey carried out by Campos (2016), based on the report of the Municipal Court of Auditors, between 1995 and 2008, after modest growth in 1996, the year in which torrential rains and tragedies occurred in the city, both the authorized budget allocation for works and the number of works carried out by Geo-Rio were drastically reduced and remained so for more than a decade (Figure 5-6).



Figura 8 – Evolução da dotação orçamentária autorizada para obras no período de 1995 a 2008.



Figura 9 – Evolução do número de obras da GEO-RIO no período de 1995 a 2008[11]

Figure 5-6: The first graph shows the budget allocation authorized for the execution of works, and the second shows the number of performed works, both for the period 1995 - 2008.
Source: Campos (2016)

This has had a very negative impact on the 'resilience' of poor communities located on slopes in the face of a new extreme weather event. If we consider Bohle, Downing and Watts' (1994) definition of

vulnerable populations as “those most exposed to perturbations, who possess the most limited coping capacity and suffer the most from the impact of a crisis or environmental perturbations (such as climate change), and who are endowed with the circumscribed potential for recovery” (ibid, 1994, p. 38), such limited investment in drainage and containment works, associated with a blackout in housing policies in the decades that preceded the 2010 disasters, means it is possible to infer that public power through “political inactions” (Davies et al., 2017) has contributed to the erosion of the favelas’ capacity to deal with disasters, and consequently, increased their risk of exposure to crises as well as the risk of severe consequences, such as loss of lives.

Still, according to Campos, despite the lack of data on the post-disaster period, the Risk Management Plan of the City of Rio de Janeiro mentions investments of R $ 207 million in works for the period 2009-2011, and a forecast of R $ 112 million for 2012, which would mean a significant increase over previous years. However, according to his survey, the contracts for works in the favelas would represent less than half of the total value contracted by Geo-Rio:

> Almost half of the total contracted value refers to stabilization and drainage works on high-traffic public roads (such as Estrada Grajaú-Jacarepaguá or Estrada da Grota Funda), or on roads within Tijuca National Park (including containment works for allowing the reopening of the Corcovado Train). Without making this distinction, one cannot be sure how many resources are allocated to the works that should be given priority, that is, those carried out inside favelas, where any geotechnical accident has a high potential to cause victims and losses to the families (Campos, 2016, n.p.).

Either the reduction in the allocation of already scarce resources for the performance of preventive actions that can effectively reduce the risk on slopes and areas subjects to risk, or, as the engineer suggests, the prioritisation of works to enhance access routes in affluent urban areas instead of works that might alleviate the impact of heavy rainfall in areas of greater vulnerability, can be qualified as

an active and deliberate production of risk by the government. In other words, it is comparable to the biopolitical decision of a “letting die politics”, as discussed in Chapter 3.

To understand these biopolitical drivers behind the DRRM we have to analyse the conditions that made it possible for the municipality to claim that removals would be the only resource available to address the problem. An interview undertook with Fernanda, an architect, and member of the Coletivo Técnico, was quite insightful when she comes to questioning the scientific grounds of the mapping. According to Fernanda, what was presented as the result of a scientific and technical study, was merely an artifice created by the municipality to legitimize the removals. This worked both from a technical legal point of view, as well as on shaping public opinion.

> According to an architect from the SMH, that Fernanda spoke to, the major wanted technical ‘evidence’ for the removal of several favelas by 2012. There was no technical study as such, technicians only added to the mayor’s criteria, items such as risk and flooding (Interview with Fernanda, Coletivo Técnico, 04/12/2017)

According to Fernanda, the "removal package" launched by the mayor under the technical risk argument would be a strategy "to fulfil a demand that the mayor presented", in the first strategic plan of the municipality, introduced soon after he took over, in 2009. According to the Strategic Plan 2009-2012, the plan would be "to reduce by at least 3.5% favela areas in the city by 2012, concerning the year 2008" (Prefeitura do Município do Rio de Janeiro, 2012). In the Strategic Plan, an urban infrastructure goal was set for the construction of fifty thousand new social housing units, by the end of 2012. Eventually, according to Fernanda, Mayor Eduardo Paes, who “wanted to make an immediate and impressive impact” (Fernanda, Coletivo Técnico) in his first mandate, came up with a list at the same time as calling for a technical study that had not even started.

There are several shreds of evidence of the synergy of factors at work in the assignment of those 119 favelas as high-risk areas. First, the launch in 2009 of the Minha Casa Minha Vida Program (PMCMV),[36] which intended to reduce the country's housing deficit, especially for the population on the minimum wage or up to three times it, and where most of the housing deficit (70%) was concentrated (Silva, 2016). Then, families living in 'high-risk areas' and those from this 'social interest range' became targets of the municipality, which needed to develop *Local Housing Plans of Social Interest*, to access the PMCMV resources. In this plan, the municipal government diagnosed the local housing deficit and the relationship between housing conditions and household incomes.[37]

Second, to make it feasible, there was an urgency to identify the spatial location of low-income families. The precarious spatial situations were then mediated by two important tools of urban planning: "risk areas", and "subnormal clusters",[38] or, favelas (Silva, 2016). Not coincidentally, it was announced that Geo-Rio would be in charge of preparing the risk assessment of these areas. Therefore, with the announcement of the list of 119 favelas, City Hall already set up the creation of a demand. In their eagerness to produce demand for accessing federal funding that would enable the goals of the Strategic Plan 2009-2012, an undifferentiated mass of victims of a potential disaster was forged. The risk areas were assigned even before the new studies began to be carried out by Geo-Rio.

Then, came the disaster of 2010. The municipal government opportunistically appropriated the tragedies to put into action its removal plan already foreseen in the Strategic Plan 2009-2012. One of the recurring themes from the interviewees threatened with removal was how quickly removals hit

[36] The PMCMV was launched in 2009 with the largest scale and volume of subsidy for the acquisition of home ownership for sectors historically excluded from the formal real estate market. The Program offered subsidies to three family income brackets: full subsidies to families affected by natural disasters; 95% subsidies to families whose income ranges from 0 to R$ 1,600, the 'social interest range.According to data from the SMH, by July 2012, 56,961 housing units were contracted by the municipality. For the 'social interest band', 27,077 housing units were contracted, distributed into 82 'popular condominiums' in the capital. Of these, 48 were ready by 2012. From this, 32 were occupied by 'removed' families, 12 by 'drawn' families and 4 were still waiting for occupation (Silva, 2016).

[37] To see how it works in practice, see Chapter 6 on Indiana.

[38] According to the IBGE, the subnormal clusters, or favelas, are the set of 51 or more housing characterized by lack of title and at least one of the characteristics: irregular traffic routes size and shape lots; and/or lack of essential public services (IBGE, 2010).

their lives. Eduardo Paes "caught everyone and put [them] in the [removal] pack". Angélica, who became a community leader through the process of resisting removals in her community (as will be discussed in Chapter 7), refers to this climate of emergency created by City Hall, that resulted in the condemnation of the entire community as a high-risk area:

> When it came to the rains of 2010, in April, the risk was throughout the city of Rio de Janeiro. The rain did not affect only the hills, it affected the entire city. There was flooding everywhere … And here in the community, the only thing that fell into the cemetery was a *fusquinha* [an old Volkswagen Beetle] that had been abandoned for a long time and a flow of mud covering some graves. There was no damage even on the street … And because of that blockage that fell inside the cemetery, Mayor Eduardo Paes … caught everyone and put them in the pack…
>
> Claiming that the whole community was at risk (Interview with Angélica, Estradinha, 14/09/2017)

Angélica account emphasises how quickly Paes introduced an emergency policy to close down any open debate about the traumatic events of 2010, putting in its place (Edkins, 2006, 2010) discourses and practices that aimed at guaranteeing the capacity of the city to 'bounce back' at the expenses of favelas, through the resumption of the removals policy.

Despite City Hall has announced a "removal package" (*O Globo*, 2010) already in 2010, the Geo-Rio list of 117 favelas would be launched only in 2011, affecting more than twenty thousand households in high-risk areas. However, as reported by Angélica and many other residents, removals in risk areas were already going full steam ahead. On an 'emergency' basis, Geo-Rio contracted the services of the engineering company, Concremat Engenharia, to produce a new risk mapping of the municipality and more detailed mapping for the Maciço da Tijuca (Tijuca Massif) and surrounding areas.

According to one of my interviewees, Maurício (an engineer and social activist, member of the Coletivo Técnico)[39], Concremat was hired to perform a risk mapping for which Geo-Rio already had expertise. What is striking is that in the reports produced by Concremat there is no reference to previous studies and interventions by Geo-Rio.

The concealment of a consolidated database produced and owned by Geo-Rio seems to have been a political strategy. City Hall ended up making invisible the success of consolidated practices that could have dramatically reduced the need for the "removal package" offered as a solution by City Hall, leaving room for infrastructural solutions that had been done by Geo-Rio for over 20 years.

This option for the 'invisibilisation' of the works done by Geo-Rio after the 2010 disaster seems incompatible with its trajectory since its creation in the late 1960s. As Maurício Campos notes, Geo-Rio's studies used to be so accurate that in a risk inventory on Laboriaux, Rocinha, in 1992, two "potentially unstable" areas at Laboriaux were identified, where, during the 2010 heavy rain, landslides occurred.[40]

With the outsourcing of Geo-Rio's functions, the accuracy and reliability of the risk assessment seem to have been affected. In the next sub-section, I will present some of the inaccuracies present in the Geo-Rio reports that exposed how the DRRM has been taken over by deep-rooted, not always substantiated, beliefs forged by racialized modes of intelligibility on favelas, similar to the colonial treatment of cortiços in the nineteenth century.

5.3.2 Fuzzy risks

This sub-section presents the inconsistencies in the risk assessment[41] used as a supporting tool for DRRM strategies aimed at reducing susceptibility to landslide in the city. For this purpose, the analysis

[39] The informant agreed to his name being published, and some of the content of his reports was published.
[40] Despite the accuracy in the identification of those high-risk areas and the reliability of the data, no containment work was done, resulting in the deaths of two people.
[41] It is based on the analysis of the Risk Management Plan of the City of Rio de Janeiro prepared after the accident of 2010; the Geoprocessing Report (Relatório No 458120-50-CD-599-RL-001) authored by Geo-Rio that provides

relies on a central document, the Geoprocessing Report, which informs the Risk Management Municipal Plan formulated in 2010. The Geoprocessing Report was conceived by the Geo-Rio Foundation/Concremat, aiming at identifying the susceptibility and resilience level of the physical and anthropic elements exposed as a first strategy in identifying the risk generating situation, the active processes and the factors of environmental degradation that can contribute to producing losses and damages (Geo-Rio, 2010).

For this purpose, a multi-attribute decision-making method, combined with fuzzy techniques,[42] was developed by Geo-Rio in the production of the susceptibility mapping (Figure 5-7). The method allows planners to take into account, according to different territorial units, all the susceptibility factors, measured through both quantitative and qualitative parameters, while providing them with a risk index, allowing the ranking of territorial units into low, medium and high risk and to single out the priority intervention areas (Galderisi, Ceudech, & Pistucci, 2008). For the calculation of landslide susceptibility, the method considers the following factors: a) geological-geotechnical characteristics; b) declivities; c) geomorphology; d) vegetation cover and e) land use.

technical basis for decisions related to risk mitigation policy in the city; and the geological-geotechnical risk assessments related to the favelas of this study, as well as the counter reports produced by the informant, a member of the Advisory Co Collective, along with interviews with the Geo-Rio expert and the informant from the Coletivo Técnico.

[42] Fuzzy techniques are a mathematical approximation to handle unquantifiable or linguistic information where it is not possible to define rigid boundaries. These are used by Geo-Rio to convert factors into standardized images on a scale of susceptibility. Factors, such as geology, declivities, geomorphology, vegetation cover and land use were rescaled to susceptibility values, ranging from zero (lower susceptibility) to 10 (higher susceptibility) (Geo-Rio, 2010),



Figure 5-7: Risk mapping of the city of Rio de Janeiro
Source: Geo-Rio (2010)

Regarding all the above-mentioned factors, a particular one calls our attention because of its totalizing character: the land-use attribute. To calculate the susceptibility related to this attribute, the Geo-Rio report claims that "the values were distributed within land-use classes according to the characteristics of each class and their vulnerability to mass movements and proximity to existing urban centres" (2010, p. 57). It is interesting to observe that in the methodology, Geo-Rio asserts that "degraded areas, as well as those occupied by the population, were assigned the highest susceptibility values" (Geo-Rio, 2010, p. 57), as presented in Table 5.2. However, if we look carefully, the only occupied areas assigned with high susceptibility to landslides are favelas while the consolidated residential areas are assigned as low susceptibility areas.

Table 5-2: Geo-Rio's classification for landslide susceptibility in Rio



RELATÓRIO Nº 458120-50-CD-599-RL-001 REV. 0
PROGRAMA APOIO TÉCNICO PARA MAPEAMENTO GEOLÓGICO EM ENCOSTAS FOLHA 58
TÍTULO: RELATÓRIO DE GEOPROCESSAMENTO

Tabela 11 – Tabela contendo as classes do uso do solo.

CLASSES DO USO DO SOLO	SUSCETIBILIDADE
Afloramentos rochosos	Médio
Cobertura arbórea e arbustiva	Baixo
Cobertura gramíneo lenhosa	Baixo à Médio
FAVELA	Alto
Áreas de educação e saúde	Baixo
Áreas de lazer	Baixo
Infraestrutura pública	Baixo
Áreas residenciais	Baixo
Áreas agrícolas	Baixo
Áreas de comércio e serviços	Baixo
Áreas de exploração mineral	Baixo
Áreas de transporte	Baixo
Áreas industriais	Baixo
Áreas não edificadas	Baixo
Corpos hídricos	Baixo

Classes of Land Use	*Susceptibility*	*Area %*
Rock outcrops	Medium	2.2
Tree and shrub cover	Low	31.9
Wood grassy cover	Low to Medium	14
FAVELA	High	3.8
Areas of education and healthy	Low	0.8
Leisure areas	Low	1.6
Public Infrastructure	Low	1.8
Residential areas	Low	28.2
Agricultural areas	Low	3.1
Trade and service areas	Low	1.4
Mineral exploitation areas	Low	0.5
Transport areas	Low	1.4
Industrial areas	Low	2.0
Non-built areas	Low	2.3
Hydric bodies	Low	2.2
Areas subject to flooding	No inf. available	2.9

Source: Geo-Rio (2010) – translated by the author

According to these criteria, 'favela' would be the only type of land use with high susceptibility to landslides. How can favelas, which correspond to only 3.8% of the occupied land of the city, be classified as highly susceptible to landslides while the residential areas which correspond to almost 30% of the areas occupied in the city are considered as a low risk? As well highlighted by the informant, Maurício Campos,

> This would be true if all favela areas on slopes were characterized by poorly executed cuts and uncompressed landfills, garbage accumulation on the ground, and so on. Such situations are often encountered in favelas but cannot be generalized, largely due to several containment and drainage works made by Geo-Rioover the last 50 years, which has contributed to significantly reduce the slopes' susceptibility to mass movements. (Campos, 2016, p. 10)

Geo-Rio/Concremat's modes of assessing and classifying uncertainties suggest another controversial issue: overestimation of risks in favela areas based on the generalization of the risk susceptibility, disregarding actual risk exposure. Although it was possible to classify the whole body of Rio's favelas as highly susceptible to landslides, to make this result feasible, the level of risk exposure would have

to be totally ignored. The triangulation of the methodology of risk assessment with the interviews with informants from Geo-Rio and Coletivo Técnico reveals how this assessment also incorporated racialized assumptions about favelas' adaptive capacity to cope with risk. In sum, 'favela' became a synonym for 'high-risk', as noted by Maurício,

> I - It was this layer [land use and occupation] that was the most arbitrary, as defined in Geo-Rio's program, because everything that was a favela was automatically classified as high risk. It is there on Concremat's classification table, favela: high risk, directly.
>
> I- So, it doesn't matter where the favela was?
>
> P - It doesn't matter where it is, it doesn't matter if this favela is already more consolidated or not, if slope stabilization and drainage work had already been carried out, it is a high-risk [because it is a] favela! This even led to an absurd thing, if you see the maps that were prepared, Santa Marta for example, as it is a favela, is, by this direct criterion, is all high-risk. Then they felt that it would be useless, that the communities would immediately contest, so what did they do? Corrections were made in this first mapping obtained by this overlapping of layers through the GeoRisk program, with local surveys carried out by Concremat technicians. Except that the surveys were extremely superficial. (Interview with Maurício, Coletivo Técnico, 02/08/2017).

This overestimation can also be found in other reports aimed at assessing the risk in favelas. The reports are part of the archive of the research informant from the Coletivo Técnico and NUTH/Public Defense, who has accumulated an extensive list of documents produced by Geo-Rio on risk assessment, because of his long role as a volunteer engineer in the group.

A comparison made by the engineer between the risk surveys made by Geo-Rio and Concremat (supervised by Geo-Rio) illustrates well the discrepancy in the risk classification in the aftermath of the 2010 disasters. To illustrate this, I placed the two mappings in two different columns. The

mappings refer to how the same areas correspond, respectively, to the favelas Santa Marta and Ladeira dos Tabajaras. With the difference of less than one year between the two mappings, according to the informant, we can see how the risk calculation was exaggerated in the survey launched by Geo-Rio in 2010. The 'high-risk' areas in red, cover almost the whole areas. The second one carried out by Concremat, based on fieldwork made by technicians in the same areas initially classified by Geo-Rio as 'high-risk areas', took place after favela dwellers and counter-experts contestation The report resulted from this second assessment distinguishes the three different risks found in the communities, which seems closer to the favelas' context. This process of contestation will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, with the example of Estradinha.

Table 5-3: Comparison between two mappings, Susceptibility to Landslide and Inventory of Risk of Santa Marta and Ladeira dos Tabajaras' favelas, respectively.

1) Susceptibility to landslides mapping (Geo-Rio, 2010)	2) Risk inventory mapping (Concremat/Geo-Rio, 2010)
	

Source: Adapted from Campos (2016)

This interesting example given by the informant corroborates the claims made by favela dwellers during my fieldwork, who feel victims of such epistemic injustice,[43] favela risk assessments and DRRM, have been highly political. A simple visual contrast illustrates the overrepresentation of high-risk areas in the first mapping made shortly after the launch of the "removal package", which has been done to technically justify the favelas' removal. It seems clear that a war has been waged against favelas since 2010, having risk as to its weapon.

5.4 "This is a rich area, not a risk area": risk acceptability and unjust distribution of risk and resiliencies

In this final section, I draw on the criteria of risk acceptability used by Geo-Rio to classify areas of risk to discuss the uneven distribution of risk and resiliencies in the city. An excerpt of an interview about risk acceptability with one informant from Geo-Rio, the Coordinator of the Alert and Alarm System, is quite representative of the logic behind this essentialization of favelas as high-risk areas. When asked if there was any difference between the level of risk acceptability between the formal and the informal city, the informant admitted that for the formal city the risk acceptability tends to be higher, not explicitly, but tacitly. When asked, he admitted there was a differential risk acceptability regarding favelas and asfalto. According to the informant, the differentiated tolerance regarding different forms of occupations in risk areas is due to

> the pressure from the formal city [that] is higher. They [the formal city] pay more taxes, they are better able to fight [for a differential treatment regarding risk regulations] and such. But there is no legislation saying the risk is such for such a place. This is an implicit, conspicuous thing, it's there, everyone knows, but you can't make it clear. (Interview with an informant from Geo-Rio, 20/12/2017).

[43] The issue of epistemic injustice will be addressed in Chapter 7.

If we compared the favela to the formal city, the level of acceptability would not be considered an attribute from the social injustices, historically forged by state precarization, but by intrinsic characteristics attributed to their residents, 'unable' to cultivate greater adaptive capacities to recover from disasters, as the formal city could. The formal city would be "better able to fight" against disaster risk because they are taxpayers, which means that they are worthy of investments to strengthen their resilience to disaster. In this sense, the risk susceptibility of the formal (and generally wealthy) neighbourhoods also occupying risk areas is minimized by their 'innate resilience' that is understood in terms of the social, economic and symbolic capital of the residents, a virtue granted to citizens that pay their taxes. By this logic, not only is the formal city always more 'resilient' concerning the informal city, but it is also considered as 'naturally resilient'. Merging privileged circumstances with resilience not only displaces infrastructural-managerial formulas and notions of risk, but it also differentially negotiates the landslide risks of the informal and the formal city.

The threshold of risk acceptability could be considered fair if it was guided by a moral sense of urgency in replacing stigmatized/racialized ways of making favelas intelligible to the government and addressing appropriate policies of urban upgrading and security in land ownership. However, risk acceptability in the case of favelas works like a threshold that defines the types of resilience made available by the municipality. The formal city – mainly represented by elitist and white neighbourhoods located in the Southern Zone and the Barra da Tijuca – can be seen as the main beneficiaries of capital flows and state subsidies arising from the 'Olympic opportunity' which also fed the city's resilience future aspiration. The formal city, then, remains the non-problematic pattern of a resilient urban future. On the other hand, the 'dark side of resilience-building' remains invisible to those only focused on the potential of resilience policies and DRRM, to save lives in risky areas, without problematizing the effects of such decisions in those territories. The unequal distribution of resilience presented here cannot be understood only as a reflection of the racial status quo, nor a predictable result of the successive failures of past urban planning. It has also to be framed in terms of building the redeemable capacities of an unjust, racist and elitist city (Bonds & Bonds, 2018; Ramalho, 2019).

Regardless of whether official risk mappings delimited both favelas and formal neighbourhoods as highly susceptible to landslides, middle and upper-class spaces evaded the high-risk label, for they were merely regarded as areas with some preventable landslide risk. Remarkably, this risk did not portend removals, so that these areas do not appear in the 'removals package'. This distinction between formal and informal city regarding the levels of risk acceptability is key to understanding risk inequalities because each category implies particular relationships, interventions and outcomes that create unequal "riskscapes" (Müller-Mahn, Everts, & Stephan, 2018) based on racialized representations of resilience (Bonds & Bonds, 2018) to disaster.

Similar to the dynamics reported by Alvarez and Cardenas (2019) in their research on 'danger zones' in the Philippines, the `high-risk areas' label "recalls the messy informality and spatial illegality of the vulnerable poor" (ibid, p.242) to get rid of them through policies of removals. Designation as 'high-risk' areas, despite the apparent scientific and technical appeal, seems to be coded according to the visual appearance of the favelas. In this sense, in favelas where "many houses were built in areas prone to landslides, often without proper design and materials" (Prefeitura do Rio de Janeiro, 2015, p. 34), to signalise danger ended up creating another form of territorial stigma that justified removals as a rational, necessary and humanitarian DRRM and urban 'resilience' intervention (Alvarez & Cardenas, 2019).

However, displacing certain populations and destroying certain properties while allowing specific others to remain, based on property rights and 'moral traits' incites critical questions on the role of governmental precarization in terms of justice and citizenship, as discussed in Chapter 4. As the state drew a boundary between 'high-risk areas' that required removals and risk areas that merited infrastructural intervention, the mandate of protecting people and property deepened the divide between citizen and favelado; formal city and informal city; resilience as an opportunity for some and resilience as permanent crises for 'others'. The examples illustrated here reveal that the rights of

"urban citizenship"(Holston, 2008), "the right to the city" (Lefebvre, 1996), and "the right to stay put" (Weinstein, 2014) are based on formality, land tenure and privileged landscapes.

An emblematic example of the differentiated treatment given to the formal city regarding the distribution of risks is the episode of a landslide that affected the mansion of the then Secretary of Housing, Urban Planning and Infrastructure, Índio da Costa. The property, partially swallowed by mud and rocks, is located in an area of one of the five most expensive neighbourhoods in the city, the Alto Jardim Botanico.[44] Paradoxically, the property is located in the vicinity of Horto, the favela[45] assigned by City Hall as a "high-risk area". Ironically, the inhabitants of Horto, target of attacks from the Secretary, reported that the Civil Defense, the organ responsible for all the proceedings regarding risky conditions, did not even appear to inspect and seal off the property – a common procedure in the occurrence of this type of incident. After all, as someone joked, "we are talking about rich areas, not risk areas, aren't we?" (Informant from Estradinha).

5.5 Conclusion

To respond to the central question of this chapter on how resilience and environmental risk have been taken to justify state interventions in the territory of favelas, this chapter analysed how risk has been governmentalized through DRRM and, most recently, resilience building. To proceed with the analysis, first, I had to look at both the visible, stated, celebrated aspects of DRRM and resilience-building and the silenced, invisible, unrepresented, or "black box" (Fraser, 2014) of risk assessment. Through the analysis of Rio de Janeiro's policies to administrate risk in informal settlements, I aimed to understand how "risk assessments embody particular assumptions" (ibid, p.132), rooted in racialised representations of favelas, as discussed in Chapter 2. These assumptions influence the responses offered by the city in the occurrence of such events. The reference to such technologies which portray

[44] According to the FipeZap (Property Price Index) the most expensive neighbourhoods in Rio de Janeiro are: 1. Leblon, 2. Ipanema, 3. Lagoa, 4. Gavea, 5. Jardim Botanico. FipeZap is an indicator used to monitor the price rises in the Brazilian real estate market. For more information see: http://fipezap.wpengine.com/

[45] For details on Horto, see Chapter 4.

risk as a favela trait will be especially relevant in Chapter 6, which demonstrates how the vulnerability of favelados is often shaped and re-shaped by the development of risk knowledge discussed in this chapter.

As we saw in Chapter 2, racialized representations of favelas that determine the 'real dangers' the political authorities select for attention at a particular time seem to have influenced the differentiated values and modes of governing risk and resilience in the formal and the informal city. Through the exposure of those fields of visibility and invisibility, it is possible to comprehend who is living within such "at-risk areas" (Walker & Burningham, 2011), but also comprehend the political choices underpinning the noble presumption of 'saving lives' evoked by the employment of technologies of risk. The way those technologies have been employed inform and are informed by the municipality's assumptions about those informal territories.

As we saw in Section 5.3, some places were assigned by these technologies as "high-risk" while others under the same geotechnical conditions were not. This distinction mainly relies on risk tolerability, or acceptability (as discussed in Section 5.4), informed by ways that favelas have been recognized, and define the way the state applies its distribution of risk and resiliencies.

I argue that within the governmental technologies of risk, lie the dynamic of equating risk with informality, enabling the classification and assignment of all favelas as risk areas, as shown in section 5.3. The historical legacies of governmental precarization are left visually unrepresented and indeterminate in the risk mapping techniques developed by Geo-Rio, even measures to mitigate risk adopted by Geo-Rio itself. This biopolitical reduction of the social, political, and spatial complexities in Rio's approach to disaster risk

> presents itself on a principle of disjunction and reduction of [the] social to the physical, seduced by the idea of abstract models that can be applied to the interpretation of any socio-environmental reality, and the price of this rationalization is mutilations of understanding of the real and barbarism (da Silva Valencio, 2014).

These forms of depoliticization of natural hazards and overestimation of the calamitous events conceal historical and socio-spatial dynamics that resulted in such events, making visible immediate effects of catastrophic events which enable the emergence of legalities and formalities, accompanied by new illegalities and informalities as the de-exceptionalization of the exceptional principle of non-removal presented in Chapter 2.

Moreover, what the analysis revealed is that the formal city – mainly represented by elitist and white neighbourhoods located in the Southern Zone and the Barra da Tijuca – remain the non-problematic pattern of a safe and resilient urban future in the city. On the other hand, the 'dark side of risk governmentalization' remain invisible to those only focused on the potential of resilience policies and DRRM to save lives in risky areas, without problematizing the effects of such decisions in those territories.

The analysis presented in this chapter also enables us to understand why some sort of risk matters more than others. Intersecting how risk areas are made visible/invisible with the legislation driven by an ineffective principle of non-removal, presented in Chapter 2, along with recent policy, making favelas high-risk areas, suggests some important conclusions. First, not only a general argument on the inequality in landslide risk exposure could be made, but also on the conditions of favelas' recognizability that inform this categorization of risk that generalizes depicts favelas as risk areas.

Second, the generalization of risk accomplished by the state through its apparatus of knowledge presents reverse effects: the invisibilisation of the real drivers of risk production and distribution throughout the city, employing spatial models, maps and categories of risk susceptibility in the black box of risk classification, whose effects will be better detailed in Chapter 6.

Third, when all favelas are classified as 'high-risk areas', there is a dangerous emptying of the concept of risk that can be filled by discretionary definitions taken by the government, according to the will of the city officials, contributing to the permanent condition of precarity experienced by favelas and their residents, a historical source of vulnerabilities as I will also show in the chapter that follows. This

permanent condition of precarity ends up undermining favelados' aspirations to the right to the city through the right to the favela.

In sum, the form of approaching risk in favelas seems to contribute to racialized imaginaries of favelas and their dwellers (Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero, & van Munster, 2008). Comparable to yellow fever, the 'black vomit' that afflicted the residents of the cortiços in the nineteenth century (see Chapter 2), favelas can assume a "generalized symbolic value" (Veras, 2010), so that people automatically assume that favela dwellers possess other undesirable traits allegedly associated with risks, such as deviance, disorder, deprivation, degradation, and unruliness.

Chapter 6 - Disaster risk displacements: aggravating favelados' precarity through administrative violence

"Disaster ruins everything, all the while leaving everything intact" - Maurice Blanchot

6.1 Introduction

As we saw in Chapter 5, between 2009 and 2015 approximately 21,000 families were removed from Rio's favelas under City Hall's argument of "preserving lives" (Prefeitura do Rio de Janeiro, 2015), leaving open how this process occurred. For this reason, in this chapter I will address the following question:

- How have removals been administratively addressed to prevent disaster risk and to what extent has this practice contributed to perpetuating favelas' precarity?

For this, this chapter aims to show how state practices aiming to maximize life through technologies of risk government have paradoxically contributed to maximizing favelas' precarity. Particularly, I consider the forms of precarity ensued by the management of risk in favelas through removals. Such precarity, I will argue, consists of a form of disaster in itself. Here, disaster is understood as one that does not emerge from a single, catastrophic, and natural event but the gradual unfolding of effects of the state-led historical precarization of favelas, as we saw in Chapter 2. Nevertheless, to analyse this gradual re-enactment of disaster posed by the removal of favelas, or its expectancy, I rely on favelados' routine encounters with the state in indirect and immediate ways, through its officials, norms, procedures, discourses and practices of favela removal.

Drawing on Judith Butler's (2006, 2010) suggestion on the analysis of public policy, I explore how political decisions, especially through administration of favela removal, place people in differential spaces of vulnerability and precariousness, to the point that institutional action can differentially expose them to violence or "premature death" (Gilmore, 2007).

The chapter is divided into six sections. In the first, I present the concept of administrative violence based on the works of Gupta (2012), Spade (2017) and Tyner and Rice (2016), which characterize well the state of affairs reported by many experiences of displacement lived by the research participants. These government practices engendered against favelados refer to any state action or inaction responsible for increasing favelados' vulnerability. In Section 6.2, I present the case of Indiana, an informal settlement in Rio de Janeiro formed in the mid-1950s, and how violent administrative practices have operated through state harassment. The sections that follow consist of the other dimensions of administrative violence practised against Indiana. Section 6.3 shows how the administrative categories created to enable the removal of favelas ends up throwing the most vulnerable among the favelados into a condition of invisibility, which also exposes them to unforeseen risks. Section 6.4 presents the material consequences of demolitions and their effects of precarity and finally, Section 6.5 evidences the political effects of the affective dimension of the violent administration of removals, characterised by deterioration of favelados as political subjects.

6.2 Precarity, biopolitics and the violent administration of disaster risk displacements

During the fieldwork, I could observe the varieties of ways in which the state has been adopting techniques of governance in the encounters between public officials and favela dwellers. Although many of these techniques vary according to the context of each favela, certain common patterns emerge. From these patterns, we can try to sketch typical techniques of governing favelas which I see in combination as enacting forms of administrative violence (Beaugrand, 2011; Spade, 2017; Tyner, 2014; Tyner & Rice, 2016).

The concept of administrative violence – understood here as any action or inaction practised by the state through its administrative assemblage that negatively affects one's potentiality to survive or live a decent life - is useful, as it helps, first, to overcome the binary between direct violence and structural violence. Second, the term captures well how subjects and people are created, positioned, categorized, and managed through a range of governing sites and technologies. Through the lenses of

administrative violence proposed by Gupta (2012) and Tyner and Rice (2016) the separation between ‘killing’ (direct violence) and ‘letting die' (structural violence), then, collapses, thus allowing an analysis focused on state failure or lack of provision of adequate housing, health services and a safe environment, to be seen as a form of violence.

Butler’s (2004) analysis highlights how the type of administrative violence we find enacted against favelados works as a kind of sovereignty exercise by the city officials. It is made possible through governmentality since it “establishes law as a tactic, something of instrumental value, and not binding by virtue of its status as law” (ibid, p.62). The administrative violence takes place in the context of the 'sovereign revitalization' of the city over removals during the 2010 events and the state of emergency that followed. As well observed by Butler, whereas Foucault argued that sovereignty and governmentality may and do coexist, the specific nature of that coexistence in the current state of emergency remains unclear. Despite governmentality designating a form of diffuse and multivalent power focusing on the management of populations, in the current state of emergency, officials of governmentality wield sovereign power, through their discretionary power. Then, in the context of risk governmentality, the sovereignty re-emerges under emergency conditions (ibid, p. 54).

Based on evidence from the favela of Indiana, this chapter documents the strategies adopted by the municipal government to remove the favela and their effects on precarity. The forms of administrative violence identified in the thematic analysis are represented in the following figure:



Figure 6-1: Interrelated forms of administrative violence experienced by the favelados during the removal process

The analysis of the constituent and interrelated elements of these violent modes of governing favelas reveals the extension of existing precarities and the making of new ones. The forms of administrative violence identified in the analysis and represented above are described in each following section.

6.3 Indiana and the removal process as governmental harassment

> When 2010 comes, [...] they enter the community, they enter our house, you know? [The] favela is interesting, if you are unaware, the government comes into your house, drinks your coffee, drinks your water, scolds you at the front door and still makes you feel bad, still makes you worried, [the] favela is like this, as if we were nothing as if we were nobody. This has happened inside my house several times, with my father several times. (Irene - Indiana's resident).

Indiana, a small favela located between Morro do Borel and the traditional Tijuca neighbourhood in the North Zone of the city of Rio de Janeiro, is home for over 600 families, whose majority migrated from the north and northeast of Brazil to make their lives in Rio de Janeiro. The favela, as described in Chapter 4, was built on the banks of Maracanã River, and, according to residents, rarely received public intervention through its over 60 years of existence. The few public interventions that were made appear to have been motivated by electoral interests. Most of the upgrading that can be found is the result of self-organized urbanization, known as *mutirões* (joint efforts), made by its residents.

In June 2009, the then-Municipal Secretary of Housing [Secretaria Municipal de Habitação (SMH)], Jorge Bittar, announced the planned removal of Indiana to clear the 13,754 square meters of an area on the banks of the Maracanã River that would be then urbanized and transformed into a square. Residents would be transferred to a social housing complex from the PMCMV to be built in the same area. In an interview with the newspaper *Extra,* Bittar declared: "What makes sure that this time Indiana's removal gets off the paper is that we have plenty of resources" (*Extra*, 2009). These resources basically would come from an agreement signed by the municipality and the Federal Government to build social housing through the newly launched PCMMV, as already discussed in Chapter 5. However, since Article 492 of the Organic Law prohibits the removal of communities (see Chapters 2 and 5), except in cases of risk or the public interest, the removal plan initially remained aspirational.

In 2010, the SMH resumed the removal plans for Indiana, but now under the legal argument that the community would be at risk. Indiana was among the 119 favelas listed to 'disappear':

> ... until the end of 2012, as they are in places at risk of landslides or flooding, environmental protection or destined for public places. (…) Among the favelas that are going to disappear are Horto (Jardim Botânico), Indiana (Tijuca), CCPL (Benfica), Metrô (Maracanã), Vila Autódromo (Barra) and Vila Taboinhas (Vargem Grande).(Globo, 2010)

Shortly after the news was released in 2010, the SMH's technical-social work team began to visit the community to register the families to be removed. During the beginning of the registration process, called the Cadastro Social[46] (Social Register), the team took pictures and measurements of the houses, informing residents that the surveys were to implement upgrading work in the community, without making it clear to them what City Hall's real plans were. A similar practice was also employed in Estradinha, where residents referred to it as "a false census in the community" (Angélica, resident of Estradinha).

The implementation of the survey was enough to give rise to rumours of removal in the community. According to residents' accounts, the suspicion that lasted two years became a fact: on 12th January 2012, the Secretary of Housing met with the residents to present the "Bairro Carioca", another project of the PMCMV in Triagem[47] - the North Zone of Rio – located 10 kilometres from the community.[48] On this occasion, the Secretary stated that only the residents who wanted to move to Bairro Carioca would be resettled; and those who chose to stay would benefit from improvements in the community. A similar strategy was also documented in Vila Autódromo.

According to Irene, when the SMH team came back to the community in 2012 "the harassment came with a badge, with a uniform, complete teams coming into our house". Despite the difficulty of defining exactly what harassment means, Indiana's resident accounts of the city officials' practices and the way they experienced them expand on this term.

Once the SMH team arrived in the favela to update the survey undertaken in 2010 and register the families living in apparent 'conditions of risk', the first question asked was whether the resident agreed

[46] The Cadastro Social consist of a survey carried out with families living in 'high-risk areas'. This registration is done after the city has mapped the areas at risk and prepared a Local Housing Plan of Social Interest [– Plano Local para Habitação de Interesse Social *(*PLHIS)]. This registration is done on site and serves to present a social demand to contractors responsible for the construction of social housing.

[47] Triagem, a neighbourhood located in the North Zone of the city, hosts the social housing project called Bairro Carioca, financed by the federal program PMCMV.

[48] The development of the Bairro Carioca is part of the Morar Carioca programme (see Chapter 2), which did not yield many benefits in the area, and was limited to the proposals of favelas' upgrading. This program represents one of Eduardo Paes 's multiple ambiguities about favelas.

to relocate to Bairro Carioca. Although the Secretary stated at that meeting that only those who agreed to the removal would leave the community, the SMH team, materializing the administrative ambiguities, omissions and dissimulation, informed the dwellers, regardless of whether they agreed or not, that the whole community would be demolished due to the risks. Cadastral maps, surveys and censuses were then used by the SMH team to show the residents the real plans for the favela.

This was the first incongruity between what had been promised at the meeting in January 2012 and what the SMH team performed in the field with the marking of the houses. Soon, such inconsistencies in the administration of removals began to have adverse psychological effects on the community, what a member of the Coletivo Técnico called "psychological terrorism", about how the abuses affected the favelados over time.

In July 2012, after six months of continuous harassment by the SMH's team and to further increase the pressure on the residents, "the bulldozers arrived" (Fieldnote, 2017). Several residents, terrified by the possibility of seeing their homes being demolished, surrendered to the 'option' given by the SMH's technical-social work team, that is, the resettlement in Bairro Carioca. At this stage, about 110 families felt compelled to leave the favela, accepting the "*troca de chaves*" (key-to-key agreement), which means to exchange their houses for apartments in Bairro Carioca. Immediately after the exchange of keys, the demolitions began.

But the residents' torment did not end with the acceptance of the city's agreement. Families who accepted were informed later that they would have to go through a family income analysis. According to the criteria specified by the city officials, only people with a family income up to R $1600,000 would be included. This contradicted the PMCMV program's stated requirements for resettling families displaced from risky areas which are that under risky conditions, families are exempted from the expense with housing finance. It also confounded the community since the inclusion of families living in high-risk areas in the PMCMV had to comply with the legal requirements set out in Article 429 of the Organic Law, which did not depend on income and family criteria.

Following the abovementioned criteria, when it comes to the existence of technically proven high-risk areas, the city must present a technical assessment of the area and also guarantee the residents' participation in the whole process from assessment to proposal of alternatives for resettlement. It also must guarantee the resettlement of displaced families in locations close to their home or work locations; more distant relocation being the last resort.

According to the residents, City Hall never provided the "*laudo técnico*" (technical report), the necessary precondition to proceeding with removals. It was only in 2013, after a long investigation carried out by Indiana's Commission, with the aid of NUTH and Land Institute of the State of Rio de Janeiro [Instituto de Terras do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (ITERJ)] – see further discussion in Chapter 7 – that the Commission discovered the presence of a Georio/Concremat study dated 12 January 2011, which listed Indiana as low risk. According to the Geo-Rio report provided by the Residents' Commission: "The reconnaissance inspection in the Indiana community indicated at the moment only a low geological risk, where the risk may be associated with cuts and irregular landfills, and features of possible landslides (low slope) were not identified" (Geo-Rio, 2011).

The omission of the Geo-Rio technical report by City Hall deliberately aimed to give the impression to the favela residents that in face of the 'risk', regardless of its severity, the only alternative available would be to accept the agreement proposed by the city. As one member of the Residents' Commission explained:

> The argument was that we were at risk, but the risk they claimed was kind of [acceptable] risk due to the whole situation [of being on the Maracanã river banks]. It's like a disease, there's the condition when you need to be hospitalised, the condition when they need surgery and the condition when you are attended to by the doctor and you go back home. The condition we are in here is one in which you can just be attended and go back home... However, when it came to 2010 and there was a geological study asserting that Indiana was a low-risk area, for the laymen and for the people who were not well informed, this is the same as saying that

> Indiana is at risk [that is, 'high-risk']. The guy [it means any person interested in the favela clearance], then, would say, "No, Indiana is at-risk". (Interview with Murilo, Indiana Residents' Commission, 27/08/2017)

According to the interviewee, the mere existence of a risk assessment report was enough for City Hall to appropriate the word 'risk' and omit telling the community that they were located in a situation of low risk, to justify its removal policy named after the fallacious discourse of preserving lives. This fallacy is corroborated by the suspension of demolitions granted by the judge who decided in favour of the lawsuit filed by Public Defenders. In the sentence, the judge declared:

> Effectively, from the analysis of the case file, it is clear the pertinence of the granting of the measure [proposed by the Public Defender's Office], which confirmed the violation of the residents' right before the apparent illegality of municipal intervention in the place [...] did not prove the existence of any risk to residents. (Tribunal de Justiça do Rio de Janeiro, 19/08/2012)[49]

This example of the city's alleged state of emergency reveals how sovereign power under a biopower regime operates through a set of administrative techniques. Favelados' lives become not only a scene of the administration's discipline and recalibration of what constitutes risk, but Indiana's case reveals how risk was transformed into a fully discretionary even arbitrary governmental technique, as exercised by the city's officials who interpreted the governmental rule and risk knowledge unilaterally and decided the condition and forms of its application. The omission of the Geo-Rio report – which classified Indiana as a low-risk area – by the city to remove Indiana exposes, then, these dynamics of risk governmentality of favelas in Rio.

[49] Juridical Process number 0402292-65.2012.8.19.0001

As a political strategy, the misleading information on risk conditions proved effective in dismantling residents in their struggle to remain in the favela or even coming to a better deal in the resettlement process, as they ended up playing against each other.

As the resident and informant reports document, the success of these practices owed much to the deliberate production of misleading information on risk by the city's officials, which made it hard for Indiana's residents to access accurate information crucial to claiming their rights. These forms of harassment employed by the SMH work team were made to obtain what the NUTH Public Defender termed "consented removal" (Interview with informant from Public Defense Office, 10/10/ 2017). This practice becomes particularly problematic due to the circumstances and power imbalance in which this consent (or lack thereof) was obtained and the perverse and often irreversible effects that it generated.

Other examples of administrative abuses committed by the city officials against Indiana's residents relate to various techniques of dividing and ruling the community. To get the city to meet its stated pledge in the meetings reported above, the residents approached the Public Defender's Office on two bases: to guarantee the resettlement of people living in risky conditions and promote improvements for those who preferred to remain. The Public Defender then filed a lawsuit against City Hall aimed at stopping the demolitions, resulting in the issuance of an injunction that made the relocation of residents who had made arrangements with City Hall conditional on the development of an upgrade plan to benefit those who choose to remain. However, what seemed to be the best tactic engendered a broad division within the community, as reported by one of the members:

> That was how the divisions were created, the people who wanted to leave and the people who wanted to stay, then side A and side B. It broke out like a war in here when we looked for the Public Defender's Office and the Pastoral of Favelas and set up a process, then we were a group [the residents who refused to leave], but when the injunction came out in December 2012, it ended up with [....] We had an injunction that prohibited the houses from being

> demolished, the city would have to present the reason why it was taking us out of here (Interview with the member of the Residents' Commission, 08/09/2017).

Once these residents through the Public Defender's Office, took victory over City Hall's authoritarian project, it was interpreted by other residents who had accepted it as an attempt to prevent them from getting an apartment. This dividing of the community was also facilitated by the actions of the Residents Association, which was accused by some of "placing City Hall within the community" according to the residents' accounts. The co-optation of the Residents Association by the city was described as "the city's provision of spare keys [of the apartments] to the Association's president", with City Hall giving "the power [to the President of the Resident's Association] to decide who should receive the keys" (Fieldnote, 12/09/2017). The immersion of the Residents' Association in the Eduardo Paes removal plan, the informants assert, contributed to an unfair relocation process as people "who didn't need a home" and even "did not meet the risk criteria"[50] benefited from the resettlement program. Participants even report cases in which "there were residents that received several apartments" (Fieldnote, 12/09/2017). The complaints about the role of the Residents' Association in facilitating removals in Indiana reminds me of an observation made by Machado da Silva (1967, p.713) about politics in the favela: the "acting style [of the part of the associations] develops along the traditional lines: 'top-level' understandings, participation in '*panelinhas*' [cliques], in short, full immersion in the party-political game".

To oppose the political game performed by the Association and also to deal with City Hall, the Indiana Tijuca Resident's Commission was established in 2012, consisting of 12 members of the community. The Pastoral de Favelas and the Public Defender's Office helped the dwellers who wanted to remain in a process of resistance. According to Commission members, the first wave of residents to be removed to Bairro Carioca were not among the most vulnerable. Families who were perceived by the community as indeed 'at risk' due to the poor structural conditions and/or insalubrity of their homes

[50] Criteria defined in page 12.

and/or because the location of their houses on the edge of the river, were not included in the resettlement program.[51] With the suspension of the removal process because of the lawsuit filed by the Public Defender's Office, the vulnerable residents had their resettlement to Bairro Carioca suspended, generating even more divisions and disputes within the community. Furthermore, the wait for the realization of the upgrading plan delayed the resettlement of the other 110 families already registered in the PMCMV. As long as the residents to be resettled could not move, it was not possible to start upgrading works, increasing not only the tensions in the community but also the spatial precarity for those who had to live together with rubble, garbage and partially demolished houses (as discussed in Section 6.4).

The list of practices of administrative harassment is long and could render a whole thesis just on this theme, from the false census in the community to the use and abuse of the classification of high-risk areas to the procedures required to conduct the removal and resettlement of the residents of risky areas. What I would like to emphasize in this section is how the lack of access to adequate information through the systematic abuse of the discretionary power of City Hall officials, which the residents called 'governmental harassment', represented a crucial device in the territorial dispute of Indiana. The right to adequate information, essential for claiming any right (such as to housing), was systematically denied to the favela residents. In its place, false information, including the severity of the risk, was put into circulation, reducing the available right circumscribed by the acceptance of a 'benevolent agreement' offered by City Hall.

6.4 Invisible people, invisible risks: Dissonances between categories of risk and experiences of vulnerability

The problem of risk in the context of favelas is the result of the problem of housing, mainly, due to the peculiar dynamics of the informal housing market within the favelas, which are poorly considered by

[51] This point will be better discussed in section 6.4.

the administrative apparatuses of the city. When the favela is affected by a natural hazard or is declared to be cleared because of disaster risk, as in Indiana's case, a mass of 'invisible' people – the tenants - are affected not only by the consequences of a possible catastrophe but also by the complexities of the removal process, mainly represented by the "*cadastramento social*".

To understand how the production of precarity takes places through the administration of disaster risk displacements I am relying on the participant observation realised during a guided tour led by Mr Agenor through the favela on 21st July 2017, and other meetings that followed this tour in the course of my fieldwork. On this walk, Mr Agenor showed me the whole favela, pointing out the "good houses", whose values are higher than the average market value of the apartment offered by PMCMV, and also the precarious ones, most of them located in the part of the favela called by the residents as Rabo de Peixe (Fish Tail). A short 'walk' in the area gave a clue why it is called this name.

Indiana is divided by the Maracanã River, called by the residents Cabeça de Peixe (Fish Head) and Rabo de Peixe (see Figure 6-2). In the latter, there is a narrow strip of houses, squeezed between the river's retaining wall, and parking that, according to residents, would be responsible for flooding the houses due to unevenness about the neighbouring street. There, the majority of the houses were classified as at high risk, not only because of their dangerous proximity to the river but also because of the fragility of their structures, with many wooden houses in which the only trace of concrete was the retention wall of the river that made up the wall of some of the houses.

Figure 6-2: Indiana favela
Source: Emau Abrico Project

Many of these houses suffered from poor lighting and ventilation due to a lack of windows, with illumination even in the daytime only possible through the use of lamps. When visiting those houses, it was clear why tuberculosis is still a reality among the favela dwellers; one of the participants' children, Irene, had been stricken with the disease and was undergoing treatment.

After a short walk through the Rabo de Peixe, we arrived in front of Ana Maria's house. She was sitting in the doorway with one of her young daughters. Ana Maria's story illustrates well the state of affairs about risk management in favelas by the city of Rio de Janeiro. Ana Maria (unemployed, mother of four), before moving to Indiana, lived on the hilltop in the Morro do Borel. Due to a disease that affected one of her kidneys she had to move with her children to this shack by the river in search of better conditions of mobility. From a homeowner in Morro do Borel to a tenant in a very precarious house in Indiana, Ana Maria told me her story of ups and downs.

Fieldnote, 30 July 2017 - Insalubrity, an invisible risk?

When I went to live in the Babilônia favela for my fieldwork, I rented a dark, poorly ventilated, one-bedroom 'kitnet' [a one-bedroom house or shack] at the back of a massive granite rock surrounding the building. After a few weeks living there, I ended up with a strong respiratory allergy, nonstop coughing, due to mould and lack of air circulation – which contributed to the delay of my fieldwork. As time went by, my condition got worse and I decided to move upstairs where there was no such problem. Being able to move when I wanted was a privilege those people didn't have. In the case of favela's report, when the possibility of finally getting out of the risky condition arose, the opportunity was denied to them because of the arrangements between City Hall and the residents' association.

During my walk through the Rabo de Peixe, my short experience in that house in Babilônia came to my mind. How can these people not get sick living in such unhealthy conditions for years? How can the municipality ignore the condition of these families living at risk, granting apartments to families that apparently did not need [them]?

Ana Maria worked for more than a decade as a community agent in the municipal program 'Guardiões do Rio' (River Guardians' Program), focused on cleaning and maintaining rivers and canals in the city's favelas. With the end of the program in the community, Ana Maria found herself unemployed and without formal housing, having to survive in the informal market. Ana's poor financial condition is aggravated by her serious health problems. Due to chronic kidney disease, she is constantly undergoing haemodialysis and must take expensive medications, whose monthly cost exceeds the national minimum wage.

Figure 6-3: View of Maracanã River from where Ana Maria lives.
Source: the author

As she is unemployed, she gets remedies from donations. Even representing an explicit case of gender, social and environmental vulnerability, Ana was left out of the Cadastro Social, a registration undertaken by the SMH to support the decision-making process on the relocation of families living in high-risk areas. According to the 'cadastramento social' criteria, only homeowners are eligible to be resettled in the social housing programmes, not renters. With this, the housing policy perpetuates the condition of the precarity of dispossessed residents like Ana Maria. This criterion also allows the process of "accumulation in the informal housing market" (Silva, 2016) once those who have more houses get more apartments.

Because of this unfair criterion, a significant number of renters like Ana Maria fall outside resettlement programs like PMCMV. The only alternative available for this public is the Social Rent Program.[52] The prioritization of homeowners in this kind of resettlement program, to the detriment of rented households, ultimately deprives the most vulnerable residents of the "right to the favela" (Silva, 2016).

To fight against this unfair situation and for a better agreement with City Hall, Ana Maria joined the Residents' Commission in 2012. With the suspension of the resettlement process by the Court in 2012, as reported in Section 6.2, Ana Maria, at the time of my visit, was still waiting for a fair outcome.

In 2018, the removal process was resumed and the SMH only offered Ana, who still lives in the same precarious condition, inclusion in the Social Rent Program for when houses are demolished. However, according to some participants with whom I had the last contact by April 2020, residents from Rabo de Peixe, which includes Ana Maria, have refused to enter the Social Rent Programme and are now

[52] Social Rent is a temporary welfare benefit, established under the Morar Seguro State Program, designed to meet the needs arising from the removal of or homeless families or those domiciled in risky areas due to temporary vulnerability and public calamity. The aid may be granted for a period of 12 months and the amount, which may be R $ 500 or R $ 400, is defined through the conclusion of the Technical Cooperation Agreement, signed between the State Government and the municipalities. For the grant of social rent, the total family income may not exceed the amount corresponding to five minimum wages. In addition, it is necessary to present a report issued by the Municipal Civil Defense (Secretariat of Social Assistance from the Rio de Janeiro State Government).

attempting to move to PMCMV social housing. While the impasse remains, Ana Maria continues to live on the edge with her children.

The refusal of residents to receive social rent has its reasons. Residents who eventually received the social rent, later on, encountered several difficulties. Due to the high price of rents triggered by the announcement of favela removal, many residents were unable to rent a better-quality property in the same or surrounding areas. According to Ana Maria, the programme only pays R$400 /month (currently US $73) to the dwellers while the rent of a 'kitnet' (one-bedroom house or shack) is usually around R$800 per month. In some cases, because of the lack of options in the locality (mainly due to the increase in the rent), they would rent houses that were worse off than the ones they had left.

Due to the relative real estate speculation created by the distribution of social rent in the wake of removals, many people were unable to rent new homes in the region and would eventually stay in those that were sealed off for demolition, as is the case of Ana Maria who preferred to stay in the same place than accept the subsidy. Usually, to prevent residents from returning to houses that had already been interdicted, City Hall officials began the demolition, but due to impasses in the court, the removals were stopped again.

What Ana Maria's story suggests is that policies that produce norms and procedures aiming to protect vulnerable lives from the risk of disaster, in the end, make people's lives 'administratively' impossible (Spade, 2017). As she does not own the property of the house where she lives, and she is also living in a situation of risk, the social rent would remain the only option available for Ana, who, if she had accepted, would probably be in a condition of greater vulnerability than she currently faces. As an unforeseen effect, there can be the formation of a "more impoverished, less rooted and more risky population, especially in hillside areas" (Benjamin, 1988, p. 37 quoted by Silva, 2016, p. 244). This Cadastro Social ended up throwing Ana into limbo. Seven years have already passed since the first attempt to demolish Indiana, and Ana Maria is still waiting for effective state action - although not passively.

The example of Cadastro Social, the gateway to accessing decent housing for people living in high-risk areas, whose purpose is to distribute the chances of living in a decent house through neutral and standard criteria, has very negative unintended consequences. To make life, its policies make the life of the most vulnerable even more precarious. The dynamics behind the Cadastro Social draw our attention to how the categorization[53] of people living in high-risk areas works as a key method of control, subjugation and "slow death" (Berlant, 2007).

Interventions at the community level depend on City Hall's categorization to organize the community that just ignore the specificities of cases like Ana Maria's (Spade, 2017). As Silva (2016, p.244) reiterates, the moment when risk management meets the specific selection criteria of the family (through the Cadastro Social), it creates several ambivalent situations due to the dissonance between the generality of the category, 'risk' and the diversity of the concrete experiences of the families living in areas classified as 'high-risk'. In my analysis, especially of Indiana's case, this *dissonance* to which the author refers have directly impacted a group of people who did not fit in the programme criteria, the tenants, rendering them 'invisible' to City Hall and placing them in a precarious condition of perpetual wait.

6.5 "It looked like a war environment": spatial precarization and its logics of abandonment

In July 2012, after the Cadastro Social of the families for consented removal, some demolitions began. The first administrative act of City Hall consisted of what public agents call "*descaracterização*" (disfigurement) of the houses, that is, the houses were not fully demolished immediately, but only some parts such as walls and slabs, which compromised the house's structure aiming to make them uninhabitable (Figure 6-4).

[53] The classification process that provides access to the apartment subsidy is carried out by City Hall's technical social work department and takes into account: the monthly household income; the priority requirements set by each municipality; and the quantitative and qualitative housing shortage estimates produced in collaboration with the João Pinheiro Foundation, the Ministry of Cities, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the United Nations Program for the Development (UNDP (Silva, 2016).

Figure 6-4: Damaged house
Source: Courtesy of a local resident

According to the residents' report, such practice of 'descaracterização' was usually carried out without any technical criterion by officials. Due to the shared structure of the houses such as walls and slabs, when a house is demolished it usually compromised the surrounding houses (Figures 6-6). This kind of practice ended up forcing the resident's neighbours of the partly demolished houses to agree to the so-called consented removal.

Figure 6-5: Attached house standing alone after the demolition of its neighbouring house
Source: Courtesy of a local resident

A second step in the development of a "*hostile environment*" (Irene, local resident), the demolitions, started shortly after the first visit by city officials to the area, as already mentioned. As the demolitions continued, another issue arose: the rubble that the city deliberately left behind. According to a Coletivo Técnico report, [54]

> the demolitions and the rubble produced created a [previously] non-existent risk to the community. There was not only the risk of collapse of this rubble but also obstruction of drainage ways, the proliferation of vectors, increased accidents in the community. It was hardware, wiring, it was absurd, they broke everything and left it there. (Interview with Maurício, Coletivo Técnico, 02/08/2017)

[54] See Section 7.3 of Chapter 7 for more details on Coletivo Técnico.

The rubble created by City Hall was often used to coerce the residents to move. As reported by the resident from Indiana,

> they [City Hall] are saying that those who continue living here will be living in the middle of the land. Let us live in the middle of the land, we make a joint effort to stay here, we put the rubble up ahead, we clear the land, we put the plants, we put flowers, we plant roses, but I will not leave here. (Interview with Irene, Indiana, 08/09/2017)

Figure 6-6: Risk posed by the debris and rubble left behind the houses demolitions
Source: Courtesy of a local resident

Stories of administrative abuses by officials against residents are abundant: there have been incidents when people who had gone to work and had their houses damaged and their possessions seized upon their return. In far worse situations, some people went to work and when they came back, they found their houses in ruins. Residents claim that the city did not wait for the furniture to be removed by the residents before the demolition began. Reports of violence such as this are common when it comes

to clearing the favela. As one of the residents I spoke to said, “removals took place as an act of total dehumanization and lack of sensitivity”.

As an informant from the Coletivo Técnico that supported many cases throughout the city, highlights:

> You see, if you resist removal, you'll be in a community where half of it turns into rubble, the street lighting damaged, rats and cockroaches begin to proliferate, and at night you can scratch yourself with a rod ... it's even easier for a criminal to hide. It is depressing for the community, the community feels bad, and these [practices of demolition and abandonment] are means of psychologically breaking the community. It is a very perverse thing (Interview with Maurício, Coletivo Técnico*,* 02/08/2017*)*

The practices of demolition, followed by the abandonment of the community, usually engenders a lot of apprehension among the residents, especially those who had not agreed to the consented removal. The fear, according to the residents, stemmed from not knowing what might happen to those who, at first, did not accept the proposal from City Hall. This situation of uncertainty created even more suspicion and disaffection within the community itself. As noted above, the favela, then, became a hostile environment.

The creation of this hostile environment through forms of spatial precarization has been further accentuated by the deliberate abandonment of areas where residents resisted City Hall’s violent incursions. This was the case in multiple favelas including Estradinha, Indiana, Santa Marta and Vila Autódromo. The deliberate abandonment was enforced by the city mainly through the discontinuity in the provision of public services and the deliberate invisibilisation of potential risks. It worked as a way to place pressure on favela dwellers, and also sanction them. When asked about the costs of resistance to the community, Murilo replied:

> We are losing because the city does not enter here, the absence of the city means a form of retaliation to us that have fought to continue living here. So, this absence of City Hall here, in

> omitting to be in the community, the secretariat [for housing and urbanism] is not here. We are losing because we not only want to live, we want to live with dignity, to live, to age with quality, we want our children to arrive with their girlfriends here, we want tranquillity, being able to receive visitors ... the public power prevents us from having the right that people of high social level have and we, just because we live in the favela, are marginalized, left there to our own devices (Interview with Murilo, Indiana's Residents Commission, 08/09/2017).

Precarization and its logics of deliberate abandonment contribute perversely to the perpetuation of favela's precarity discussed in Chapter 2. As a form of slow death (Berlant, 2007) this constrains favelados to racialised topographies of exclusion, leading them to a systematically and disproportionately severe condition of vulnerability and risk. An emblematic case that confirms the deliberate and arbitrary classification and mitigation of risks refers to an old claim by residents in Indiana: the construction of a retaining wall at the entrance to the favela to reduce water pressure in periods of heavy rain. However, this request was never granted by the city. As one of the residents questioned, "if risk mitigation was a matter of urgency, why has the wall not been built up to this day?" (Fieldnote, 2017)

Figure 6-7: Maracanã River section that is a risk to the favela, according to Indiana dwellers
Source: author's photograph

Furthermore, residents claim the build of a retaining wall in the area is to mitigate a risk produced by the city itself in the past with work that narrowed a section of the Maracanã River (Fig 6.8 and 6.9). Since this work was done, flooding has become a routine in the community.

Precarity and its logics of abandonment ended up leading many residents to anticipate their move, helping to produce more ruins in the middle of the favela, where rats, insects and garbage proliferated. Once vacant, city officials were responsible for their immediate disfiguration. When asked about the reasons for this procedure, officials justified it stating that this would be necessary so that there would be no time to reoccupy the houses. Despite the procedure adopted, many of the disfigured houses were occupied by people unknown to the community. According to the residents' reports, many of the new residents were "people close to parallel power" authorized by the "*donos do morro*" (drug dealers) to reoccupy the houses.

Figure 6-8: Upstream section of the Maracanã River

Figure 6-9: Upstream section of the Maracanã River, where the river is narrowed, causing floods.
Source: author's photograph

For the many times that I have visited the community and tried to find out about the situation of the reoccupied houses, I have often received an embarrassing silence about my questions. Only when my interaction with residents became as informal as possible, with no trace of field notebook or recorder, and usually in contexts far from the narrow favela corridors and alleys where "the others could not hear us", did the residents feel comfortable talking about the situation of the reoccupied houses in the post-removal scenario. According to reports, after demolitions, the friendly and peaceful climate they were proud of had been broken down by the presence of people selling or using drugs, violent verbal confrontations and intimidation often followed by physical attacks; situations that were not common to the long-standing residents.

Determined to better understand this story, I looked to the Public Defender's Office to understand the impact of the presence of the new occupants in the community. One of the Defenders confirmed that, indeed, "the trafficking came and occupied, trafficking takes power. It is much faster to respond than the state and the Public Defender itself" (Public Defender's interview, 10/10/2017). "Parallel power," as the residents usually call drug dealers, ended up occupying a void left by City Hall, further exposing residents to unusual risk situations in the community. This situation has thus contributed to further feed the atmosphere of suspicion in the community, undermining even more any possibility of contestation and resistance.

Although the representative of the Public Defender tended to minimize this situation, stating that the favelados were used to the presence of the parallel power, being the most relevant issue at that time for the mobilization of the community, my assessment, from the interviews with locals and field observations, was different. This kind of assumption commonly made by the outsiders is quite problematic because it conceals the possible reasons for the sudden demobilization of residents, also contributing to the process of administrative violence against favela dwellers, reported here. First, it is a form of naturalizing of the idea that a favela is a place of criminals, bandits, and deviants, where the favelados are used to the presence of drug trafficking. If it is true, why should the favelados show so much fear and concern for the new internal organization of the favela?

Even if in the case of favelas where there is a known presence of the parallel power, assuming the favela dwellers can easily readapt to a new reality is a way to underestimate the impacts of such changes in those settlements. Second, this kind of reading results in underestimating the impact of such territorial reorganization on cooling down the participation of residents in the resistance process. Residents end up accused of being poorly organized or apathetic when, in fact, what is at stake is their fear of suffering some kind of retaliation, as they cannot read the new reality in the favela, even though outsiders assume that the interaction between old and new residents would occur almost automatically.

6.6 Negative circuit of affects and the violent administration of disaster risk displacements

One of the meta-themes that emerged in the whole analysis of favelados' displacement was "the role of affect in the governing of removals". Removals function not simply through favelados' experience of physical loss of their houses, but as a form of violence operating through affectivities engendered by an inevitable yet indeterminable future. Although the interview below refers to Estradinha's case, it captures well how a negative "circuit of affects" (Safatle, 2016) was used by officials to coerce favelados to consent to removal:

> P: Actually, they said that I would be guilty of any accident in the community. If a house falls here, and someone dies, it's your fault that you're preventing City Hall from taking the community away […] it frightened. And for people who they thought were a little weaker, they sent some employees of City Hall to coerce these people. (Interview with Angélica, Estradinha, 14/09/2017)

In this interview, Angélica made it clear how the government mobilized fear to intimidate leaders who were resisting disaster risk displacements and to hold them responsible for any deaths that occurred as a result of a potential landslide that could affect the community in the future. This type of intimidation, which was very common in stories shared by favela dwellers, suggests that City Hall was not interested either in mitigating the risk of disasters or in ensuring the democratic participation of residents in the construction of alternatives to the removal of potentially at-risk houses. On the contrary, according to the favelados' version, City Hall seemed to be working with the expectation of an imminent disaster of unimaginable proportions, which annihilates any possibility of discussion or negotiation with the favela residents, to put into practice the taboo agenda for removals. In this way, a policy of disaster risk-backed removals is created without any political, contradictory dissensus or conflict.

As witnessed by the evidence presented above, the policy of removal has a strong emotional element in circulation, with appeals to fear, blame, despair and hope as central political affects. Having this in

mind, the objective of this section is to understand how the affective life of the favelados became “an object-target and a condition” (Anderson, 2012) for the contemporary form of biopolitical removal of favelas. To this, the notion of the “circuit of affects” (Safatle, 2016), based on fear, plays a central role here not only in maintaining a status quo but in rescuing obsolete and disastrous political responses in a context where ‘the principle of non-removal’ has become the rule of law (see Chapters 2 & 4).

Once the probability of a catastrophe seemed inescapable in the eyes of the favelados, who had been experiencing all those events in close proximity, two alternatives were offered by City Hall officials: either leave or die. In this context, “to die” assume two meanings here: the first refers to the possibility of having their lives taken by an unprecedented catastrophe like the one in 2010; the second, a symbolic one, refers to the political inaction widely adopted by City Hall when residents refused to leave. The latter refers to the policy of “letting die” (see Chapter 3) comprised of forms of negligence and abandonment which were abundantly reported in the previous sections (see sections 6.3 & 6.4). In this context of threats, to “remain” in the community means the possibility of coping with the consequences and losing the chance of having not only a house but also a minimally habitable environment, as their territory has become a source of uncertainty and insecurity.

In an interview with a member of the Coletivo Técnico, the informant illustrated well how this kind of emergency politics is mediated by a negative “circuit of affects” (Safatle, 2016) like fear and blame and how this has been mobilized to nullify rights like the right to housing of favelados:

> With the conquest of several housing guarantee rights, through social housing movements that have existed for many years, the room for manoeuvre to remove housing has become institutionally more limited. Now, and within that margin of manoeuvre, there is a case, which is a case where the interference of the conquered rights is very small, which is exactly the technical argument of risk that practically nullifies all rights, because it would be above something greater, which it would be, theoretically, the life protection argument, the main right. So, when the risk argument is raised, it practically suspends several rights that arise. No,

> you cannot talk about the right to housing for a person who lives in a place where a hill will fall on him. That kind of argument. And second, what is involved in this type of argument is a technical discourse that is not apprehended by the vast majority of people (Interview with Maurício, Coletivo Técnico, 02/08/2017).

This type of strategy underpinned by the argument of maximizing life through the circulation of negative affects has left very few options to the favela dwellers, at least at the beginning of the state incursions against those territories. As highlighted by Angélica at the beginning of the section, she was feeling overwhelmed by the possibility of being responsible for a tragedy that could claim lives, which prevented her from getting involved in any social and political action against removals at the beginning.

With these circuits at play, the city creates an illusion of options, supported by an image of an imminent catastrophe, that City Hall itself might end through an emergency policy based on favela removal (see Chapter 5). The interview with the engineer of the Coletivo Técnico clearly represents how this image of terror was put in place and its effects:

> Nowadays it is a scientific discipline [risk management] that has its criteria, and if these criteria are followed, it is a very useful thing in the sense of guaranteeing security for people. This applies in several fields, right? But it has to be treated thoughtfully, and not to use the risk argument as an all or nothing and not to use the risk argument as psychological terrorism. One of the best interviews I gave at the time, in 2010, was neither for an engineer, nor for a lawyer, or anything. She was a psychologist at the Regional Council of Psychology. And I think it has everything to do with it because we are working here not only as risk is being treated as an objective thing, that can be quantified, that can be treated, but we are also dealing with the psychological approach to risk, how it is treated, how is this discussion of risk becoming infantilized ... if it becomes infantilized, it takes advantage of people's trauma so that they become infantilized and cannot see the nuances of risk. It is either risk, or it is not risk, there

> is no such thing. There is a degree of risk, there is a possibility and there is a way to treat it. Now, using a tragedy to impose a childish and Manichean risky discussion is a crime, it is not only technically incorrect but in terms of rights, it is absurd, right?

City Hall claims on totalizing forms of risk suggests removals as an inevitable path, which frightens the favela dwellers. This kind of “all or nothing approach” to risk prevents other alternatives such as investments in favela upgrading and mitigation works, gaining visibility. The circuit of affects works as a blocker of political imagination, being a logic widely applied in the examples reported so far.

Paradoxically, this administrative manipulation of affects that narrowed down the options given to the favelados took place in a period when the set of options available for the municipality had, if anything, broadened (see Chapter 1). However, the only options made available were mainly fuelled by invented risk assessments, based on the manipulation of events and fabricated risks. In other words, just as it would have been feasible for the State to radicalize its policies and invest in alternatives to the political project of “favelas integration” (Landesman, 2016), the authorities opted for interventions that favoured the intensification of precarity and ultimately, the dispossession of favelados.

Considering the many stories, I have heard in the field, the success of removals especially during the first advances of City Hall against favelas can be attributed to what I call “biopolitical blackmail”. In other words, it could be literally translated as "either you leave, or we will let you die”. This approach refers, as we saw in the previous section, to logics of abandonment mobilized by City Hall either to bargain consent, which clearly refers to logics of abandonment, a way to pressure residents to leave or to punish them for refusing to leave.

This affective circuit, however, has its origins at the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century (as shown in Chapter 2), when hygienists mobilized the imaginaries around the pandemic of yellow fever to create social panic to legitimize the violent suppression of cortiços. The contemporary politics of removals emerge as an effect of the external circuits of affects in which the media plays a central

role. In contemporary Rio, the media mobilized images of a dystopic city where favelas became the prevalent element in the landscape of the city's South Zone, transformed into an environmental threat to the reproduction of the general good life of Carioca society. This kind of social imaginary contributed to create social cohesion and provide legitimacy to the policy of removal, to avoid further evil: the favelisation of the South Zone.

Considering the role of the media in the construction of social imaginaries and its influence on political action, the example of the news released by the *O Globo* entitled "Removals Saved the Lagoon Landscape" (Fig 6.12) is emblematic. The news was mainly focused on the success of the removal policy implemented by the government of Major Negrão de Lima in the 1960s. At that time, favelas like Praia do Pinto, Catacumba, Vila Hípica and Ilha das Dragas located in what today is the picture-postcard view of the city, were removed. This is represented as a "successful" measure adopted by the city. The newspaper reports that without a removal policy, "instead of forested slopes and the landscape that today is one of the postcards of Rio, around the Lagoon could have been taken over by a sea of shacks" (O Globo, 12/04/2009). According to the newspaper, the population of the four favelas (which in 1950 had 13,000 inhabitants) at a normal rate would represent 96,904 inhabitants; but if the growth rate followed Rocinha (the biggest favela in the city), the communities would house 172,619 people. Thus, "the cluster of shacks that could exist today would be equivalent to a Complexo do Alemão [a complex of favelas in the North Zone of the city] in the South Zone" (ibid).

Remoções salvaram a paisagem da Lagoa

Cartão postal do Rio poderia ter sido transformado em complexo de favelas com pelo menos 96 mil moradores

Jacqueline Costa, Luiz Ernesto Magalhães e Selma Schmidt

• No lugar de encostas reflorestadas e da paisagem que hoje é um dos cartões postais do Rio, o entorno da Lagoa poderia estar tomado por um mar de barracos. Projeções indicam que, se não tivessem sido removidas, as favelas da Praia do Pinto, Catacumba, Vila Hípica e Ilha das Dragas teriam nada menos que 96.304 moradores. Mas se o ritmo de crescimento seguisse o da Rocinha, as comunidades abrigariam hoje 172.619 mil pessoas.

O cálculo mais conservador foi feito pelo GLOBO cruzando estatísticas do IBGE sobre o crescimento da população com dados do Instituto Pereira Passos (IPP) relacionados à expansão das comunidades carentes em quase seis décadas. Segundo o Censo de 1950, as favelas da Lagoa tinham 13 mil habitantes. Em 59 anos, elas poderiam ter crescido 645%. Usando a expansão da Rocinha como referência, o acréscimo seria de 1.228%.

Para o engenheiro Francisco Filardi, que acompanhou as remoções de Negrão de Lima, o aglomerado de barracos que poderia existir hoje equivaleria a um Complexo do Alemão encravado na Zona Sul. A partir de fotos dos anos 60, ele projetou como estariam as encostas do bairro se os barracos se multiplicassem. O resultado impressiona.

O arquiteto e historiador Nireu Cavalcanti explica que as favelas no entorno da Lagoa surgiram numa época em que a região não despertava tanto interesse da construção civil e da classe média quanto Copacabana e Leblon.

Especialista diz que futuro da área seria imprevisível

Ao contrário de Filardi, o arquiteto e professor da UFRJ Sérgio Magalhães diz que não há como prever o que teria ocorrido na Lagoa sem as remoções:

— Não sei como teria se desenvolvido politicamente a cidade. O que sei é que as famílias que foram para conjuntos habitacionais não gostaram. A mudança era compulsória. E pessoas foram levadas para lugares distantes, vazios. A história mostrou que as remoções do passado não deram certo.

Já a presidente do Instituto de Arquitetos do Brasil (IAB), Dayse Góis, diz que a cidade convive com favelas como Ro-

Editoria de Arte

A FAVELA DA CATACUMBA SE NÃO TIVESSE SIDO REMOVIDA....

Na simulação, o engenheiro Francisco Filardi indica a extensão (área mais clara) da favela caso não tivesse sido retirada. Segundo ele, as contruções se estenderiam até a Rua Fonte da Saudade, pelo lado esquerdo, e até o Corte do Cantagalo, pelo lado direito

Esta foto, de 1965, mostra a área ocupada pelos barracos, que chegavam à beira da Avenida Epitácio Pessoa

Mirante Dona Marta

Prédios atuais

ÁREA QUE SERIA OCUPADA PELA FAVELA

Favela da Catacumba

LAGOA

Prédios atuais

...E A PAISAGEM DA LAGOA HOJE, SEM A FAVELA

Segundo uma projeção, se as favelas do bairro não tivessem sido removidas, elas teriam hoje **96 mil** moradores

Outro cálculo, baseado no crescimento da Rocinha, estima que esse número poderia chegar a **172 mil** moradores

Corcovado

Mirante Dona Marta

Parque da Catacumba

ONDE FICAVAM AS FAVELAS NA LAGOA ANTES DA REMOÇÃO

Favela da Catacumba

Pavão-Pavãozinho e Cantagalo

Favela da Ilha das Dragas
Ao lado do canal Jardim de Alah

COPACABANA

IPANEMA

LEBLON

Lagoa Rodrigo de Freitas

Favela Praia do Pinto
Ficava onde é hoje o condomínio Selva de Pedra. Na foto, a arquibancada do estádio do Flamengo pode ser vista próxima ao espaço ocupado pela favela

Vila Hípica
Ocupava área que seguia da Hípica até próximo do Clube Piraquê

Figure 6-10: "Removals Saved the Lagoon Landscape": the picture post card view of the city could be transformed into a complex of favelas with at least 96,000 inhabitants.
Source: *O Globo*, 12/04/2009, p. 15.

In a brief analysis of the report, it is possible to notice that there are also recurrent statements that deal with the issue of favelas' growth in an almost apocalyptic manner. The text resorts to catastrophic projections with images simulating the landscape of the Lagoa Rodrigo de Freitas taken over by favelas - a future imaginary abhorred by Rio's white elites. According to the text, if removalist policies had not been adopted in the past, the Lagoa Rodrigo de Freitas would be covered by a complex of favelas. This image presents a strong appeal to the newspaper audience – in general, white, middle-class people – and also to the government, afraid of the negative repercussions at the polls. Then, it sounded like a

public call for reviewing the "demagogy" of non-favela removal through a clear attempt to convince the authorities of the need to safeguard the city's landscapes still untouched by the presence of favelas. Coincidently or not, City Hall launched a “removal package” of favelas less than one year after the release of this news report (see Chapter 5).

Hence, the above examples pose the following question: What would be the greater evil to be avoided? Irene's account of the moment when the public officials were trying to convince her to accept the agreement to be resettled in Bairro Carioca might give us an idea of what this great evil should be:

> I work here, I held the fort, I listened to a lot, I had to hold on. "Dona Irene, your husband is from the navy, your children are beautiful, they are white, you want to continue living in this shit, here in this smelly favela where there are only vagabonds, stoners, prostitutes*, cheirador de loló* [glue sniffers], I don't know why you want to keep living here anyway, I don't understand that". People cried they vented their anger at me, how do you think I was? Got it!? (Interview with Irene, Indiana, 08/09/2017)

Given the above account, it is not surprising that the great evil is seen as the favela itself. At the heart of this interpellation was the attempt to take away from her, a racialized woman, her aspiration to the favela, her right to the favela, what would correspond to the right to the city in a decolonized city perspective. The mobilization of a stigmatized image of the favela as a place where “there are only vagabonds, stoners, prostitutes and cheirador de loló” was crucial.

Curiously, this evil reality in which she and her family were supposedly immersed seemed to be incompatible with the distinct traits of her family: the light skin of her children, the respectable professional background of her husband, and her good manners. When, during the interview, she asked me “how do you think I was?”, she questioned the contradictory feelings she had about being a favelada and her desire to stay in the place she chose to live, which seemed inappropriate at the time.

The constant abuses to which she was exposed made her question the decision to stay: *"*Am I really on the right track?". Therefore, given the above, fear, blame and shame were distilled to their highest intensity as a government technique for self-discipline, self-monitoring, self-conquest, instilled in favelados by public officials to keep them under control (Miller, 2015).

The favelados' internalization of blame, as the examples of Angélica and Irene suggest, was triggered by two main strategies: first, state blaming for a possible environmental disaster outcome, as they would insist on remaining in a hazardous condition; second, and perhaps the most subtle and perverse mechanism, state blaming through a racialized fixation of the favelados' image based on negative stereotypes. That is, the resident felt guilty for making a choice that would not only entail the risk of death for her family, but also for wanting to keep it in an environment of "disqualified people", in a place of moral and social degeneration. This feeling of blame and shame gain perverse contours in face of the favelados' refusal to go to Bairro Carioca, once City Hall was offering them "the opportunity" to not only physically but also morally save their families, through the social ascent to a respectable life close to the white middle-class condominiums of PMCMV. The internalization of blame made most of them complicit in their subjugation and the structural injustices that surround them. Perhaps it is no coincidence that many residents and former residents reported some kind of regret in having accepted to go to Bairro Carioca.

The participants' affective experiences of violent administration of removals are marked by emotional abuses and wounds inflicted on their identity as favelados. Participants usually linked their everyday emotionally abusive experiences to the emergence of health problems, particularly, mental illness, given the way their routines were so significantly altered. Mr Agenor illustrates well this possible devastating effect of removals on the physical and mental health of residents:

> Do you know why my wife died? Her stomach blew, she had three cardiac surgeries and died with a stomach problem, nothing in her heart, that was the nervous thing here in the community, but if I didn't take her [to the hospital], she would have died already. It was four

> times that she went to the hospital and it was enough to see that her stomach blew (Interview with Mr Agenor, Indiana, 21/07/2017)

Mr Agenor, after his wife's death, suffered a heart attack and had to undergo heart surgery. The accumulation of stress experienced by the long, slow, and violent process of Indiana's removal has also left deep marks on the residents' mental health. Mr Agenor shows symptoms of isolation and sadness over the loss of his wife, of some friends, and the disharmony that eventually prevailed in the community he was so proud to belong to. Although Indiana is still there, in Mr Agenor's stories prevails a certain longing for the favela that no longer exists, and melancholy about the uncertain future of the community.

Murillo, one of the founders of the Residents' Commission, also explained how he got mentally ill during the removal process:

> When there was the removal process, there were people who died here because they went into depression, but after a while, I got into depression too. I didn't want to accept leaving here, because I understood that this house is linked to me, got it!? (Interview with Murillo, Indiana, 08/09/2017)

The insecurity brought by the possibility of being uprooted, made homeless, results in traumatising "those affected [who] are still trapped in place, and an ongoing relationship with the perpetrator is hard to escape" (Pain, 2019, p. 393). The earlier brutality of Indiana's clearances has continued with the violent administration of those who remain in the area followed by the deliberate abandonment of the community by City Hall. The administrative violence, almost invisible in the large picture of removals, becomes real through the subjective suffering of the favelados created by the city officials.

6.7 Conclusion

In this Chapter I applied the analytical concept of "administrative violence" as a complementary tool to the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 3, to examine how disaster risk displacements take

place. I have explored the case of the favela of Indiana where populations living on the banks of the Maracanã River suffered displacement spurred by the argument of risk prevention.

In the post-2010 context, attempts to "make life" through administrative technologies – based on risk assessment, the Cadastro Social of families in high-risk areas, negotiation of houses, indemnities, house demolitions, the inclusion of families in the social rent and resettlements program – ended up producing more vulnerability and, consequently, exposing the favelados to all sort of risks.

The analysis of how these administrative technologies of risk and displacements are undertaken by the city made evident that favelas' vulnerability, or precarity, is not the result of a cascade effect of catastrophic events, but rather intentionally produced through coordinated governmental actions and inactions that have affected the social, material and affective life conditions of the favela's residents, thereby reducing their potential to strive and survive.

Taking into account that I was interested in "any action or inaction that affects the material and non-material conditions of others, thereby reducing one's potential for survival" (Tyner & Rice, 2016, p.09), the administrative practices of disaster risk displacements described in this chapter, from disclosure to resettlement, can be taken as a violent process. The violence against favelados in the process of displacement has been operationalized since the beginning, with the biopolitical mechanism of standardization and categorizations of risk (as we saw in Chapter 5), through the risk assessment enacted by Geo-Rio. Then, we have the development of an assemblage of practices of direct and structural violence portrayed in this chapter that reaches its apogee with the state incursions in the favela territories, producing, through the contact between favelados and city officials, stark suffering, besides potentializing favelados' *slow death* through (re) production of vulnerabilities and exposure to risks such as:

- Erosion of long-established systems of social and communal protection
- Indirectly decreasing the capacity of favelados to cope with future disasters (including removals)

- The collapse of houses because of partial or inadvertent demolitions.
- Degradation of local living conditions through the deliberate abandonment of the favela
- Indirect expulsion of the most vulnerable residents, the tenants, to areas of greatest environmental risk or unsuitable housing
- "*Adoecimento*" (physical and mental illness) of the favelados due to the traumatic process of removals[55]

The analysis revealed, then, that the biopolitical strives to make favelados live by way of specific (violent) techniques of government produced other forms of vulnerability collaborating to prolong a historical cycle of state-led precarization and removals. Thus, what we can learn from disaster risk displacement in Indiana is that, after all, the risk claims made by the city are not a neutral description; they are inevitably part of an argument about classification, causality, responsibility and the imaginable and pragmatic logics of expulsion (Berlant, 2007).

[55] I would particularly recommend research on the effects of disastrous risk displacements on the health of favelados, especially on the mental health as complaints on it were almost unanimous between the participants, especially between those who were in the front line of resistance.

Chapter 7 "*Pisa ligeiro, pisa ligeiro! Quem não pode com a formiga não pisa no formigueiro!*": favelados' vulnerability against displacements[56]

7.1 Introduction

> In Rio de Janeiro, the removal of favelas has become a major taboo, supported by cheap assistencialism that the state must provide everything to the poor of the hills - even if their stay there could put their own lives at risk and cause damage to the city as a whole. The absurd idea embedded in this reasoning is that whoever lives in the favela is a special citizen, who does not need to submit to the Constitution and does not have the same duties as other Brazilians. From this obtuse perspective, removing favelas is seen as an affront to the rights of the neediest. This demagogic nonsense has its roots in the populism that has contaminated the politics of Rio de Janeiro for decades. The swelling of Rio's favelas is the result of a combination of these factors (Interview of Sérgio Besserman to *Veja* Magazine, 17/04/2010).

The interview above took place shortly after the heavy rains that affected the city in 2010 and summarizes well how the favela is portrayed by urban planners, "middle-class environmentalists" and politicians: as an environmental threat not only to itself but to the whole of Rio's society. Coincidently, Besserman, at that time president of the Pereira Passos Institute (Instituto Pereira Passos – IPP), was one of the pioneers on the theme of resilience in Brazil. He has been a member of the Steering Committee of Rio Resilient since its inception in 2014 and would become president of the Jardim

[56] The slogan, translated as "Step lightly, step lightly! Those who cannot lead with the ant do not step on the anthill!", was used during the four acts of the 'Journey against Removals' (see Chapter 4) refers to the favelados' condition of vulnerability in resistance.

Botânico (Garden Research Institute of Rio de Janeiro), from 2016 to 2020, responsible for resuming the removal policy against Horto's residents (see Chapter 4).

According to his interview, the "demagoguery" would be responsible for the proliferation of so-called "risk areas" in the city (Magalhaes, 2013). His explicit call for the reintroduction of removals deliberately ignores the longstanding role of the state in the process of favelas' precarization, which Chapters 2 and 6 documented well. In this racialized view, the favela becomes a synonym of vulnerability and is also responsible for *"causing damage to the city as a whole"*.

Besserman paints a markedly reactionary political vision. Moreover, it manifests a widespread framing in which the favelados are depicted as passive victims waiting to be protected through assistentialist policies. Crucially, in this frame, readers are left to contemplate a system of precarization and dispossession that leaves little space for agency, resistance, and refusal. In this register, which reduces vulnerability to victimhood or complicity, it is almost impossible to imagine acts of resistance, liberation and empowerment (Pieterse, 2008; Vasudevan, 2015). This disabling stance deliberately overlooks the historical protagonism of favelados in their production of housing, and also ignores their efforts to upgrade their communities, which may include mitigation works to reduce the impact of landslides and flooding, which should otherwise be carried out by the state. This kind of discourse dismisses or renders invisible, the fact that favelados' vulnerability creates the potential for political resistance (Butler, 2016).

These discourses, practices and arguments deny favelados' agency and blame them for causing damage to the city. To challenge the epistemology of ignorance (Sullivan & Tuana, 2007, p.102) it is crucial to affirmatively discuss the way favela dwellers have been resisting processes of precarization through forced displacements.

Focusing exclusively on the political biases behind the discourses and procedures of risk management (as discussed in Chapter 5) or on the violence and injustices outlined throughout Chapter 6, will replicate the same rationale that relegates favela citizens to the troublesome status as

victims/perpetrators of environmental problems. This position, as shown in Chapter 2, has contributed to legitimizing the long process of governmental precarization of those territories which, I argue, is behind favelas' condition of 'displaceability' (Yiftachel, 2020).

Therefore, this chapter aims to go beyond a focus on vulnerability as a condition that subjugates favelados to removals, to show how the vulnerability might be seen as part of favelados' resistance. From a Butlerian perspective, as discussed in Chapter 3, vulnerability is interpreted as a deliberate exposure to power (Butler, 2016), thus potentially an important part of the very nature of favelados' political opposition to the contemporary politics of removals.

Such vulnerability can function as an instrument for governing favelados through uncertainty and fear of future removals, as we saw in Chapter 6, or as the basis for a "simultaneously incalculable and potentially empowering self-government" (Lorey, 2011, p. 05), as I will show in this chapter. This articulation on vulnerability with a Foucauldian perspective of power that is omnipresent, productive and relational (see Chapter 3) is of significance here because it allows us to interrelate power, hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forms of knowledge production on risk and resistance in a contingent and complex way, to give space for an open dialogue with forms of governmental precarization brought by the disaster risk displacements, as discussed in previous chapters. The main contribution of this chapter is to show how favelados respond to racialized ascriptions of risk made by the city, which contributes to the perpetuation of their precarization.

The chapter, then, is the first of two that examine the following question:

- How have favela dwellers experienced and responded to such politics of disaster risk displacement?

For analytical clarity, I divided responses into four categories of resistance as outlined in the figure below. The first refers to 'epistemic resistance', which examines the mobilisation of counter knowledge claims by favela dwellers and their support network, to disrupt and alter an

unfair normative structure of DRRM and the complacent cognitive-affective process that underpins these structures (Medina, 2013).

The others, which will be discussed in Chapter 8, focus on resistance which is made manifest by temporal, affective and material forms of political contestation.



Figure 7-1: Research findings
Source: Elaborated by the author

The chapter, then, is structured as follow. In Section 7.2, I present how a condition of vulnerability created by the threats of home demolitions became part of the very practice of political resistance of favelados. Following a similar direction taken in the last chapter, which introduced the case of Indiana, I take the analytical study to Estradinha, and particularly Angélica, a prominent leader against the contemporary wave of disaster risk displacements.

What Angélica's story shows is the emergence of the process of resistance. Facing dispossession, she became aware of the object of resistance (Samaddar, 2009, p.136), that is, the precarization posed by

the removals. Her narrative resonates with many others. She was previously non-political but through a strong desire 'to stay put' she emerged as someone "authoring politics" (Samaddar, 2010) against displacement, claiming her right to the favela, and consequently, the city.

In Section 7.3, I demonstrate how this 'subject authoring strategy', embodied by Angélica and other actors (historically) engaged in the Rio housing conflict, motivates collective modes of epistemic resistance, sustained by authoritative knowledge claims of high-risk conditions in favelas. This type of encounter was integral to the conformation of a counter-expertise network

Section 7.4 seeks to show how the network works to address injustices embedded by the racialized ascription of favelas as 'high-risk areas. Finally, Section 7.5 outlines the key findings, thus linking this chapter with the overall structure of the thesis and the next analytical chapter.

7.2 "*Eu era apenas uma dona de casa*"[57]: vulnerability and the emergence of favelados' resistance

One of the most prominent themes emerging from my data analysis refers to the moment in which favela residents who undergo "affectual demolitions" (Joronen & Griffiths, 2019a), as we saw in Chapter 6, experienced not only the despair and fear of losing their homes but also the resoluteness to act on and against state-led precarity and exposure to the risk posed by this form of dispossession.[58]

Such resoluteness to act seems like any injustice occurs first in political life, and then there is a reaction. But, as highlighted by (Butler, 2016, p. 26-27), it might be that the reaction happens as the injustice happens, and this gives us another way of thinking about "historical events, action, passion, and vulnerability in modes of opposition" (ibid.). Indeed, "not only power but also resistance creates resistance" (Lilja, Baaz, Schulz, & Vinthagen, 2017, p.45)

[57] Translation: "I was just a housewife".
[58] For details see Chapter 6

The story of Angélica clearly illustrates the productive side of vulnerability that is central to the argument of this chapter. Angélica, before engaging in the struggles against removals, defined herself as “a housewife, alienated from the issues of the community” (Fieldnotes, 2017). A religious woman, her “life was just from home to the church, having no contact with anyone” *(Angélica’s interview)*. However, the turning point in the unfolding of removals is when she found herself confronted with the state of devastation left once around two-thirds of Estradinha had been removed:

> As I told you it was 355 houses [remaining] before I even got into the fight, to understand the fight, because, in reality, I didn't even understand my rights, I thought that City Hall had the right to take away the community, that they were more knowledgeable, more educated, that they knew what was best for the community. Before I understood my rights, they managed to get 255 homes out of the community. So, when I understood that it was up to me, it wasn't up to City Hall to stay, that I started walking and seeking help, yeah, I got 100 residents in the resistance. 100 residents. […] and once I climbed up here in the *morro* (favela), in the community, and it looked like they had dropped a bomb in my community. The whole top had been destroyed (Angélica, Estradinha)

As the stories told by the City officials to remove those families were embedded in assumptions that exploited the disastrous events of 2010 (as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6), this explains the undisputed reception and the initial agreement reached with the city official, including Angélica. According to her, when the city began "investing against the community" strategically targeting the most vulnerable or recent residents,[59] she was “feeling alienated” from the situation, even coming to agree with the state of affairs in the favela. As the first group of residents were in a position of greater vulnerability – due to their precarious status (as tenants) or the habitability of their homes – and disadvantage concerning access to information to negotiate with City Hall (see examples in Chapter 6), those group of residents

[59] According to the interviews and observations, the new residents would be more inclined to make an agreement with City Hall because of loose ties to the community and, second, because of their poor living conditions.

eventually accepted the proposal made by the city, either by coercion or for money.[60] This was clear to Angelica:

> And for the people they thought were a little weaker, they sent some city employees to coerce them. Or propose, like, "the mayor wants to buy your house and with this money, they are giving you, you can buy two houses in the suburbs". And he even got a lot of people through that kind of behaviour. (Angélica, Estradinha)

As a result, at the beginning of the removals in Estradinha the rhythm of demolitions was intense, which made Angélica scared about her future in the community. With the heavy rains of 2010, the demolitions were like a domino effect, she knew her home could be the next if she did not react. As the contradictions in the interventions of the city officials were becoming more evident, especially about risk assessment (see Chapter 5 and 6), Angélica began to question them. At this point, she decided to seek help from other favelas that were undergoing a similar removal process.

The rejection of the idea of risk and, with this, the rejection of the idea of being dispossessed by the possibility of removal, motivated Angélica to join the Estradinha's Residents Association and engage in one of the most definitive cases of resistance in Rio's contemporary history of removals.[61] The need and desire to fight for the right to the favela began to be articulated from elements of the settlement's history, the residents' memories and the lived experience of building the houses, and their daily lives in the favela. As Angélica points out:

> I know the hole that was drilled in your house, I know how the *laje* (a flat rooftop) was built. My house, so that I could make the *sapata* (foundation) of my house, I dug 2.10m, 2.20m, I didn't get out of the hole until I found the bedrock. And the soil here is gravel, not loose soil.

[60] As we saw in Chapter 6, one of the strategies by City Hall in the preceding period of removals was the spread of misleading information: rumours, information released by the local media, false census in the community. Misleading information is considered by the research participants one of the most important factors of demobilization of favela residents.

[61] The majority of participants of this research that had some involvement with the resistance movement cited Angélica as one of the main references in the fight against removals. Due to the unanimity of opinions on her importance in the fight against the process of resistance, I decided to interview her.

> The city is lying! So, I started talking to the community […] Then, I started one of my journeys through the communities, wanting help, or wanting to understand how the business worked, in Vila Autódromo, Indiana, in all the communities that were in the process of being removed. (Angélica, Estradinha)

In one of those visits, Angélica met a dweller from Babilônia, who invited her to join Favela Nao Se Cala (Favela Don't Be Quiet), a collective of favela residents, social activists, and public defenders started in 2012 with the purpose to raise awareness among favela residents of the abuses of power and "strengthen the fight in the communities" (Arthur, Babilônia resident) against the state violence practised by the city.

> It was to resist, to resist and to resist! It is always this awareness that we do not need to expect help from outside when we can strengthen ourselves at the base. So, I learned a lot from Favela Nao Se Cala in that way. When a community was at risk, those with experience, those with expertise, had to pass the experience on to the community to strengthen it and understand that the struggle does not start from there, the struggle begins from here […] It would be just that, to make people understand that there may be danger from above, but if it has not rooted, it falls. But if the *movimento de base* (grass-roots movement) is strengthened, we can reach the top. (Angélica, Estradinha)

Therefore, to the extent that Angélica's experiences in the face of removals in *Estradinha* were getting known by other communities, she was being invited, along with Favela Não Se Cala, by residents of other favelas facing similar problems (such as Indiana, Horto, Providência and Vila Autódromo) to exchange her experiences about the removals process, building an important support network at that time. According to her, the Favela Não Se Cala had a mission:

> To bring to the community the knowledge of their rights and bringing along other community leaders to tell the community that their weaknesses were their strengths. And at the same time, we left with experience too. What doesn't suit me, I left it there. I passed on my

> experiences to them, what I did here that was working; and what I listened to there that was working, was brought to me. (Angélica, Estradinha).

Initiatives such as Favela Não Se Cala also ended up breaking the invisibility of the removal process, drawing the attention of the media, especially alternative outlets. According to Murilo, a resident of Indiana and also a member of the collective at that time, "the Favela Não Se Cala represented a space for the favela residents to express themselves and get known" (Fieldnote, 29/10/2017).

An important tool used by collectives like Favela Não Se Cala and also widely employed by favela leaders from Estradinha, Horto and Vila Autódromo were the Internet and social media. Angélica created a blog in which she exposed all the outrages committed by the city. By analysing the blog,[62] I identified a pattern in her posts: she emphasizes the affective ties of the residents with the community, by sharing their stories, followed by images that portray the devastation of the community, then, the community reaction, with posts containing complaints against the violent practices of the city officials (see Figure 7.2); and registers visits from institutions such as Amnesty International, universities, NUTH, along with records of the demonstrations organized by the residents.

[62] In 2010, when City Hall begin the removal process, there were 116 posts.

Figure 7-2: Post denouncing that “the resident's furniture is removed from the residence and thrown on the street in any way, amid the trash”
Source: Estradinha’s blog

One important moment highlighted in the blog was a protest made by Estradinha’s residents on August 5th, 2010, in front of the Court, in downtown Rio de Janeiro (see Figure 7.3). At the time, the State Public Defender's Office filed a public civil action demanding that the city remove all the rubble from demolitions, comply with the technical criteria of demolition works, stop the demolition of attached houses, and other measures. To exert pressure on the judge who would rule the case and make visible the forms of administrative violence to which they were being subjected (for examples, see Chapter 6), the residents brought some of the rubble accumulated by City Hall's demolitions, calling for the interruption of removal and this form of precarization.

Figure 7-3: Demonstration organized by the residents in front of the city's Forum with the rubble left by City Hall in the community after the demolitions
Source: Estradinha's blog

The mobilization of (social) media here, as pointed out by Butler (2016, p. 14), acts as part of the "infrastructural support" as it promotes forms of solidarity and generates new spatial-temporal dimensions of the public sphere, for those who, by coercion, fear or necessity, living outside of the reach of the visual frame are both seen and heard.

One of the most common concerns highlighted by participants facing removals (as clear in my analysis of interviews, documents, and posts in social media) was about the rubble left behind by City Hall. In Estradinha it was no different. With the stoppage of removals granted by the courts in 2013, the rubble became an immense problem for the favela residents. Even in the face of a favourable court decision to Estradinha's residents determining the immediate removal of the rubble, despite the penalty of a fine for non-compliance with the judicial sentence, the mayor deliberately failed to comply with what was required

This situation led residents to seek alternatives to the legal and institutional milieu, although procedural forms of resistance in line with epistemic ones were mobilized with the counter-expertise network, as we will see in Section 7.3. In seeking alternatives, then, new actions were performed by the community. In one case, Angélica decided to take the rubble left behind by the city officials and put it in front of the mayor's house, "to clog the mayor's drain down in Alto da Boa Vista", an upper-middle-class neighbourhood where the former mayor of Rio de Janeiro lived. According to Angélica, "we took the small dump truck, went up and clogged the mayor's main drain, and we hung clothes on the clothesline, with banners saying: 'Estradinha was here!'".

According to residents' information, after this act, the mayor contacted the priest responsible for the *Pastoral de Favelas* to mediate a conversation with Angélica, inviting the community leader to a meeting. Afraid of the mayor's intentions, Angélica said she would only agree to talk to the mayor in the community's domain. The mayor eventually accepted the proposal and on the agreed date went to the community accompanied by his entourage. This moment, decisive for the community, was portrayed by a documentary.

In the documentary, we can see the community leader going from house to house calling residents one by one, to share with her the commitment and bond around the important unexpected meeting with the mayor. "Every community needs to be together", says Angélica in the documentary. The mayor had agreed to visit the community "bringing good news to the residents". Then, Eduardo Paes finally arrives. The meeting contains some interesting scenes: Angélica showing the problems caused by the mayor's eviction order signed in 2010, the power asymmetry between them, and the claim that she could be heard (V. De Oliveira, 2017).

In one of the scenes, Angélica refers to the fact that the mayor did not walk in the community and, therefore, could not verify with his own eyes the rubble and wreckage of the houses he had torn down in 2010. She says: "You could not walk through my community, but I brought the rubble here". She refers to the photographs displayed beside her on the church wall, focusing on a mural of photographs

from the community (see Figure 7.4), showing what she has been fighting for the mayor to see: the devastation of the community. Later on, she categorically says, "What happened here was a crime".

Figure 7-4: Mural of horrors. Throughout the mural, there is a collection of pictures depicting demolitions. In the centre, a drawing depicting the favela threatened by a City Hall employee wielding a hammer, with the following words: "*Tabajara is my place*".
Source: Estradinha's blog

The dispossession forced upon Angélica and her community would not stop her from providing a critical examination of that situation. This is obvious as Angélica tells the mayor: "If you want my support in constructing a retaining wall so that nothing falls on these buildings, I'll teach you!". Her speech is an articulation of the experience and 'alternative knowledge' developed throughout decades of participation in mutirões and auto-construção (self-construction) in the production of housing and infrastructure in the community. As we will see in the next section, Angela's embodied experience is also fundamental to the epistemic claims against the assignment of Estradinha as a high-risk area.

The conflict of knowledge claims is well represented by the mayor's "reply", which sought to delegitimate Angélica's speech as political: "You're not going to teach me how to handle Rio de Janeiro's favelas," and then, "Don't come with a political speech". To that, Angélica replies: "I'm not a politician". This dialogue is full of meaning and tells us a lot about what each person means by politics, agency, disavowal, and asymmetry. This argument only reinforces the conflict of knowledge claims that have marked the disputes on risk in Estradinha. In trying to disallow Angélica's words, Eduardo Paes seeks to marginalise her to a social place, or, in other words, send her back to the margins (V. De Oliveira, 2017).

Nevertheless, Angélica – by saying she is not a politician – refuses to be a mere object of government and rule, or subject to the politics practised against favelas since 2010. Angélica, aware of the subjection imposed by the 'emergency politics' of City Hall, wishes to subject politics to its visions and desires, that is, she wants "authoring politics" (Samadar, 2010). For this purpose, Angélica was able to mobilize a series of strategies to create, preserve, or open a new platform for the community's political expression.

The mayor, in response to Angélica's statement that other communities suffered from the same problems, tells her not to generalise. As we saw in previous chapters (5 and 6), through the weaponization of risk assessment against favelas, the mayor made broad generalizations about Rio's favelas, categorizing the majority of them as high-risk areas, resulting in clear political effects in terms of urban legislation.[63]

Although Angélica had no legitimacy for authoring public policy – a prerogative of the elected mayor – it does not mean that, as a community leader, she is unable to identify the problems experienced by Estradinha and point out possible solutions by authoring politics. She could not only identify but also cease the removal process with the support of counter-experts and their epistemic network, as will be presented in the next section. The fundamental contradiction highlighted by Angélica and so many

[63] More details in Chapters 5 and 6.

other research participants is that they inhabit the city, but yet are excluded from it. Residents like Angélica have appropriated the precarious conditions caused by City Hall, turning them into public acts against removals, either by exposing the rubble on the door of a public agency (see Figure 7.4 above) or, as happened in favelas like Vila Autódromo, by reusing the rubble to reconstruct or resignifying the infrastructure destroyed by the City Hall, as we will see in Chapter 8.

Indeed, one of the important features of Angélica's example of endurance is that political resistance relies fundamentally on the mobilization of vulnerability, which means that it can be a way of being exposed and agentic at the same time (Butler, 2016, p.24). In other words, the power structures that define the favela's condition of precarity are not only acting on favelados' lives but also favelados are acting upon the historically induced condition of vulnerability that these structures have produced.

7.3 Introducing the counter-expertise network

This section offers a contextualization on the articulation of a contingent and complex multi-actor network structured through a combination of technical, political and legal tactics to support favelados' struggle against disaster risk displacements. In presenting this network, this section argues that it can be classified as a form of epistemic resistance, which refers to "the use of our epistemic resources and abilities to undermine and change oppressive normative structures and the complacent cognitive-affective functioning that sustains those structures" (Medina, 2013, p. 03). The focus, then, is on the role of a network of 'counter expertise' – that emerged from and supported the favela dwellers in their fight against the resumption of the removals policy – in exposing what Yarina, (2018) calls "double-check rhetoric" about climate adaptation, or, in other words, the aspects left in the shadows by adaptive responses and resilience-building strategies such as in Rio de Janeiro.

In the favelas' case, epistemic resistance specifically entails the favelados' capacity to generate knowledge and reveal the limits of the framework of risk employed by the city, exposing how the normative vulnerability created by the precarious social pact established by the 1988 Brazilian

Constitution (see Chapter 2) has been exploited by City Hall to justify the removals (see Chapter 5). To exploit the fragilities in the technical assessment of risk, law, urban policies and other governmental technologies, the favelados have the support of four main bodies: Pastoral de Favelas, Conselho Popular (Popular Council), Public Defence's Officer (specifically the Land and Housing Division, NUTH) and the ITERJ. Figure 7.5 provides a portrayal of these bodies of counter-experts, activists and their practices that support favelados' struggles against the removals' process.

In general, when the communities in Rio de Janeiro are threatened by (disaster risk) displacements, the residents first rely on NUTH and the Conselho Popular — an assembly of favela leaders, activists, academics, and experts. This collective was born as a self-organized movement, composed of residents of favelas affected by the waves of attempted removals that started in 2007 and intensified after the 2010 disasters. The Conselho Popular regularly meets and organises in the Pastoral de Favelas.

Conselho Popular was initially set up in response to the first removal of a favela led by the city since the re-democratization process in 1988. The Canal do Anil, a small favela located in Jacarepaguá, in the West Zone of the city, was removed because of 'environmental risk'. According to one of the Public Defenders interviewed for this research:

> Canal do Anil, I do not know if you know, is a community of Jacarepaguá, which was built near the Vila do Pan [Pan American Village][64] and then a campaign, including newspapers, against the community began. *O Globo* spoke every day about the Canal do Anil, the favela, which was absurd. The *O Dia* newspaper made a big headline saying, "Oh, Pan's Favela" as if Pan were something before the favela, right? Then came a concrete threat because the city began to go to the community saying it was a risk area, it had to leave. So, there, it became clear [....]

[64] The Pan American Village of Rio de Janeiro is a residential complex opened in 2007, consisting of 17 buildings and 1480 apartments, built especially for the 2007 Pan American Games to house 5500 athletes from 42 countries. All the apartments were sold during the launch in 2005.

> The Canal do Anil was the community that formed the support, and from the Canal do Anil's community, the Conselho Popular was formed. The Conselho Popular has come to answer the demands of the Canal do Anil. (Interview, Public Defender, 10/10/2017)

The Conselho Popular became very active in anti-eviction strategies, playing an important role in the favelas' struggles against disaster risk displacements. According to the interviewee, the case of Canal does Anil was also responsible for the emergence of the Coletivo Técnico, a collective of architects, geographers and engineers, that has contributed to the strengthening of favelas' resistance by providing the technical expertise necessary to dismantle the risk arguments mobilized by the city.

An important change resulting from the demands of the residents of Canal do Anil and the Conselho Popular was the change of NUTH from the Attorney General's Office to the Public Defender's Office of Rio de Janeiro.

> When the Canal do Anil went to the Land and Housing Nucleus [at that time, subordinated to the Attorney General's Office], the attention they received was questioned by the residents and leaders of the Conselho Popular. From this questioning, they began to think about bringing a person [from the Public Defender's Office] to the Land and Housing Nucleus. (Public Defender)

According to the interviewee, the Canal do Anil demands for restructuring NUTH were responsible for restoring the confidence of favela residents threatened by removals and that was assisted by the NUTH.

Another organization that plays an important role in this ecology of resistance is the Pastoral de Favelas, a church branch subordinated to the Archdiocese of Rio de Janeiro, with a historical role in the housing struggles in Rio de Janeiro. Favela meetings were often organized at places administered by the branch (Gurgel, 2018). However, the role of the Pastoral is not limited to providing space for meetings. Created in 1976 by the Archbishop of Rio de Janeiro Eugenio Salles during the democratising

process in Brazil (Brum, 2005), Pastoral de Favelas became an important institution by defending favelados' against eviction (Gay, 1999). Although Pastoral was not the first or only Catholic organisation tasked with supporting favela residents against eviction, it assumed a leading role among the Catholic Church organizations inspired by liberation theology in the support of urban social movements throughout the military dictatorship (Gohn 1991, 37).



Figure 7-5: Epistemic Resistance Network
Source: elaborated by the author

The Pastoral position shifted with the end of the military regime's policy of removal. With the changes achieved by the Constitution of 1988 concerning favelas (see Chapter 2), the Pastoral did not have to fight against removals. Rather, it started fighting for the upgrading of favelas and the provision of public services. This strategy was deemed more tangible and valuable as it was seen as conducive to an official 'guarantee' of the recognition of favelas' right to remain (Brum, 2005). However, with the

resumption of removals from 2010, the Pastoral resumed its historical role in the struggles against removals through mediation between favela residents and representatives of the state. In this new context, Pastoral had to resume one of its roles in the provision of legal assistance to favelados threatened by displacements, which made it one of the main collaborators of NUTH.

7.4 "The environmental discourse has to be ours, not theirs": favelados and the epistemic resistance network

> "When counter-expert stories are not told, knowledge and hermeneutic injustices emerge" (Williams & Moore, 2019).

To illustrate how epistemic resistance works through the support of the abovementioned bodies, the present section introduces evidence from interviews with favelados, members of the Coletivo Técnico, and document analysis from the Public Defender's Office, along with observations from my participation in the meetings organized by such organizations. Estradinha was chosen as a case of success in the struggles against removals, shedding light on the dynamics of epistemic resistance in the context of disaster risk displacements.

In the case of Estradinha, the partnership between Pastoral de Favelas, Conselho Popular and NUTH/Public Defender's Office to support residents in their struggle against removals began right after the release of another list of eight favelas in 2010 to be completely removed in the response to the 'April rains' that affected the municipality that year.[65] In the same period, Geo-Rio announced that there was a technical report 'condemning' the area, which was supposed to be at risk.

With a city-wide offensive, Estradinha's residents, organized by the Residents' Association, decided to seek help from NUTH, which was active in defence of other communities on the referred list and had already notified Geo-Rio requesting the technical report that would attest the risk situation of the eight favelas, including Estradinha. According to a NUTH/Public Defender's representative, the report

[65] For more details see Chapter 5.

obtained was produced for the eight communities, based on generic information, recommending their entire removal.

Based on the demand from the affected communities, NUTH then asked Conselho Popular to produce a counter-report portraying, in an impartial manner, the situation of the community. On May 10th, Maurício an engineer from the Coletivo Técnico visited Estradinha for a technical survey, accompanied by the Residents' Association and the Residents' Commission. The main purpose of the visit was to:

- Inspect all incident points reported by residents, to suggest precautionary measures;
- Inspect the community as a whole, especially the areas upstream of landslide episodes, to verify the likelihood of further landslides;
- Inspect the main containment works performed, checking their conditions;
- Compare the data presented by the community with those offered by the Geo-Rio report

The report produced by the engineer – in which he concludes that "there is no technical or economic basis in this proposed removal" – was delivered to the Public Defender's Office and the Public Prosecutor's Office on June 7, 2010. In the report, Maurício highlighted that "unneeded demolitions have, on the other hand, threatened to shake the structures of neighbouring houses (the rubble has not been removed and often remains on the lajes), leading to the accumulation of rubble and rubbish" (Campos, 2010).

As evidenced in Chapter 6, numerous reports are evidencing the inconveniences and risks brought by the often illegal practice of demolition by the city, and Estradinha was not an exception. Paradoxically, the interventions made to 'prevent risk' ended up generating real risks for residents who began to see the structure of their homes compromised, the disfiguration of their neighbourhood, the proliferation of disease vectors (like mosquitos, cockroaches, rats, snakes), and the accumulation of rubbish and

rubble. To systematically evidence these problems, the residents wrote the *Report on the current situation of the Ladeira dos Tabajaras community*[66] that was delivered to NUTH, stating:

> We believe that this municipal government intends to "let the community die" and create a state of defencelessness where the only way out is the spurious negotiation for the release of the area for real estate purposes. The situation is really serious since in the rainy season what will happen to this rubble that is obstructing channels and places where water seeps? We also fear what will happen to these "skeletons" of houses that currently house rats, flies, and in some cases addicts. No to terrorist removal from City Hall" (Estradinha's blog cited by Mendes & Cocco, 2016)

As the residents' evidence was not enough but needed to be supported by the expertise and the formal process of knowledge-making, NUTH requested a formal survey that was carried out by an engineer from FIOCRUZ[67] who made a diagnosis showing a series of irregularities practised by the city. The report pointed to the following problems: i) lack of identification of areas under demolition ii) absence of protective barriers in houses under demolition; iii) problems in the residents' access roads; iv) obstruction of the rainwater drainage system; v) demolitions very close to inhabited dwellings; vi) accumulation of rubble near these dwellings; vii) presence of power grid near to ongoing demolitions, viii) insecurity due to demolitions (Mendes & Cocco, 2016).

The report findings and also the opinion of the Attorney for Human Rights of the State Public Prosecution Office underpinned the Public Civil Action (0251060-74.2010.8.19.0001) filed by NUTH in August 2010. In this case, the approach of NUTH included a mixture of tactics, from the use of counter-reports produced by the Coletivo Técnico to legal stratagems, as well as the encouragement of political demonstrations by Estradinha's residents to pressure the judiciary to make decisions that favour the

[66] Available at: http://wwwestradinha1014.blogspot.com/

[67] The Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (also known as FIOCRUZ) is a scientific institution for research and development in the biological sciences located in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and is considered to be one of the world's leading public health research institutions. It was founded in 1900 by Dr. Oswaldo Cruz, a renowned epidemiologist responsible for the health reform that eradicated the bubonic plague and yellow fever epidemic in the city.

community, as showed in the previous section. NUTH action culminated in a decision favourable to residents, in which the judge responsible for the sentence declared:

> As for the request for the removal of the rubble, the residents who did not adhere to the resettlement deserve the public consideration, touching on the Municipality the restoration of the previous state, promptly, simply by respecting the rights of others, without which the administrator/administered relationship would return to the era of suzerainty or, worse, absolutism, which would be unfortunate, unacceptable. It is repeated that the always prevailing public interest will not be fully protected if the Public Administration acts without due care. Given the foregoing, I PARTIALLY APPROVE THE ANTECIPAÇÃO DE TUTELA (SUMMARY JUDGEMENT), and I determine the defendant to provide the removal of debris resulting from actions taken by the municipal government in 05 days, subject to a daily fine of R $ 50,000.00, plus immediate suspension of demolitions in the community.[68] (Public Civil Action 0251060-74.2010.8.19.0001)

The juridical stratagem generally employed by NUTH, was to combine legal tactics with political pressure, without directly confronting the prevailing statutes of law. For example, instead of directly challenging the interruption of the removals, NUTH focused on secondary issues such as the risks posed by the accumulation of rubble and garbage. This stratagem was necessary for the face of the conservative and elitist character of the Brazilian judiciary, which normally took decisions that undermined favelados' expectation of remaining in their homes. In this privileged regulatory and technical field, important battles were fought. An interview with one of the members of the Coletivo Técnico makes this aspect evident. When asked about the role of the judiciary in disaster risk displacements, the informant asserted that not all cases resulted in trials. It is because the counter-experts and members of NUTH/Public Defense already knew how the judiciary system works:

[68] Available at the Rio de Janeiro Court of Justice website: http://www4.tjrj.jus.br/consultaProcessoWebV2/consultaProc.do?v=2&FLAGNOME=&back=1&tipoConsulta=publica&numProcesso=2010.001.226909-0

> Even NUTH had a very good idea that due to the guidance of the judiciary it was very risky to file lawsuits. Actions had a very good chance of being dismissed, and that was indeed true of some. For example, in the Pavão-Pavãozinho's case, the judge says, "Oh no! I don't understand the technical argument, but the city has competent bodies so if it claims that [it is a risk area], I have faith that's right". So, such a business is very complicated. (Interview with Maurício, Coletivo Técnico, 02/08/2017)

To circumvent the common recourse to official institutional expertise by the judiciary NUTH/Public Defense along with the technical support from the Coletivo Técnico, a 'non-direct confrontation strategy' was developed (Fieldnotes, 2017), focusing on "secondary actions" (Maurício, Coletivo Técnico), such as the issue of rubble removal.

> So, usually the actions NUTH filed were more obvious. For example, in Estradinha they did not file a lawsuit against removal, they filed one initially to stop demolitions for rubble removal, with a technically well-constructed argument. It was even a colleague, a sanitary engineer, right, who did it, showing that the demolitions and the rubble were a huge risk for the community. Not only was the risk of that debris collapsing, but also the drainage obstruction, the proliferation of disease vectors, the increase in the accidents in the community: it was hardware, wiring, it was absurd, they broke everything and left it there. And they won [the favelados], this action was won, the city continued to delay removing the rubble. The mayor would rather pay for much of the court sentence than make the removal. In the end, it eventually withdrew, but it took too long. (Maurício, Coletivo Técnico)

Article 492 of the Organic Law establishes clear procedures and/or requirements for removals in risk areas, such as a) technical report of the responsible body; b) participation of the interested community and representative entities in the analysis and definition of solutions; and c) settlement in localities close to the place of residence or work, if relocation is necessary. In this case, NUTH was able to use

the counter-report produced by the Coletivo Técnico to request the suspension of the demolitions, which was granted in August 2010.

All this technical, legal and political mobilization resulted in a new study by Geo-Rio in November 2010, conducted by *Concremat* – a company outsourced by Geo-Rio to update the risk assessment (see Chapter 5). The report presented offered results very similar to those presented by Maurício, the member of the Coletivo Técnico. According to the report, only a few specific high-risk areas were identified, which would affect only 25 houses in the community. For this reason, the report concludes by excluding removals as the only possible alternative as we can see below:

> In 1996, a map of risk points was made by Geo-Rio with a total of thirteen points analysed: eight low risks, three medium risks and two high risks; This may indicate that, at that time, most of the community had low risk. In 2010, with a risk inventory, it was found that the community continues to present a low risk for the most part. A sector was also identified as a high-risk facility in the north-northeast end of the community. (Geo-Rio & Concremat, 2010)

This fact was even published in one of the main newspapers, *Jornal do Brasil* (JB), which stated: “the number [of houses at risk] is well below the 348 indemnities paid by City Hall", costing a total of "10.7 million reais to remove residents of a safe area" (Mendes & Cocco, 2016). This epistemic battle – engendered by the mobilization of ‘alternative knowledge’ by Estradinha’s residents, the performance of the Coletivo Técnico along with the Public Defender’s Office – resulted not only in the issuance of a new report favourable to the community but also culminated in the interruption of the removal process, where 100 houses were left standing. The action performed by the combined efforts of Estradinha’s residents, NUTH and Conselho Popular involved “the innovative use of laws, policies, and other officially promoted values to defy ‘disloyal’ political and economic elites” (O’Brien, 1996, p.33).

What this example shows is that the key epistemic resources mobilized by the favela dwellers to contest, reframe and engage the production of official discourse on risk can be attributed to the favelados’ direct relationship with organizations in the counter-expertise network. However, the

favelados' embodied experience in the construction of their homes and territories still had an important role. Angélica, from Estradinha, makes this point clear:

> This house was built upon a bedrock. This house is in the bedrock! From below, you go inside the cemetery and see the huge rock that is there. So, I know this house will never fall! … And the soil here is Saibro [a popular name given to the soil in the region] … hard, we sometimes had to cut with a pick to get where we wanted. The only intention of City Hall was to remove the community. Every time I met Bittar [the then-Secretary of Housing] we argued because he used to say, "I have a satellite that looked down from above, made a survey and found that the terrain is slippery". Then, I said, "but I have a satellite called my hand that dug the holes to build my house and found that the ground is firm. So, your satellite is crazy. (Interview with Angélica, Estradinha)

In this passage, Angélica's accounts of the geophysical features of her community represent a way of knowing based on her lived experience and embodied practices of building her own house and helping the community to build their own houses. It also reflects the knowledge exchange between her and the counter-experts in which the incorporation of the jargon from geo-technicians suggests the performance of a position of authority in the field, helped Angela to achieve more attention from the city officials about her concerns. As highlighted by one of the informants from NUTH/ Public Defense, "the environmental discourse has to be ours, not theirs". Recognizing that local knowledge and alternative ways of knowing are persistently marginalized across the state, in its different sectors, especially regarding environmental issues, favela dwellers and activists have chosen to adopt mainstream techno-scientific resources by reference to counter-expertise to defend their right to stay put[69]. Counter-experts offer alternative visions because they demonstrate that civil society

[69] This framing created by Hartman (1998) refers to the acts of residents and activists of simply resisting displacement, instead of referring to revolutionary framing posed by claims to the right to the city, as imagined by Henry Lefebvre. Despite the social transformative aspirations of certain housing and favelas movements in Rio de Janeiro, the constant state of transitoriness posed by the threat of removals compel those groups to a more immediate objective: keep their homes standing (Weinstein, 2014).

organizations and social movements representing marginalized groups can, and do, share powerful stories about coping with complex questions of science, technology, and social life (Williams & Moore, 2019).

As the claims made by the favela's residents that their territories were not at risk would rarely be acknowledged by the legal-institutional-administrative power, the translation of the lived experience of the favelados into technical, authoritative knowledge promoted by the counter-experts from the Coletivo Técnico was crucial. And the efforts of the legalistic tactics adopted by NUTH would be rarely successful without the support of the Coletivo Técnico. Therefore, the partial success was only possible because of the articulation of the residents in tandem with members of NUTH, Coletivo Técnico, Pastoral de Favelas and Conselho Popular.

The counter-reports along with the favela dwellers' lived experience from their territories helped to make the invisible visible**,** by exposing the contradictions present in City Hall's claims of risk, employing local inspections, critical reviews of the reports presented by Geo-Rio, and production of counter-reports. Curiously, the counter-reports more than an administrative/juridical harness became a political instrument in the hands of the favela dwellers. One of the informants from the Coletivo Técnico, when asked about the destiny of the counter-reports, answered that

> most of the reports I made would not say most, but more than half of them, were not used as a court case, but they were used politically by the communities. They would take it and go to a City Hall meeting with the report in hand. (Maurício, Coletivo Técnico).

Recognizing the potential of the counter-reports in the political struggle of favela residents, the informant stated that he "was trying to make reports readable to people", without giving up the technical precision needed. The accessible language of the reports and the intense process of knowledge exchange between counter-experts and communities made it possible for favela dwellers to use another strategy to attack bureaucratic rules, by not only identifying the problems of bias in technical-political interventions but also arguing that decision-making that appears detached and

objective masks systematic biases that do not necessarily serve the favelas' interest.[70] This kind of strategy is closely entangled with the strategy of demanding compliance with the precarious social pact (see Chapter 2) resulting from the struggles of favela dwellers for the right to stay put, or in other words, the compliance with the principle of non-removal. As made clear in Chapter 5, displacements were in principle allowed only in very exceptional cases and had to follow the series of procedures provided by the Organic Law (Rio de Janeiro, 2010). However, as well highlighted by the informant from Coletivo Técnico,

> The Municipality's own Organic Law, even with this question of risk, establishes steps, for instance, the right to the communities to ask for a technical opinion. And we took advantage of this. And what happens in Brazil, it has very good laws, a seemingly very advanced constitution, but deep down it works like a mafia state, where all these rights on paper are derogated in practice, in an extremely mobster-like, underground structure, where what counts more is the direct links between public agents and large companies. Not that legal achievements are unimportant, they often hold back offensives, so the community must be mobilized. (Interview with Fernanda, Coletivo Técnico, 04/12/2020).

In sum, favela dwellers' 'local knowledge', awareness and understanding of the local environment, based on observations, historical knowledge, and embodied experience, combined with counter-expertise, created in this case a potent instrument against disaster risk displacements. Through a combination of distinct and intertwined strategies, the violent machinery of displacements could be postponed or prevented.

7.5 Conclusion

In defending their right to stay put, which implies their right to the favela, the residents affirmatively engaged with their vulnerability to displacement to oppose the biopolitical removals (Naback, 2015)

[70] For more detail see the examples in Chapter 5.

imposed by the city. The main argument of the present chapter is that not only vulnerability creates everyday forms of resistance, but also encourages organized ones. The case of Angélica exemplifies well the first part of the argument, once her vulnerability to house demolition encouraged a "mere housewife" (Angelica) to develop a broad range of strategies to defend her right to housing in the favela.

From the challenges faced and posed by the residents threatened by disaster risk displacements, a whole network of counter-experts emerged to attend to their demands. The formation of this 'epistemic network' is, then, the second part of the argument here. With the help of Butler (2004) and her accounts on vulnerability, relationality and resistance, it can be understood how forms of everyday resistance emerge and how they are enmeshed in more formal or organized forms of resistance against the precarizing order posed by disaster risk displacements.

The favelados' demands put forward a network of epistemic resistance made up of representatives from different fields of knowledge (local, technical and legal) that mobilized combined efforts to open up the 'black box' of risk assessment and mapping, to resist the disaster risk displacements policy. This network of favela dwellers, activists, lawyers, and specialists from different fields including geographers, engineers, and architects, has been contributed to slowing down or even blocking this renewed cycle of removals in the city.

As shown in the last section, the forces of depoliticization embodied by discourses and practices of disaster risk displacements is disarticulated by the counter-discourses produced by the epistemic network which, at the same time, opened up new spaces for favela dwellers "authoring politics" (Samadar, 2010) against governmental forms of 'epistemic injustice'. As we saw through the examples shown here, the epistemic injustice took place through a series of discursive practices employed in the process of risk ascription, which resemble historical practices of Othering the residents of favelas (see Chapter 2).

The historical construction of epistemically disadvantaged identities (Sullivan & Tuana, 2007) of favelados and their territories can explain certain 'ignorance' regarding favelas vulnerability, leading to a generalization of favelas' high susceptibility to disaster. As we saw by the common *modus operandi* of the court in case of judicialization of disaster risk displacements, in the context of epistemically disadvantaged identities (Dotson, 2017), it is not the absence of facts, events, practices or technologies to assess the risk that renders ignorance regarding favelas, but the stigmatization of these groups promoted by privileged ones.

Additionally, the hegemonic and depoliticizing role of the technologies of risk in the suppression of the controversial right of favelas to the city could only be contested through an attempt to assert the legitimacy of favelados' participation, by demonstrating to the technocrats of City Hall their mastery over the highly technical topics under scrutiny. The emergence and capillarity of the epistemic network showed the plasticity and adaptability of the favelados in their historical resistance to state epistemic and administrative violence.

Chapter 8 – Embodying vulnerability: memory affects and precarity against disaster risk displacements

8.1 Introduction

As a continuation of Chapter 7, in this fourth and final analytical chapter, I examine how favelados' vulnerability is transformed into agential capacity by forms of temporal, affective and material practices of resistance (see figure 7.1 in Chapter 7), which comprehend, respectively, the mobilization of memory and trauma; collective caring; and the embodiment of hyper-precarity through practices of self-demolition and rebuilding in high-risk areas. The main contribution here is to show how favelas' vulnerability to two forms of disaster (exposure to hazards and removal) are not just social and environmental, but also deeply political. To this end, I discuss how the practices of resisting state-led precarity produced by disaster risk displacements contain deep claims for social justice.

Overall, the chapter provides new insights into how bodily experience of removals mediated by trauma, negative affects and exposure to risk helps us to understand the experience of removals and how the temporal/affective/material experience of vulnerability from state-led precarization is converted into agential power. To make this argument, the chapter uses examples across four favelas researched: Horto, Indiana, Santa Marta, and Vila Autódromo.

This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 8.2, I demonstrate how traumatic experiences of disaster risk displacements and their memories have become a valuable tool for favelados to recognize stories of belonging and struggle and also create counter-narratives against forms of dispossession. Remembrance of traumatic experiences is also used to acknowledge the violence and injustice the state attempted to erase with the clearance of favelas. Because this strategy implies disputes of narratives and representations of time, central to the issue of disaster risk displacements discussed in this thesis, there is a new trend in the movements of resistance, the recovery of favelas' memory or historiography, which I refer to as a form of chronoresistance. Here, the best examples are the case

of Vila Autódromo and Horto with their museums. Those initiatives also engage with the environmental discourses, showing the favelados' protagonism in the preservation of the environment in their communities and also contrasting and denouncing the practices of environmental degradation applied by City Hall in the process of removal. The museums, then, come to show the continued existence of violent state practices when it comes to favelas' territories.

Section 8.3 discusses forms of affective resistance to the governmental precarization through the logics of caring created by the Café com Bobagem in Estradinha. Estradinha's dwellers, while building affective spatialities, critically show how logics of collective caring can be transformed into democratic spaces of collective action, especially as a way of breaking the circuits of negative affects as discussed in Chapter 6.

To illustrate material resistance, Section 8.4 presents the story of Edmundo, from Santa Marta. His experience shows how, through practices of self-demolition and, afterwards, rebuilding in an area classified as high-risk, he performs a daily and silent protest by claiming the right to have a right to decent housing, which, in the context of removals in high-risk areas means having somewhere to live.[71] Acknowledging that to have the right to housing recognised he needs to have a house, Edmundo embarks on a courageous and persistent journey of rebuilding homes, whenever demolished, to be able to make such a claim.

This chapter links to the discussion on vulnerability in Chapter 7, as it shows how experiences of displacements mediated by trauma, exposure to risk and violence are mobilized by the favelados to create political subjectivity and spaces of contestation.

[71] As we saw in Chapter 6, to have the right to be resettled in public housing, families living in high-risk areas should possess a house, otherwise, the only alternative available would be the inclusion of the family in the social rent programme.

8.2 Favela museums and the making of subaltern temporalities to an open-ended future

The aftermath of the 2010 events marked City Hall's attempt to mobilize deep-rooted narratives about the need for the removal of favelas.[72] It also created a political opportunity in which the occupants sought to disrupt discourses and relocation procedures, seeking to render the established claims of the need for forced displacements and resettlement unthinkable in the future. Refusing to express their traumas in a traditional way which entails forms of forgetting (Edkins, 2006), favela dwellers mobilised the "vulnerable times" (Hirsch, 2016) created by removals to expose the state violence against them.

Bringing the removals back through the retrospective glance of memory, favelados have opened subaltern temporalities (Väyrynen, 2016) through the creation of the Museu das Remoções (Museum of Removals). Favela museums have often been portrayed from the perspective of heritage (Chisholm, 2019; Freire-Medeiros, 2007; Frenzel, Koens, & Steinbrink, 2012). However, little has been said about their role as a space for performing resistance, by dismantling the politics of "disruptive time" imposed by City Hall to close off any possibility for the political (Edkins, 2006). This disruptive time was characterized not only by the landslides and flooding that affected the whole city that year but mainly by what came later, the resumption of favela removals, an unforeseen scenario that had not happened since the 1970s.

These forms of alternative temporalities or Chronoresistance, will be the subject of the following sub-sections, detailing the efforts of Vila Autódromo and Horto to subvert racialized and stigmatized narratives about favelas through counter-narratives on past and present experiences/legacies which the state seeks to silence. Through rescuing this collective memory, the favela museum is also seeking to rewrite the future through the radical perspective of favelados' having a right to the favela.

[72] For details, see Chapters 2 and 5.

8.2.1 Museu das Remoções: rewriting the past to reopening a radical future

The Museu das Remoções arose from the traumatic experience of the removals process of the Vila Autódromo favela initiated in 2014. When Rio de Janeiro was elected to host the 2016 Olympics, the ghost of removals came up again. City Hall's plan consisted of demolishing the old racetrack of Jacarepaguá to build the Olympic Park. According to the argument present in the *Urban and Environmental Legacy Plan* for the games, the Vila Autódromo area would be sacrificed for the expansion of the Avenues Abelardo Bueno and Salvador Allende. Pointing to the same logic of removal, the *Strategic Plan 2009-2012* established among its goals "a 3.5% reduction in areas occupied by favelas in Rio" (Prefeitura do Município do Rio de Janeiro, 2012). Vila Autódromo was included in the list of 119 favelas to be completely removed by 2012, due to the risk of flooding, and also destined for the public interest, according to City Hall. With the release of the list, Mayor Eduardo Paes went on, once more, to claim that the Vila Autódromo would be at risk of flooding and therefore it would have to be removed.

Risk assessments carried out previously (Santos, 2016), coupled with catastrophic future projections, were once again mobilized to legitimize the exceptionalism in the removal of Vila Autódromo. Aiming to "decrease future risks to all" (Prefeitura do Rio de Janeiro, 2015b), City Hall caused suffering and trauma for some, the 'Others', through forced displacements and resettlements. In a context of protracted uncertainty posed by more than two decades of threats of removals, Vila Autódromo residents have been subjected to a combination of forms of 'administrative' violence, similar to those analysed in Chapter 6 in the case of Indiana, which could be characterized as a process of chronic urban trauma production (Pain, 2019).

However, while the recurrent experiences of trauma could be reduced to a repertoire of losses and damages, or even silenced over the years, the residents of Vila Autódromo have mobilized their traumatic experience as a source of contestation, resistance, and redemption. This period is described

by a resident of the Vila: “while it was at the same time that we were suffering, we went out all the time, we were in front, but we also had joy, we were able to play, chat, when we were discouraged, that group of people from outside would arrive” (Interview with Eliana, Vila Autódromo, 05/12/2017).

There was a remarkable openness to collaboration and discussion, and, according to residents' reports, as removals progressed, people from different backgrounds and interests arrived from different places to help Vila Autódromo in resisting evictions. It was from these ‘outsiders’, a support network formed by academics, social activists and residents, that the Museu das Remoções emerged in May 2016. With the motto “*Memória não se remove*” (Memory is not removed), the community turned the hostile environment left by the demolition of the houses initiated in 2014 into an open-air museum, aiming to show the state violence practised in the process that removed 97% of its residents, which at the time was about 600 households.

In a context where time was suspended and everyday life no longer took place because of the rhythm of the demolitions, new meanings were open, and residents, collaborators and supporters saw the possibility to politically articulate the life that throbbed in the scenario of devastation. Due to the speed imposed by the demolitions, the Museu das Remoções became favela territory, with the marks of state violence inscribed in it and somehow preserved by the residents themselves. What is the most important aspect about those traumatic events is that it opened up new forms of radical relationality (Edkins, 2006) in which the museum plays a central role as it arose from the radical interconnectedness that had been built in and through the violence of Vila Autódromo removals. As highlighted by Eliana, one of the main leaders of the movement of resistance in Vila Autódromo, from the “small gestures a great soldier [the support network] came” (Interview on 12/09/2016) to reanimate, encourage and fight for the community. In addition to the primary function of the museum, that is, to preserve the memory of the removed and their stories; it also aims to be an instrument of struggle by synchronizing the agendas and strategies of the favelas threatened by removals, as Eliana pointed out: “the museum

was born there, from rubble structures and the potential increases, we have faith that one day it will be a fighting tool to the point of saying: 'No more removals', we will succeed".

Based on the understanding that memory is a way of transcending racialized and sedimented narratives of favelas (as backward, barbaric, pathological, anti-ecological), and mobilizing affirmative affects (joy, care, empathy, encouragement), the museum was converted as one of the greatest instruments of resistance by its potential for creating and embodying a different conception of and relation to time than the dominant ones. The museum, with its temporal marks of demolitions is maintained by the residents. Its collection includes sculptures, ruins, the São José Operário Church - the only building not demolished by City Hall, the home of one of the residents due to a lawsuit still in dispute, and the amphitheatre, rebuilt in 2017 through a partnership with the Goethe Institute.

Memory workshops were held with residents, former residents and supporters of Vila Autódromo (Museu das Remoções, n.d.). Out of those, sculptures were built by students of Architecture and Urbanism from Anhanguera University between April and May 2016, mostly depicting significant places that had been removed, such as the home of residents striking for Vila's struggle.

Figure 8-1: "A Associação sou eu" ["The Association is me"]: sculpture in honour of the Neighbourhood Association, made by students Tiago Guedes and Geisler Benevuto.
Source: Museu das Remoções

The rubble, which in other communities became a problem (as we saw in Chapter 6), became an object of remembering, being an important element for the museum due to its "symbolism of resistance and memory, in addition to the current land and houses of Vila Autódromo, this rubble is also part of the collection of the Museum of Removals" (Museu das Remoções, n.d.). According to information from the museum, of the eleven streets that existed in the community, at least four still keep records of the removal of the original houses. The spaces are part of the visitation route of the museum and portray all the violence suffered by the residents.

The traumatic events of these demolitions imprinted in the territory and in the narratives of the events portrayed by the sculptures, photographs, art monuments and even the territory itself "provide a sequencing of images and logical and semantic connections that are retained and repeated, becoming the container of memory" (Fierke, 2006, 125). The stories not only provide a representation of the removal's events, but connect, clarify, and interpret them, "not allowing the violent removal process experienced by the favela to sink into oblivion" (Fieldnote, 11/11/2016).

Figure 8-2: The only former house remaining in the Vila Autódromo
Source: author's photograph

Everywhere we look, it is possible to find the marks of violence practised by City Hall, as well as the marks of the resistance of residents. Starting at the entrance, a sign announces that we have arrived in the village which belonged to the former Residents' Association (Figure 8-3).

Figure 8-3: Panel at the entrance of Vila Autódromo stating it belonged to the former residents' association and below, a banner stating: “Museu das Remoções: Memory is not removed”
Source: *Museu das Remoções*

The surrounding land also holds affective memories. On one of my visits, one of the residents, Sara, takes me to collect fruits and tomatoes behind the new houses, where the backyards of the demolished houses were. When we harvested coconut, soursop, and tomatoes that afternoon, I could see that the territory still had signs that have not been wiped from the old Vila, reminding us about affection, devotion, recreation, and nourishment (Figure 8-4).

Figure 8-4: Sara going to harvest fruits in what used to be her backyard.
Source: author's photograph

The Vila Autódromo re-enacts the past as part of the ritual of the (remaining) favela, not only through the Museu das Remoções but also through the field of artistic resistance, to disseminate, propagate and reflect on real situations of oppression, through debates, workshops, theatre, exhibitions, literary fairs, etc. (Museu das Remoções, n.d.) as an alternative strategy in the fight against forced eviction. Estradinha and Babilônia also have used artistic resistance as a form of collective remembering (Figure 8-5).

Figure 8-5: Resident's image sculpted by artist Alexandre Farto on the wall of one of the remaining houses
Source: author's photograph

During the fieldwork in 2017, I had the opportunity to attend several events created by the community and its supporters: photographic and documentary exhibitions, artistic workshops, the opening of squares, a book launch, and a *churrasco* (barbecue party). I will delve into two significant events.

On 02/09/2017, at the invitation of a resident and some agents from Pastoral de Favelas and Conselho Popular, I participated in the opening event of the Projeto à Céu Aberto (Open Sky Project), carried out by residents in partnership with the Goethe-Institute. The barbecue in the Vila was attended by residents, activists for the right to the city, students, and academics. The highlight of the meeting was the raising of flags similar to the Olympics, but containing slogans with words such as FIGHT, RESISTANCE, URGENCY and RIGHTS, in celebration of the aspects of the daily struggle faced by residents. Each slogan referred to an image - like Olympic posters with images of athletes – of the silhouette of residents, ordinary people who, through the struggle for the right to stay in that place,

transformed the course of that small community - marked for demolition since its emergence in the 1960s (Figure 8-6).

Figure 8-6: Flag written “Resistance”
Source: author’s photograph

The event also featured the logos of the community and the Museu das Remoções, in addition to the collection of photographs by resident Luíz Cláudio. Luíz, using a compact digital camera, made a complete record of all moments involving the process of removing the Vila. At the end of the day, we watched the documentary *Somos Nós Maria da Penha* (We are all Maria da Penha), in honour of one of the main female leaders of the community.

Figure 8-7: Film exhibition at Vila Autódromo
Source: author's photograph

On November 8 of the same year, I was at another event organized by the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), an exhibition of the photographs taken by Luíz, called "Memory of Resistance and Fight". It opened with a presentation by the main leaders of the Vila's resistance struggle, including a resident removed due to an expropriation decree. In 2015, three expropriation decrees for public utility were issued by Mayor Eduardo Paes, reaching about 50 houses, including the residents' association and the homes of the main leaders in the struggle for permanence (Comitê Popular da Copa e Olimpíadas do Rio de Janeiro, 2015).

Throughout the removal process, Luiz had recorded all the key moments of the community's resistance struggle, producing a vast and rich archive of photos and videos documenting the whole removal history. His photographs have already covered several cultural spaces in the city. But, according to him, the most important exhibition space is the favelas themselves since the photos traverse these endangered territories. In these exhibitions, Luís and other residents tell a little about the history of the village, share experiences and thus contribute to the residents' awareness process.

Banners to denounce the barbarism committed by the State, even sidings placed by City Hall have become panels for exposure and denouncements of City Hall abuses. Luíz Claudio pointed out that "the camera and the cell phone is the best weapon against them because it shows everything" (Fieldnote, 08/11/2017). Academic knowledge also contributed to giving visibility to the struggle of the village. The Museu das Remoções, an open-air museum, can be characterised as the favela's territory, its residents, and their stories. At the end of the presentation, Maria da Penha, a central figure in the housing activism of the Vila Autódromo, highlighted: "we remove the trash, not people" (Fieldnote, 08/11/2017).

Maria da Penha played one of the decisive moments in Vila Autódromo history of resistance. On International Women's Day, May 8, 2016, her house was demolished by a violent action lead by a municipal guard. On that same day, she received a tribute from the City Council for her role in the struggle for permanence. On the same day, pressed by the negative repercussion in the national and international press due to the demolition of Penha's house, Mayor Eduardo Paes 'finally' announced the Vila Autódromo plan.

These stories shared by the residents not only provide a representation of particular events but connect, clarify and resignify them to claim their right to have a right to an open-ended future. On the importance of memory in the process of fighting against the arbitrariness of the state invested against the favelas, Arnaldo, from the Babilônia favela, who is also planning to turn the favela into a museum, made an important observation:

> When we got here, we had nothing. So, we look at each other and say, "Dude! We have ourselves. If we don't do anything, we won't have anything here". So, the task forces started, solidarity started, and it was something effervescent in our environment and there was nothing. So, the new generation [youngest] has already arrived with everything. For this reason, the Museum of Babilônia is also important, to tell this story, some people have suffered, people who have died [fighting for rights] … The favela resident got used to political

> favour, but the favelado must know the difference between a favour and a right, a right is a right. (Interview with Arnaldo, *Babilônia*, 24/10/2017)

8.2.2 Horto Museum: heritage and environment as tools against removals

The creation of the Horto Museum in 2010 was stimulated by the Programa Pontos de Memória (Instituto Brasileiro de Museus – IBRAM)[73]. Its mission since then has been to safeguard the material and immaterial heritage of the traditional community of Horto Florestal, legitimizing the housing rights of the families who live there (Horto Museum, n.d.). According to Eduarda, community leader and coordinator of the museum and resident of Horto since the age of three, the Horto Museum is an instrument of struggle. "The greatest asset that the community has is memory" (Eduarda).

Similar to the Museu das Remoções, Horto Museum is an open-air museum, and the best way to experience it is through guided tours by residents associated with the museum. Besides, it is possible to access the collection online.[74] Despite having been to Horto a few times in 2016, I only managed to take the tour on July 22nd, 2017. It was arranged by Professors Rafael Soares Gonçalves (PUC-Rio) and Mário Brum (UERJ), the mentors of a course I attended entitled, "*Favelas cariocas: ontem e hoje*" ("Favelas cariocas: yesterday and today").

The tour, coordinated by the Museu do Horto, was led by Emerson, president of the Horto Residents' Association (Associação dos Moradores e Amigos do Horto – AMAHOR), as well as the project founder. The starting point was at the entry gate. The tour began with a testimony of one resident, also a student of one of the professors. She presented an overview of the history of *Horto*, giving details of the process of removal. According to her, the Jardim Botânico had filed several lawsuits against the

[73] The federal government program, Pontos de Memória, consists of a set of actions and initiatives for the recognition and enhancement of social memory, so that the museal processes carried out and developed by peoples, communities, groups and social movements, in their various formats and typologies, are recognized and valued as an integral and indispensable part of the memory of the Brazilian social system.
[74] Horto Museum website: www.museudohorto.org.br

residents of Horto in the 1980s, even though some living in the lower area, Pacheco Leão, were employees. Residents of another area, Dona Castorina, worked for Tijuca National Park.

According to the residents' testimony, the Jardim Botânico neighbourhood is composed of members of the Brazilian political, economic and media elite. The Rede Globo,[75] located next to Horto, has been engaged in the campaign against Horto, through media reports that talk about the favelados as 'invaders', 'criminals', an 'environmental threat', as discussed in Chapter 6.

Then, we stopped in front of another gate, built by the Jardim Botânico, which divides the community in two. According to Emerson and another dweller's testimony, Pedro, whose family has lived in the area for almost 100 years - the gate represents the park's offensive against the community (Figure 8-8).

Figure 8-8: Jardim Botânico's gate
Source: author's photograph

[75] Rede Globo is the largest mass media group of Latin America, founded in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1925.

They showed us the elementary school, Júlia Kubitschek, inaugurated by former president Juscelino Kubitschek in the 1960s which, according to Emerson, serves as the boundary between the Jardim Botânico and the community. Part of the school grounds, in an area originally part of the community's territory is now part of the Jardim Botanico domains. Emília, a black woman, resident, and pioneer in the resistance struggle of Horto described the annexing agreed between the municipality and the Jardim Botanico of half of the schoolyard, as an invasion (Interview with Emília, Horto, 03/12/2016). Next, we were taken to an emblematic point for the community: the location of the first house removed in the 2000s. The inscription on the wall symbolises the place: "O Horto Fica" (“The Horto stays”) (Figure 8-9).

Figure 8-9: The first house to be demolished
Source: author's photograph

Along the way, we came across vestiges of barricades made of tires, old furniture, and wood. Although less evident, they resembled the ones that I registered during my first visit, just after the removal of one of the residents, on 19th November 2016.

> The barricades have been a constant presence in the community since the demolition of Marcelo' house. Along with barricades, the dwellers have also organized night vigils and defined emergency communication tactics, such as the use of mortars, in case of police invasion. The feeling when going through those barricades and listening to the stories told by Emília is of injustice. How could a community that historically helped build and maintain the Jardim Botânico and Tijuca National Park, as is the case of Horto and Vila Hípica, be so cruelly criminalized by what residents refer to a "false ecologism? (Fieldnote, 19/11/2016).

This expression "false ecologism" is used by the dwellers to refer to the environmental discourse of the park that would serve to hide the hygienist intentions behind the removals. Then, we passed by Caxinguelê, a meeting point of the community, Morro das Margaridas, an area where there are traces of the colonial period, with the ruins of an old sugar cane mill dated from 1650, Emerson also showed us a transmission tower built during the military regime in front of a resident's house, exposing the family because of possible health risks (Figure 8-10).

Figure 8-10: Area assigned as risky by the community
Source: author's photograph

Next, we stopped in an area called Grotão, the area most vulnerable to landslides. Emerson told us that two houses were facing the risk of collapse due to landslides from two houses in Canto e Melo Condominium during the rains of 2010. Built in the 1980s, the condominium owns part of the Jardim Botânico site, above the quota of 100 metres of elevation – which, according to land use and occupation law, is considered either an area of environmental protection or environmental risk, where there should be no construction. However, unlike the houses of Horto, the condominium area was regularized and allowed to stay in place.[76]

At different moments in the tour, Emerson emphasised that when the families originally arrived in *Horto* "they didn't arrive to destroy anything, they arrived to preserve it". He continued at another moment: "the community grew (vertically) but did not expand its territory. We are not invading the forest, we are not invading the park, on the contrary, it is the park that is invading the community".

This discourse defines well the main concern of the tour: to build a counter-narrative that depicts the long history of occupation which contradicts the mainstream discourses that assert that residents are just (recent) invaders. Moreover, residents attempt to reclaim the mainstream one about environmental protection and risk. The residents' narratives also denounce the violence administered against the community and the disparities in City Hall's risk ascriptions, especially when compared to the rich areas that surround the community. In Horto's case, risk and environmental protection appear as facets of the same coin: ecologism. However, it is detached from the debate on social justice and the historical roots of the social and environmental vulnerability of racialized groups. Hence, there is a need to think about favela ecologism that makes precariousness, creativity, and permanence instruments for positively transforming these spaces, in which vulnerability is a condition for daily resistance. Although the museum did not emerge specifically with this motive, the recurrent threats of removal motivated by the issue of risk and environmental preservation, led its residents to incorporate the environmental issue in the museum's repertoire.

[76] For details, see Chapter 4 on Horto.

The achievements of Vila Autódromo and Horto demonstrate that collective remembering of the removals' processes can play an insurgent role in founding a new vision and creating an alternative future for the favelas. As highlighted by Houston, "[i]insurgence [from the peripheries of the city] is important to the project of rethinking the social planning because it reveals a realm of the possible that is rooted in the heterogeneity of lived experience, which is to say, in the ethnographic present and not in utopian futures (Holston, 2008, p.53).

These multiplicities of lived experience, or an ethnographic present, are then appropriated by the favelas' residents, with trauma and memory as allies to recount a history that City Hall and its elites attempt to erase.

8.3 'Café com bobagem': opening affective and material spaces of resistance

The third form of resistance in the scheme presented in Chapter 7 is that of affectual resistance, emerging from how the insecurities around the future brought by home demolitions in the name of disaster risk prevention can open up a space for "affirmative affectual" and "agential capacities"' (Joronen & Griffiths, 2019a) of the favelados. As we saw throughout this thesis, the historical process of state-led precarization of favelas places those territories in great vulnerability, where the condition of displaceability (Yiftachel, 2017) has conditioned the modes of addressing favelas' issues, engendering fears and anxieties about future displacements, as discussed in Chapter 6 and the negative circuits of affects mobilized by the city official. However, instead of a mere source of insecurity and debilitating vulnerability, the precarity induced by the continued threat of home demolitions, or what Joronen and Griffiths (2019) call "affectual demolitions", gave rise to ordinary forms of agency.

Drawing on evidence from interviews and observations in the favela of Estradinha, and also inspired by the work of Joronen and Griffiths on affective politics of precarity in Palestine, this section describes how anticipatory affects around disaster risk displacements connect the fears and insecurities around

vulnerability to resoluteness to act on and against induced precarity, for instance, through the transformation of spaces of abandonment and despair into spaces of affirmative affect and collective care as ways of resisting displacements.

The Café com Bobagem (Cafe with Nonsense) consisted of a monthly meeting of Estradinha's residents that began as a way to inform them about the process of removals. However, as City Hall was trying to divide the community through rumours, leadership bribes and high compensation payments,[77] the meetings also became a space of collective care, which entailed creating a sense of belonging, companionship, and a space for listening and mutual support for residents threatened with eviction, to counter City Hall strategies undermining the favelados' resoluteness to stay.

The meetings occurred in an emblematic space: an abandoned house transformed into a social centre. The history of the centre also tells us a lot about the embodied/affective forms of resistance adopted by the residents. Angélica, in her spare time, had tutored local children, but with the removals, these activities had stopped. However, due to the constant harassment to abandon the resistance, she saw in the siege of City Hall an opportunity to bargain for a social space, which is the house where the social centre now operates. In one of several attempts by the Housing Secretary to convince her to abandon the resistance movement and leave the community, Angélica strategically said that she would only agree to negotiate if they gave her a house within the community. The Secretary then accepted the agreement. When I asked why that particular house, Angélica said it was due to its strategic location.

> Because, first, it was at the edge of the community, where they said they were most at risk, right? According to City Hall design, this house is at the end, but it was outside the risk area. So, I had a strategic point here. And another thing, here I knew that nothing would happen,

[77] For more details about such practices, see Chapter 6.

> because of the location, the community was all around, it was not going to be so simple. (Interview with Angélica, Estradinha*,* 14/09/2017)

Even after the agreement, they continued to threaten the demolition of the house. According to reports from residents, one day, tired of being 'deceived' by the community, City Hall decided to demolish the house, "then, when he arrived here, the house was full of children" (Fieldnotes, 07/10/2017). After this episode, and with the help of the Public Defender's Office, the community got a formal agreement from City Hall which, for fear of scandals in the press, ended up giving in to the community's request.

> The mayor said that this house would not go down until the entire community process was resolved, because the house turned into a weapon against them. Because if City Hall demolished a house full of children, how would it look? So, the house was protected that way. Then it became the symbol of community resistance. (Interview with Angélica, *Estradinha*)

Interestingly, after we ended the interview that took place in the same home, Angélica showed me the bell and warning system that had previously been mounted by City Hall on the wall of the building. According to her, the house had been designated as a support point for the community in the event of heavy rainfall. And it was material evidence that the house was not in a danger zone, as City Hall had claimed when they came to demolish it.

Figure 8-11: Social Centre
Source: author's photograph

So, it was in this symbolic space of resistance that Café com Bobagem worked. That space became much more than a space for community meetings, it became, in "trauma time" (Bell, 2006), a therapeutic space, space where the residents could have a "moment of distraction, of relaxation, where people talked nonsense". According to Angélica, in the moment of relaxation, people were more susceptible to reveal their sorrows, fragilities, fears, anger, concerns and hopes, showing what could be a future source of what she terms "small fires":

> I listened to nonsense and knew where the small fires were. Because in reality, people have to understand that what threatens a community is not the big fire, it is the small outbreaks. When I discovered the small outbreaks or some resident who was weak, or who the city was coercing, or who had no way, I would go there as if they were from my family, I would talk, I would show them that it was not like that. I put out that fire. And in that cafe, I discovered a lot.

The Café com Bobagem worked like a shared breakfast, where "everyone was relaxed, drinking, they said what had happened, that someone had heard something" and then Angélica could have a clue

where the source of internal conflict in the community was. The space also brought emotional and mental benefits to Angélica herself, as she said, her "strength was in the union, was there in the collective"; with the favela's support she could share the burdens of leading a saga for approximately six years against City Hall.

> The whole community thinking together, the whole community deciding everything together, I knew that there was my strength. So, I started to make the most of the removal process, the strengthening with the whole community and I started to build there ... a trust base with the Association and the residents. So, whatever we decided, decided collectively. We didn't decide anything outside of a meeting.

Responding to the logics of precarity produced by City Hall, as discussed in Chapter 6, the example of resistance conducted by the residents of Estradinha can be viewed as caring practices, and these activities attempted to fix the lack of information or deception and the persistent harassment practised by City Hall through the continuous threat of future demolition of houses. Especially the joint action of being there for residents that were most vulnerable to threats of removal illustrates how resisting homelessness becomes a practice of caring. For that reason, the Café com Bobagem used to offer a broader understanding of experiences of precariousness and precarity to the residents themselves through interactions with diverse demands that emerged in those meetings. Thus, the example of Estradinha once more shed light on everyday forms of resisting displacements through "a logic of care" (Lorey, 2015, p. 94) that acknowledged the favelados' relationality and vulnerability and the ways such intersubjectivities and their unevenly distributed precarity could be transformed into democratic and resistance initiatives.

8.4 Materializing hyper-precarity: self-demolition and rebuilding as forms of claiming the right to have housing rights

Practices of self-demolition and rebuilding in the so-called “high-risk areas” are the embodiment of the ordinary, and mostly invisible forms of resistance, the fourth form of resistance that emerged from my data analysis. The story of Edmundo, from Santa Marta, is exemplary. Edmundo, a bricklayer about fifty years old, call himself the “*cria da favela*” (born in the favela) who grew up and had a family in Santa Marta. After his second divorce, left the house he built in the Morro for his wife and children and “went to live his life” in a “*barraco de alvenaria*” (masonry shack). Then, when he met his current wife and had a child.

In 2005, he started clearing the land that used to be destined to receive the waste produced by the community. Neighbouring residents at the time thought he was going crazy or abused drug use for dedicating so much time cleaning such an area. However, seeing its potential, he continued digging and cleaning. According to him, the site called Santa Martinha was a place where “guys were killed, there were several ... The guys threw dead things here, dog, cat… It was an ugly dump and the wars that were going on here…”. A place marked by abandonment with “the smell of the dead, just the smell of rotten things” was transformed, according to him, into a place of dwelling, conviviality and belonging, where “today you smell food, today you see children running”.

They ended up living on a dump because as a precarious worker he could not afford to rent a shack in the favela:

> If I am here it is because I need it, if I did not need it, I would not be here. Why would I be here if I could be in an apartment if I could be in a penthouse in Barra? Or if I could even be there inside the hill, but on the topside of the hill [where are the best houses], in a brick shack, I wouldn't be here. But, one thing I say, I will not leave here to rent, with the mediocre salary that we earn, a salary for starvation? A cheaper rental here, a small house is R $ 500.00 or R $ 600.00, I earn R $ 890.00, how am I going to eat? (Interview with Edmundo, Santa Marta, 17/07/2017)

This passage can be interpreted through the lens of Butler's (2009) take on resistance: any act of subversion or resistance, as shown by Edmundo, who insists on building in a hazardous area, becomes possible not because he is a sovereign subject (marked by will and intentions), but because of the historically conditioned circumstances (see Chapter 2). Having no other way to survive, he was compelled to build his house on the dump. The condition of hyper-precarity creates the condition of possibility of living in a risk area.[78]

Edmundo's story echoes the story of other residents living in risk areas who are generally pushed into this condition due to the lack of adequate housing policies. Aline, also a resident of Santa Martinha, went to live in the same area for similar reasons. Aline migrated to Rio de Janeiro in search of a better life in 2015. Even working as a wage earner for a company responsible for maintaining the inclined plane that serves the community, what she earned "was not paying for rent and food" despite living in a one-bedroom shed (Interview with Aline, Santa Marta, 17/09/2017). Motivated by the urgency to find a place to live, she met Edmundo, who helped her to build her wooden house using material recycled from a concert in the community.

The area where Edmundo lives is called by the residents as Santa Martinha or Tortinho, because of a football field close by. Santa Martinha comprises approximately thirty shacks and is located on the borders of the Ecolimites barrier of Santa Marta (Figure 8-12).

[78] For a similar discussion see Chapter 6 and the discussion on invisible vulnerabilities.

Figure 8-12: Santa Martinha
Source: author's photograph

No risk mitigation initiative or housing project had contemplated the area (Figure 8-13) when the state government promoted a series of initiatives in Santa Marta in 2008, from introducing City Hall's first UPP to reconstruction schemes.

Translation:

Urbanization of access streets – Phase II

64 Housing Units – Phase II

Community Centre of Social Action – Phase II

128 Housing Units – Phase III

Sports Training Centre – Phase III

2 Leisure areas – Phase III

Reforestation in the risk-areas – Phases II and III



Figure 8-13: Project presented by the State Government to the upgrading of Santa Marta's favela.
Source: EMOP (Public Works Company of the State of Rio de Janeiro)

That year, as part of the Growth Acceleration Program (Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento – PAC), a re-urbanization initiative aimed at improving the conditions of mobility, sanitation and introducing a resettlement project was released. The aim of the housing project (Figure 8-14), currently abandoned, was to construct 64 housing units to resettle 52 households from Pico, the uppermost site of the favela classified by Geo-Rio as a high-risk area.

Figure 8-14: Abandoned housing project designed to allocate families living in high-risk areas within the favela. Source: author's picture

Paradoxically, the inhabitants of Santa Martinha were not included in the initiative even though the relocation scheme was being built less than fifty metres away. This invisibility of the Santa Martinha inhabitants created a great deal of uncertainty and tension when an official from City Hall visited the area in 2013, and, for the first time, reported that the houses were advancing on the Tijuca forest, even with the presence of the Ecolimites barrier demarcating the boundaries between the favela and the forest.

At this time, Edmundo's house was demolished for the second time. After this episode, the resettlement works were interrupted[79] and City Hall no longer appeared on the site to register Santa Martinha's households for future evictions. No alternatives were offered to residents who had their houses demolished, as required by the law. For the residents, the demolitions felt more like retaliation

[79] Residents alleged that the resettlement housing works were interrupted because of diversion of funds for the works of the World Cup and the Olympics.

for the recurrent police allegations that the area only served to shelter bandits, than necessary for the disaster risk.

For this reason, the residents were surprised when officials from City Hall came to visit the site almost five years later, in 2017, claiming that residents needed to leave the area because of landslide risk. According to residents, the house demolitions that had occurred previously, in 2009 and 2013, were carried out by UPP, without the participation of the SMH. The area, according to the Coletivo Técnico, would indeed be a risk area for being on top of a garbage dump - the same conditions that led to the tragedy in Morro do Bumba,[80] in 2010:

> It was a dump there. They built on top of the dump. City Hall argues that the risk came from the deposits of blocks above. I went there and saw that there was nothing to worry about. Then I showed the residents the following: your soil here is complicated. Luckily, the day I went there, the resident had made a deep excavation to make a *sapata* (foundation), and had dug almost two metres, and that served as a profile survey and I saw that it was a landfill of up to two metres, probably deeper, and when you talk about waste, you talk about plastic, organic matter, you don't compact it. You have to take it out. It was the substrate of Morro do Bumba. There was nothing to be built there. I said, look, I'm not going to argue here that it's okay for you, because this soil here is soil that doesn't support [buildings], there's no way to treat this soil, everything would have to be removed. (Interview with Maurício, Coletivo Técnico, 02/08/2017)

For all of this ignorance and invisibility about Santa Martinha, the site represents a space of exceptional precarity, where the already known elements of governmental precarization of favelas (as we saw in Chapter 2) – abandonment, transitoriness and control - is exacerbated through a process of extreme invisibility. In these spaces of exceptional precarity, the subjects are neither full favelados nor

[80] Morro do Bumba, a favela located in the municipality of Niterói metropolitan region of Rio, was settled on top of a dump that collapsed in April 2010. 267 people died - only 48 survivors were found - and many were left homeless.

homeless. The impression I got while I was visiting Santa Martinha and talking to people elsewhere is that it was a place at the margin of the margins. First, because the state and even favela residents treat Santa Martinha as a 'non-place' and their dwellers as invaders or outsiders, not recognizing them as part of Santa Marta's territory. This perception is corroborated by the stories shared by Santa Martinha's residents that complained of being neglected by the Santa Marta Residents' Association.[81]

Second, because for the government projects targeting the so-called 'risk areas', Santa Martinha does not officially even exist. With the proposal for the removal of the Pico, all attention was turned there, putting Santa Martinha in the shadows. This invisibility, that for some dwellers has been positive as it had enabled people to continue living there for more than 20 years without being harassed, ended up exposing them to abuses of power committed by both the police and City Hall, for instance, the attempts of clearance made by the UPP, overriding legal requirements, and the exposure to another risk, not only to landslide but also to state violence, one of the greatest concerns of the dwellers.

Despite their status of exceptional precarity, Santa Martinha's residents used this condition of being at the 'margin of the margins' and 'out-of-placeness' to perform material practices of resistance such as self-demolition, rebuilding and paying governmental taxes to claim the right to have their housing rights recognized. For example, in 2009 when the police officials from UPP came to demolish his house, Edmundo intervened to demolish it himself so that less damage would be done to the materials it was constructed of to rebuild his house.

> Then they arrived and after everything was surrounded, they arrived: "Oh, we came to demolish", just like that. I left everything as it is and I went there to dismantle my house […] then, I said to the guy: "My brother, I'm going to take my things apart and I'm going to dismantle my shack, nobody here is offending you, nobody is ignorant. So, you don't break

[81] This cycle of invisibility was only broken when, after the second tentative of clearance (in 2013), the residents decided to look for the Pastoral de Favelas, through each they obtained support from NUTH. It was in function of this mobilization that one of the members of the Coletivo Técnico conducted an inspection in the area concluding that it is a risk area because there are houses built on garbage deposit still existent on site.

> down my shack, I'm going to take things apart" (Interview with Edmundo, Santa Marta, 17/09/17).

The policeman, not realizing his intention, told him to only remove the tiles. However, as Edmundo was nearing the end, he started dismantling the rest of the house:

> I started to remove the tiles, right!? A boy was helping me, there were three helping me, removing the tiles. Then I started taking other parts, then the guy [the policeman] said: "Oh, the guy said [a city's official] just to get the tiles out", I said: "Look, my brother, nobody is getting in here with you, nobody is chasing you, nobody is making a fuss with you. So, you stay in your house and let me take my house apart, shouldn't I take it apart? Then I'll take it apart, bro!". So, I went, I disassembled everything again, so I could reuse the wood again because if it were to cut, they come to break, to destroy. Guys, this is my life, this is my blood .... I'm getting here and breaking, it's soft! So, where am I going? How am I going to live? (Edmundo, Santa Marta)

Despite the risk of future demolition, if City Hall police officials came again, Edmundo and other residents affirmed that would "build again, and as many times as necessary" (Fieldnote, 2017). The continued threat of demolition does not, then, entail debilitation and passivity by the residents. As further evidence from the fieldwork shows, self-demolition and rebuilding is a decisive part of resistance under the constant threat of homelessness in those spaces of exceptional precarity. However, this condition pushes dwellers to abandon their wishes to materially improve their homes as residents do in less precarious conditions, who can continue investing in the improvement of their masonry-built homes (see examples of Indiana and Estradinha). For instance, Edmundo, when asked about the houses in Santa Martinha being made of wood, he explained that with wood *"there is little loss"*. He uses the case of his neighbour who had spent a considerable amount of money to build a masonry house that was demolished by the police without any right to material compensation. In his account, in addition to highlighting the resulting material loss of the house demolition, he also

highlights the physical effort necessary to bring building materials to the top of the hill to build the house:

> … you know why he spent R $ 26,000.00, he was already at the slab point, he was already finishing the slab … do you know how much he paid me a week to do his house? He paid me R$ 650.00 every Friday! For material, he has a pile of iron, sand, stone, you know what I mean!? He spent, summing up everything, the labour, carrying the material to bring here, every metre of sand to bring here […]. (Edmundo, Santa Marta)

The practice of rebuilding here shows similarities to demolitions in Palestine, where the "precarities did not only debilitate but actually pushed threatened subjects to build (again), even in the knowledge that structures will be destroyed" (Joronen & Griffiths, 2019, p. 09). As Joronen and Griffiths (2019) pointed out in the case of demolitions in Palestine: "staying is a practice that resists simply by existing, by being-there, by staying-there". This practice of rebuilding is, then, associated with other practices such as paying for public taxes and services without relying on the '*gato*' (illegal connections of water and electricity). As Edmundo explained:

> Because that gives me a certainty that I can say what I'm saying now. I can question and demand something because I pay, I'm not here for the *gato,* I'm not here, as the others said, because we are not criminals, it's like I'm talking, we are not criminals, we have our accounts here, they are paid, do you understand !? So, I can get in his face [city officials] and say: "No, bro, you call me a thug but I'm a worker and I pay my bills as you pay. You don't pay your bills; I also pay my bills and the money you have I don't have. You suddenly live in a building, you have a lift, you have the street clean for you, your is building clean. Oh, my condominium, look at the front of my condominium [he invites me to look around carefully], do you understand!? It is mud, there is no decent sewage, the water we have is precarious, because it got there, so we had to bring it here". (Edmundo, Santa Marta)

The field observations and interviews suggest that through the materially performative practices of self-demolition, rebuilding and tax payment the residents of Santa Martinha were exercising the right of housing without having that right (Butler et al., 2016). So, they were asserting a right they did not have to make the case, overtly, that they should have the very right to a decent house. Considering the specificities of Brazilian and Rio de Janeiro's normative and administrative apparatus, as we saw in Chapter 4, the Código de Obras de 1937 (1937 Code of Works) - despite contributing to the legal construction of favelas as precarious territories - guaranteed certain rights to favelados, since it was not possible to remove the favelas without the construction of minimal housing to replace them. This rule is confirmed, in some way, by the State Constitution and the Municipal Organic Law, which guarantee the principle of non-removal, stipulating that residents can be removed, only for reasons related to the risk of their homes.[82] In Santa Martinha's case, the inhabitants' precarity accumulates, since they live not only in homes with a low standard of habitability but also in areas at risk, which do not entitle them to indemnities or resettlement in a housing program, throwing them into normative limbo, where there would be no guarantee for the families in that condition. This situation is comparable to the tenants of properties located in areas at risk, to whom the only right available is the social rent (see Chapter 6).[83]

Therefore, the process of rebuilding performs several functions here, it is: (a) articulating a right to housing, to the city, and to the broader rights of citizenship by those who do not have that right but exercise it anyway; (b) giving voice and visibility to those populations that are regularly disavowed as part of the city and even from housing rights movements, and in this way, exposes the modes of disavowal through which the city constitutes itself.

[82] See Chapters 4 and 5 for more details.

[83] Due to the rental inflation triggered by the announcement of a favela removal, many residents encounter difficulties to afford a rent in a better-quality property in the same area or in the surrounding areas, and get pushed to the peripheries of the city or to risk-areas in the surroundings of the favela where they used to live. This creates a cascade effect of precarization promoted by the policies of risk disaster management.

Regarding the performative practice of tax payment for services not available to them (but charged by the municipality, such as garbage collection and street lighting), or, when available, are extremely precarious, the residents of Santa Martinha simply assert their right to reclaim a right to housing through the underlying logic that they contribute to the society through the fulfilment of their duties as citizens (Arrigoitia, 2010). However, this logic can contribute to the perpetuation of the vicious cycle of precarity once "it gets individual workers [favela's residents in extreme precarity] to defend special treatment for themselves and disqualification for others as the means to confirm their particular worthiness and attainment" (Holston, 2008, p. 258).

This is exemplified by the enactments of indifference and stigmatization, albeit in a passive way when favelados residing nearby, in a marginally more privileged position, cannot recognize that dwellers from Santa Martinha are part of the same oppressive, a racialized and normative social structure that partially define their understanding of citizenship, leading them to enact relative exclusions against them. However, the paradox of such discrimination and exclusion is that from outside the favela everyone is a favelado and those gradations of legality/illegality, formality/informality, safety/risk are concealed by the stigmas posed by the asfalto.

In sum, the material form of resistance developed by the residents of Santa Martinha, apart from problematizing their situations and experiences, which often remain invisible to the housing rights movements, mobilize practices that attempt to denounce their lack of rights in an already precarious context. It also offers the critical insight that all action requires support and, in the face of no infrastructural support (decent housing, public services), Santa Martinha's residents had to create their infrastructural conditions to literally support their "acting bodies" (Butler et al., 2016) in seeking housing rights.

8.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have explored how favela dwellers from Vila Autódromo Estradinha and Santa Marta have articulated temporal, affective and material forms of vulnerability to fight for their right to have

the right to housing and the favela, and also denounce, contest and oppose forms of administrative violence imposed on them. This discussion is directly connected to what was first analysed in Chapter 7 regarding the potency of vulnerability to generate forms of political agency. It also connects with discussions in Chapter 6, showing how the numerous forms of administrative violence engendered by City Hall have been responded to by the favela dwellers.

The main contribution of the chapter in addressing research question three, as presented in Chapters 1 and 4, is to explain how a focus on the ordinary forms of agency in the face of longstanding state-led precarity is required to make sense of the multiple roles played by vulnerable subjects of the communities classified as high-risk areas, beyond paternalistic or blaming responses. Again, this complements the study in Chapter 7 with an additional overview of the agential capacity developed by the precarious position of vulnerable groups in face of housing dispossession.

It can be concluded, from the data analysis, that the political action of the residents through the mobilization of vulnerabilities produced by biopolitical removals (Naback, 2015) was taken in the field of epistemic disputes on risk, memory, affect and material vulnerability. It is exactly these new forms of precarious production from attempts to 'preserve lives' the form of resistance developed by favelados comes to denounce, expose and oppose. As discussed in Chapter 7, the role of the favela's epistemic networks, memories, affect and material practices of resistance, not only point to those situations of harm and suffering that question what forms of life can and should be secured by emergency politics, but also claim for the right to have rights not only to housing but also to the favela and the city. The emergency claims made by City Hall and the ones presented by the favela dwellers are marked by "the disjuncture between an emergency claim and the racializing assemblages that structure which subjects may claim a future in need of protection" (Anderson, Grove, Rickards, & Kearnes, 2019, p.03). This disjuncture lays bare the racialized foundations of emergency politics engendered by City Hall and introduces another kind of emergency, the demand for recognition, revealing the line between the 2010 disaster and the removals that followed it; and the slow

emergencies and racially uneven distribution of risk, resiliencies and futurity have been exposed by the favelados.

The experiences have shown here evidenced how the notion of vulnerability, specifically, precipitated by the removals, is central to understanding the response to the disaster risk displacements once it subverts the epistemes, temporalities, affectivities and materialities posed by favelados' experiences of trauma and the catastrophe of removals in which there is "this sense of an inexorable repetition of the past in the present and future in which injury cannot be healed or repaired" (Butler, 2016, p. 80). Through the experiences of museums, acts of collective caring self-demolitions, and reconstruction, the retrospective glance of double trauma (disaster and displacements) experienced by the favela dwellers might be expanded and redirected to open alternative futures that might be more porous and justice-oriented and that also might nurture a sense of emergency about the need for change in the historical approach to favelas.

In sum, the acknowledgement and celebration of forms of vulnerability posed by the experiences of removal, both shared and produced, as seen in the previous chapter, opened a space for radical relationality and temporal/affective/material resistance. As Hirsch (2016, p.379) pointed out, "unlike trauma, vulnerability shapes an open-ended temporality—that of the threshold of an alternate, reimagined reality". If we think of vulnerability as a radical openness toward surprising possibilities, then we might be able to engage with it more creatively — as a space to work from as opposed to something only to be overcome.

Chapter 9 – Conclusion

9.1 – Introduction

This thesis has analysed the contemporary politics of favelas' removals in Rio de Janeiro/Brazil under the justification of 'preserving [favelados'] life' against disaster risk. The study has traced how environmental risk has been mobilised to justify favelas' clearance; in this context, I argued that risk becomes a renewed facet of the biopolitical management of favelas territories, which have contributed to perpetrate forms of precarity. To reach this conclusion, a critical analysis of the ideas and practices of sameness and difference in the colonial past of Rio de Janeiro, as presented in Chapter 2, made it possible to comprehend the episteme, not only informing the regime of the production of favelas as landscapes of risk in contemporary Rio, but also the discursive/spatial formations that inform the city's (Legg, 2007, p.38) production. One of my key claims in this thesis is that risk and its discursive formations of power and knowledge work as a new facet of masqueraded racism documented through the longstanding politics of favela displacements.

In face of this shift, favela dwellers have responded to the further precarisation of life with new forms of resistance. I have positioned precarity as a biopolitically regulated condition actively produced and reiterated by the state to subjugate favelas' territories. Following this path, I looked at the chronic forms of state-led precarity to understand how it was possible to undertake removals as the prime policy to handle disaster risk in Rio de Janeiro in the wake of the accomplishments of favela dwellers with Brazilian redemocratization.

Considering that the government effort to make favelados even more vulnerable and powerless has not succeeded in full, rather new forms of resistance and mobilization have arisen, Butler's notion of vulnerability is particularly helpful in acknowledging and conceptualizing how the condition of enforced vulnerability can – for some, unexpectedly – become a basis for political subjectivity and

resistance. According to this approach, the condition of shared precarity is no longer seen as a threat or as a mechanism for the production of hierarchical protected differences, but instead, it is taken as an affirmative basis for policy. For Butler (2015), precarity, in its different extensions, is the point of departure for political alliances against a logic of protection and security for some, at the expense of many others. Such a critical approach to vulnerability and precarity was employed in the analysis of five case studies involving disaster risk displacements and their contestation.

To conclude this study, I will summarize the key results of each analytical chapter in Section 9.2. The key empirical, methodological, and theoretical contributions of this study are discussed in Section 9.3 section. Finally, research implications for further discussion beyond Rio de Janeiro are noted in Section 9.4.

9.2 Revisiting the analytical chapters

In this section, I will revisit the analytical chapters (2 and 5-8) whose goals were to respond to the questions posed by this research. Chapter 2 built on a genealogical approach to critically review how different governmental discourses and practices have contributed to produce multiple forms of precarity for favelas since the late nineteenth century. There are three reasons why I have discussed and propose precarity as an alternative lens to the contemporary analysis of favela removals. First, the historical debate on favelas' existence as a temporary and convenient solution in the urban landscape had a profound and negative influence over how the favelas were socially constructed and understood in both academic and political debates. The "permanent transience" (Rolnik, 2015, Yiftachel, 2009), I argued, defined the condition of recognizability of favelas, co-constituting and prescribing the whole fabric of public interventions to the 'favela problem'. Second, abandonment, an effect of this normative transitoriness of favelas serves to justify the sporadic and scarce public investments in favelas' territorial improvement, shaping the conditions of the vulnerability of those spaces. Third, favelas' control and surveillance, not only through material forms of containment, for

instance, the Ecolimite's barrier, but through forms of subjectification also contribute to favelas' exposure to a varied forms of risk. Without an explicit understanding of how favelas' precarity has been historically (re)produced, and without acknowledging the racialized nature of such protracted governmental precarization, we cannot fully understand the cyclical resumption of favela displacement, especially in post-authoritarian Brazil.

Chapter 5 documented the emersion of a new biopolitical form of governing favelas based on new technologies of risk management that have legitimised biopolitical removals of favelas. Having set up this background, I addressed the first research question of the thesis:

- How has environmental risk, as a contemporary governmental technology, been employed in discourse and practices to justify the resumption of favelas' removals?

In addressing this question, Chapter 5 showed how the discourses and technologies of risk, organized through the grammar of resilience policies, represent a new facet of favelas' displaceability. Urban resilience policies, the empirical analysis reveals, operate within a wider racialized logic of risk, through the assignment of a geographically broad and diverse group of favelas as 'high-risk areas'. Such technologies of biopolitical management of disaster risk in the city have defined who is disposable and who is not. As the analysis revealed, the favelas' contemporary condition of displaceability was 'reactivated' after the disaster of 2009/2010 employing

a) linear narratives on time with references to a Rio de Janeiro of progress and free of dangers;
b) production of 'undifferentiated victims' through a racialized mapping of risk carried out by the technical body of City Hall;
c) discourse that essentialized favelas' vulnerability, since the disproportional concentration of the vulnerable is in favelas, environments with conditions that make them dangerous places, reinforcing and reproducing a historical discourse;

d) the recurrence of catastrophic future imaginaries that present the demolition of favelas as the only effective answer in the face of a disastrous event.

Thus, the logic of control and erasure deployed by DRRM techniques (resilience planning, risk mapping, preventive measures, etc.), as discussed in Chapter 5, underpinned by the de-exceptionalisation of favela removals, have given way to the politics of disaster-based removals.

Chapter 6 was driven by the second research question:

- How have removals been administratively addressed to prevent disaster risk and to what extent has this practice contributed to perpetuating favelas' precarity?

To address this, I expanded the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 3 with the conceptual contribution of Tyner and Rice (2016) on "administrative violence", to examine how disaster risk displacements took place at the local level, focusing on Indiana's case. The city's attempts to "make life" by administrative technologies of risk assessment and displacements – such as biased risk assessments; the Cadastro Social of families in hypothetical 'high-risk areas', 'housing negotiations' through blackmail, harassment and threats; and payment of illegal indemnities, partial demolitions, the inclusion of families in the social rent and resettlement scheme – ended up producing, more vulnerability and, ultimately, exposing Indiana's residents to all sorts of risk. Analysis of administrative practices has shown that the vulnerability of favelados is created by both concerted governmental actions *and* inactions that have influenced the social, political material and emotional conditions of life of favela residents, thereby reducing their capacity to cope with future disruptions and survive.

The emphasis on an approach based on administrative forms of violence contributes to expanding the literature on precarity and biopolitical governmentality, as it allows us to understand how the biopolitical structures of risk governance function in the process of the removal of favelas, acting on their historical precarity. As the data analysis reveals, this violence is based on administrative technologies that are mainly discretionarily, even arbitrarily, exercised by officials who unilaterally

interpret laws, rules, and decrees, deciding the condition and form of their application. The main contribution, then, is to understand how this abstraction called 'state' and its governmental technologies, like risk and displacements, work in the encounter between state officials and favelados; and how violent this encounter might be. This encounter, marked by the systematic abuse of the discretionary power of the city officials when interacting with favela dwellers, represented a crucial device in the territorial dispute of favelas' territories, characterizing what I argued to be 'administrative violence'. The first form of violent administration that I documented was what the favela dwellers called 'governmental harassment'. This harassment is characterized by pervasive and continuous practices of misinformation, threatening and blackmail. This form of administrative violence created the conditions for removals, even if technically contestable (as I showed in Chapter 7), to take place. Second, the administration of removals was violent because of the dissonance between administrative categories of risk, founded by the technocratic classifications, and concrete experiences of risk lived by the favela dwellers, especially an 'invisible group', the renters. Such dissonance emerges during the 'cadastramento social' whose norms, rules and procedures exclude renters, usually the most vulnerable among the vulnerable, from resettlement. Such renters, included in the social rent scheme, could not afford to rent in the inflated real estate market of the favelas. The demands created by the housing programme ended up pushing these residents to the fringes of the favelas, usually the most environmentally vulnerable areas, exposing them to disaster risk. Third, when the "bulldozers arrived" (Fieldnotes, 2017), the third form of administrative violence was documented. It took place through the transformation of favelas into a 'hostile environment' by partial demolitions, deliberate abandonment through the discontinuity in the provision of public services and the deliberate invisibilisation of potential risks created by City Hall. Last, but not least, there was the affective dimension of such an inevitable, yet the indeterminable future threat of house demolitions. By mobilizing affects like fear, blame, despair, hope, City Hall transformed the affective life of the favelados into "an object-target and a condition" (Anderson, 2012) for the biopolitical removal of favelas.

In Chapters 7 and 8 I focused on favelados' vulnerability and their agential capacity to address research question three:

- How have favela dwellers experienced and responded to such politics of disaster risk displacements?

To this purpose, vulnerability has been approached differently, from the "politically debilitating" condition to "an ontologically productive condition" (Joronen, 2019) that allows favelas dwellers to contest, refuse and resist historical and political debilitating forces behind ascriptions such as 'pathological', 'dangerous', and, especially, 'risky'.

Uncertainty, insecurity and precarity, familiar characteristics of the everyday life of favelados, have conferred on them forms of solidarity, resistance, and combative affects to respond to enduring conditions of precarity. Through the analysis of favelados' responses to contemporary forms of displacements, I identified four main forms of resistance: epistemic, affective, temporal and material.

In Chapter 7, I particularly explored the manifestation of epistemic injustice regarding disaster risk displacements and its relation to the politics of epistemic resistance. This form of resistance emerged within threatened favela communities to challenge the basis of the city's apparently expert risk-based decision-making. The focus was on the role of a network of 'counter expertise' responsible for mobilizing the epistemic resources and abilities necessary to support the favela dwellers in their fight against the resumption of the removals policy. Through such epistemic resistance (Medina, 2013), the "double-check rhetoric" (Yarina, 2018) about climate adaptation, or, in other words, the aspects left in the shadows by resilience-building strategies (such as dispossession, precarization and violence) was emphasised.

In the context of the Estradinha case, I argued that local knowledge is essential to the mobilization of processes, but that it is not sufficient on its own to challenge the epistemological and procedural power exerted by the State effectively. Only by organizing and strategically deploying various forms

of knowledge can the momentum of state-sanctioned processes be disrupted, and successful epistemological resistance deployed.

Chapter 8 focused on the other three forms of resistance directly responding to the strategies discussed in Chapters 5 and 6: *temporal, affective and material*. The first dispute takes place in the field of memory and the temporalities it mobilises. This form of resistance especially enacted by residents of favelas like Vila Autódromo and Horto encompasses alternative or counter-narratives of time (subaltern temporalities), trying to make visible "subvisible temporalities and spatialities of slow violence" (Pain, 2019) practised by the city through disruptive experiences of being uprooted. These traumatic experiences, the analysis showed, represented both closeness and openness of any possibility created by the fissures, instabilities and uncertainties brought by the double experience of disasters: the natural hazard and the displacements that follow. What the analysis of the 'Chronoresistance' of the favelados showed is that there is a multiplicity of experiences – between resilience and resistance - that reveals alternatives to settled temporalities within narratives of disruptive times. To respond to the openness left by the disaster posed by the experience of removals, favela dwellers have used the traumatic time as a way to politicize the meanings of disastrous experiences, through the mobilization of traumatic memories. This form of resistance based on collective memory refuses forms of indistinction created by the city through the racialized classification of favelas as high-risk areas, allowing them to fight for a radical future: the perpetuation of favelas in Rio's cityscape.

Regarding *affective* forms of resistance, I explored the case of Estradinha and one of the strategies of resistance developed by its dwellers, the Café com Bobagem, a space of collective caring, where residents made vulnerable by the violent administration of the removals process found a space for attentive and active listening, in addition to information about the process and guidance on how to respond to the numerous forms of harassment, practised by City Hall, as discussed in Chapter 6. In Café com Bobagem affects like endurance, joy, kindness and also practices of active listening were

mobilized against negative affects like fear, uncertainty, and anxiety, intensively used as psychological weapons against favelados, particularly right after the disasters 2010.

The last form of resistance conveyed by the research regarded the mobilization of material precarity. By analysing the case of Santa Martinha, a risk area within Santa Marta favela, it showed how the most socially and physically vulnerable have exercised the right to housing without having the right, through performative practices of self-demolition, rehabilitation, and tax payment. Through the exercise of a right, they did not have they were publicly making the argument that they should have the right to a decent home.

The dispute in these fields – knowledge production, time, affects and material precarity – seems to mark a major change from past struggles and also reveal much about the current social, political, economic, and environmental context in which these removals take place. In this way, instead of a mere condition of displaceability, precarity around threatening favelados' futures also encompasses practices of mutual support, caring, openness, contestation, (re)building and mundane forms of resistance. The resumption of forced displacements, I argued throughout the thesis, was made possible through also opening up "a space for affirmative affectual and agential capacities" (Joronen, 2009 p.09). In the face of the resumption of favela removals, made possible through a latent condition of precarity inflicted on favelas, I argued in Chapters 7 and 8 that emphasis on both organized and ordinary forms of resistance is needed to make sense of the multiple roles played by vulnerable subjects, beyond paternalistic or blaming interpretations that just contribute to normalising removals as an adequate political response.

9.3 – Overall contributions of this study

9.3.1 Empirical contribution

This research contribution can be situated at the intersection of Political and Urban Geography, Critical Disaster Studies and Environmental Justice. Regarding Political and Urban Geography, the primary

contribution of this research is to the sub-field of favela studies, in general, and the study of forced displacements of informal settlements, in particular. Within this sub-field, my empirical contribution based on over 10 months of in-depth research living in a favela, building networks and trust across multiple cases of removals and resistance is bringing to the fore a recent phenomenon in the longstanding tradition of favelas displacements: the forced displacements taken as a measure of reducing disaster risk, or, more broadly, as an adaptation to urban climatic disruptions. Although research on displacement and disaster has traditionally been associated with humanitarian relief and human rights protection, there are very few studies documenting disaster-induced displacement in informal settlements as a way of perpetuating vulnerabilities and, consequently, injustices. The distinctive elements of the phenomena investigated relies, then, on the relationship between resilience, climate disaster and forced displacements as adaptive responses.

This research also applies to vulnerability studies, given that it contributes to understanding not only the long-term production of disaster risk – an overlooked aspect of such research, as suggested by the contemporary studies on risk (Cutter, 2006; da Silva Valencio, 2014; Ford et al., 2018; Oliver-Smith, Alcántara-Ayala, Burton, & Lavell, 2017; Wisner et al., 2003) – but also extends such efforts to understand the particular role of state administrative apparatuses in the making of lives of the already vulnerable unviable in its attempt to preserve them.

This study also represents a contribution to the fields of environmental justice and disaster studies through its emphasis on the forms of epistemic resistance developed through the counter-expertise network, which played a crucial role in the challenging of the power-knowledge enacted by official risk assessments. In a context like Rio, where climate and disaster risk are becoming a particularly significant domain in which knowledge disputes are being played out to justify the resumption of removals as a preventive measure to disaster risk, the forms of epistemic resistance developed by the favela dwellers and their network of support add new insights to what ought to be 'just adaptation'. The case of epistemic resistance brought by the example of Estradinha was at least partially successful

in resisting the city's plan which makes it particularly significant and distinctive to the environmental justice field where we have few successful cases reported.

The second empirical contribution of this research on favela removals centres on the documentation of resistance, which is already scarce in the academic literature on favelas, especially in the face of disaster risk-induced removals. My specific contribution relies on showing the potentiality of favelados' vulnerability as a basis for political resistance. In other words, it offers a promising investigation into how vulnerability also presents a potential for resistance through the cases in which the favelados transformed the precarious forms-of-life precluded by technopolitical forms of risk management, marked by traumatic memories, negative affects and hyper-precarity, into instances of resistance.

Through Vila Autódromo and Horto's case, I highlighted the favelados' resignification of the traumatic experiences of being uprooted as a way to politicize the meanings of disastrous experience. This form of resistance is still underrepresented in the academic literature on resistance, especially when it comes to informal settlements, and figures as a modest contribution of this thesis.

This research also documented the role of affects in the favelados' resistance process. In response to the numerous affective processes of vulnerabilization created by the city to dismantle the favelados' movements of contestation, spaces of collective caring were created to unify, strengthen and inform residents' actions. Despite being a comprehensive research topic, there are still few studies investigating the importance of emotions and affects through embodied subjects that are racialized, gendered, and economically stratified (Chisholm, 2019) and this study also represents a modest contribution to this agenda. Lastly, this research contributes to the growing literature on precarity, particularly when analysing the embodiment of hyper-precarious conditions as a way to claim the right to have rights, as exemplified by the practices of self-demolition and reconstruction performed by Edmundo, a resident from Santa Marta.

9.3.2 Methodological contribution

The methodological contribution of this thesis lies, first, in the multi-sited approach to the case study, allowing me to move away from single-site fieldwork which enabled me to observe the different nuances of the risk technologies in distinct contexts. This approach to the field enabled my movement across various favelas, state offices and public events around the city, while I still stayed 'inside' the designed field. Second, this qualitative research highlighted the importance of historical and archival research in contemporary urban risk studies. Understanding how favelas have been historically constructed through precarious forms of recognition, norms and land rights entails recognising that vulnerability and risk are produced in tandem. Therefore, the analysis of legal documents related to lawsuits on disaster risk displacements was fundamental to understand the role of political agencies, especially of the counter-experts network. It also contributed to understanding the limits of its contestation once the procedures and decision-making processes are readily corrupted or ignored, and power hierarchies are deeply embedded. Third, such understanding would not have been possible without my political engagement with favelas' grassroots movements. A distinguishing feature of such a research method is that it not only provides research findings that may be useful for the political struggle with which I was associated, but it can also generate new perspectives and information that challenge and transform traditional academic knowledge on vulnerability, disaster reduction policies and urban displacements.

9.3.3 Conceptual contribution

Conceptually, this research first represents a contribution to what Waite (2009) called a "critical geography of precarity", expanding the idea of precarity beyond employment and labour market insecurities (Paret & Gleeson, 2016) experienced by the workers of the affluent Global North, to understand it as "as spatially generative and co-constitutive of urban life" (Ferreri, Dawson, & Vasudevan, 2017, p. 247), especially when it comes to marginalized territories like favelas. Through the apport of feminists and postcolonial understanding on precarity as a biopolitically regulated

condition (Butler & Spivak, 2007; LLoyd, 2015), this study contributes to this literature by emphasising the role of the state in the active and reiterated production of such biopolitical conditions of urban precarity. Such an innovative approach was made possible through a radical reading of vulnerability based on feminist scholarship. Such a theoretical approach consists of explaining the particular contribution of the state in the production of vulnerability and the resistance and mobilisation of favelados, which exposes the latter calls for a more profound take on vulnerability. From this viewpoint, it was possible to see how precarity is a characteristic not just in the development of informal urban spaces, but also how precarity is a co-constitutive part of the vulnerability that the state claims to mitigate. Looking at reiterated forms of favelas exclusion from the cityscape by successive governments (from authoritarian to democratic), I argue that instead of a contemporary phenomenon lead by the neo-liberalization of urban policies, precarity can be understood as a structural category of ordering segmented relations of violence and inequality in the production of urban space. Precarity, employed here as historically instantiated modes of vulnerability that produce certain populations as exposed; or, bio-politically constituted as at risk, is the missed link to understand the 'dark side' of biopolitical management of future aimed at 'preserving lives'. This understanding on precarity contributes to comprehending the role of governmental dynamics in the regulation of the precariousness shared among all, through the striation and placing of the risky 'others' like favelas at the margins.

A second theoretical contribution of this thesis is to the literature on Southern urban studies (Parnell & Robinson, 2012). The 'recent' wave of favela removals in Rio de Janeiro has been typically interpreted as an effect of Rio's aspirations to the hall of global cities by hosting mega-events like the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics, along with real estate speculation, living in the shadows the dynamics of risk governmentalization, which I argued figures as a new façade of a protracted politics towards favelas, whose origins date from colonial times. According to this prevailing view, displacement occurs as a new type of 'class war' through a markedly guided, relentless phase of capital investment, speculation and redevelopment, rooting people out of their homes and neighbourhoods,

and as part of a continuing capitalist influence over public policies. What the investigation of favela disaster risk-induced displacements showed was the deep roots that have rendered favelas the constitutive outside of the liberal/modern/resilient city. While the contemporary removal policies do not explicitly resonate with the colonial racial matrix, as did the policies of cortiços eradication between the nineteenth and twentieth century, as we saw in Chapter 2, the logic of risk resonates with those patterns of thinking from colonial Brazil.

The third theoretical contribution of this dissertation is to the field of critical disaster studies. Despite my research topic indirectly approaching issues such as climate change and therefore resilience, it contributes to show how de-politicized DRRM interventions work to turn informal settlements into passive objects of biopolitical management of high-risk areas. Although the critical literature on the disaster has given attention to the long-term production of disaster risk, critical disaster studies' emphasis on disaster as a sudden onset still underestimates the structural conditions that gradually become a disaster in itself. This dissertation is a contribution to this gap once it includes the favelados' precarious experience of forced displacements/resettlement as disaster production in itself.

9.4 Research implications and future works

On March 18, 2015, the Third United Nations World Conference in Sendai, Japan, adopted the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030. The Sendai Framework is the successor instrument to the HFA 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters. The Sendai Framework introduces several innovations and shifts compared to HFA. The most significant, however, "is a strong emphasis on DRRM as opposed to disaster management" (UNISDR, 2015, n.p). This represents a paradigm shift from an emergency response approach to one which addresses risk factors through the introduction of DRRM techniques into [urban] development agendas. Prevention and reduction of hazard exposure and vulnerability to the disaster have become, then, the main goal to be achieved by 2030.

Taking this 'preventive turn' to disaster approach one step further, the lessons of the disaster risk displacements presented in this study can be worrisome though helpful for future researches in this regard. Bearing in mind that favela displacements by the city of Rio de Janeiro were justified as a way to minimize disaster risks, climate change adaptation/ mitigation initiatives, as Bose (2016) noted, would then have as much potential to displace communities as any environmental change might. Admittedly, as the climate change debate and particularly the efforts to mitigate its effects are becoming hegemonic through the global climate regime apparatus, we may begin to see the emergence of a special type of environmentally displaced people, not just those displaced by climate change, but rather those that are displaced by preventive measures designed to reduce the potential of future impacts (ibid, 2016). Particularly in contexts like Rio de Janeiro where a risk assessment has been racialized to justify the normalisation of 'last resource measures' like removals, this research affirms preventive-based disaster risk displacements as a phenomenon is taking place in some cities from the Global South (see Bose, 2016; Alvarez & Cardenas, 2019; Correa, n.d.; Ramalho, 2019); such a phenomenon deserves attention from disciplines like urban geography, critical disaster studies, urban environmental justice, urban political ecology, urban planning, etc.

As a report from the World Bank on experiences of preventive resettlement in Latin American cities asserts: "preventive resettlement of at-risk populations is now being implemented, among other DRRM measures […] and these experiences can help guide other countries currently developing risk reduction strategies"(Correa, 2011, p.17). In other words, such a report suggests that preventive disaster risk displacements might become a trend in the future of cities like Rio de Janeiro, so this phenomenon deserves attention.

Despite the particular experiences of injustice posed by such preventive measures on favelados' lives, it might have a potential for generalizability when some of the conditions highlighted here are met: populations that are not only excluded from the preventive solutions available – due to their

racialized, gendered or class condition, or even precarious land rights – but due to their susceptibility to climate impact are viewed as an obstacle to a city's (or even country's) developmental course.

Given the abovementioned implications, there are several openings for future research, but I will limit my suggestions here to three. First, a comparative analysis of other cities in Brazil and Latin America experiencing removals in high-risk areas might be a potential extension of this study. Other contexts might have policies, laws and institutions that have evolved differently in the disaster risk displacement of informal settlements. However, successful experiences of state-citizen co-production of disaster risk urban policies (see Smith et al., 2020) might evidence the exceptionalism of Rio as a case study. Such a feature, if established, might lead to the reduction of conflicts stemming from such preventive displacement as a response to DRRM.

Second, considering that women in vulnerable situations are not only disproportionately affected by both disaster and homelessness (Khosola, 2014), but, as I noted during my fieldwork, are also the main presence in the housing rights movement in Rio's favelas, an extension of this study would consider how women in informal settlements, where almost half of the households are (black) female-headed (IPEA, n.d),[84] have been affected by and are affecting disaster risk displacements, especially in the context of housing activism. An extension of this would be the investigation of the health impacts of such geography of precarity posed by disaster risk displacements on favela residents, once many participants, mostly women, reported having developed (mental) health problems in the course of removals.

A third possible extension of this research is to propose an investigation of the impacts of disaster risk displacements in the favela real estate market. As I mentioned in Chapter 6, when removal is announced, it dramatically changes the housing dynamics within the favelas, with the tenants frequently being the most harmed by the rise of local rents. Despite being partially addressed here,

[84] Details available at https://www.ipea.gov.br/retrato/apresentacao.html

this particular issue deserves more attention, especially to understand how it contributes to both the favelisation and the expansion of the city's frontiers of environmental risks.

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Appendix A – List of interviews per category

Local/Institution/ Movement	Actors	Interviewees (anonymised)	Data
Babilônia	Resident	Paulo	08/12/2016
	Residents' Association president	Arthur	24/08/2017
	Resident	Silvia	17/07/2017
Coletivo Técnico	Architect	Fernanda	04/12/2017
	Engineer	Fidel	02/08/2017
Civil Defence	Coordinator	Adalto	07/12/2017
Estradinha	Resident	Doralice	16/11/2017
	Leader	Angélica	14/09/2017
Geo-Rio	Coordinator	Rogério	20/12/2017
Horto	Resident	Eduarda	03/12/2016
Indiana	Residents' Commission	Irene, Agenor, Clara and Murillo	01/12/2016
	Residents	Clara	03/08/2017
		Nara	03/08/2017
		Irene	08/09/2017
		Murilo	08/09/2017
		Agenor	21/07/2017
		Agenor	23/07/2017
Insolar Project	Coordinator	Henrique	30/11/2016
Laboriaux (Rocinha)	Resident	Hermes	22/11/2016
	Residents' Association	Italo	17/11/2016
NUTH/Public Defence	Coordinator and Lawyer	Mariana	10/10/2017
Rio Resilient (Municipality	Coordinator – Eduardo Paes' administration	Plinio	09/11/2016

	Coordinator – Crivella's administration	Fabiana	26/09/2017
Santa Marta	Residents	Marcelo	21/11/2016
		Alice	17/09/2017
		Bianca	17/09/2017
		Edmundo	17/09/2017
		Everton	10/09/2017
		Teodoro	25/08/2017
	Residents' Association	Merval	07/07/2017
Vale Encantado	Residents' Association	Olavo	06/12/2016
Vila Autódromo	Residents	Patricia	09/12/2016
		Deco	09/12/2016
	Residents' Association	Eliana	05/12/2017
		Jurema	14/12/2017
		Lauro	13/11/2017
Total interviews		36	

Appendix B –Interview Guide Sample for Representatives of Government

RESILIENCE AND URBAN POLICIES FOR FAVELAS: the case of Rio de Janeiro

SECTION ONE: OPENING QUESTIONS

1. Could you talk about your role here in City Hall?
2. How long have you been working here?
3. What is the relationship between your field and the sectors involved in the [INSERT THE NAME OF THE PROGRAM/ ACTION HERE]?

SECTION TWO: FOCUSED QUESTIONS

Obs: the questions formulated here will be addressed according to the expertise area of the interviewee)

A. CLIMATE EVENTS

4. What have been the main challenges posed by climate events to the city?
5. Who are the most exposed to such events?
6. How has City Hall been addressing/would like to address it?
7. What has been the main impacts of these actions/interventions?

B. RIO RESILIENT PROGRAM

One of the responses to such changes found by City Hall was the Rio Resilient Program formulated by the last administration.

8. What has changed/is it intended to change in relation to the previous program?
9. And what is the program proposal for the favelas?

C. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND RISK

The disordered expansion of the city in the last decades took place in areas considered as Areas of Permanent Preservation (APPs), such as forests, hilltops, and riverbanks. One of the goals of the Program is to preserve and expand the green areas in the city in order to mitigate the climate change impacts and prevent risks.

10. What does City Hall understand by risk?

11. How has City Hall classified the risk areas?

12. How does City Hall plan to reconcile the concerns of environmental protection and risk prevention with the illegal occupation of APPs?

    Prompt: Those areas are known for their potential for disasters.

13. What are the main initiatives aimed at reducing the risk disaster in these areas?

14. How have these initiatives contributed to the reduction of risks in the most vulnerable areas?

The last government has committed, according to its 2013-2016 Strategic Plan of the City, to the reduction of 5% in the number of favelas as well as the and the elimination of residences in environmentally protected and risk areas.

15. What are the plans of the new government regarding occupations in areas of risk/area of environmental protection?

16. In the case of removals, what are the alternatives offered to residents removed/evicted?

17. One of the goals to increase the resilience of the population and promote the social cohesion is to promote the 'right to the city'.

18. What does the "right to the city" mean?

19. How can the "right to the city" be achieved?

20. What are the main obstacles for its achievement?

D. MEGA EVENTS

21. What has been the main legacies of the mega events for the city?

22. In which ways have the legacies from the 'Olympic City' been affecting the favelas and their dwellers?

SECTION THREE: CLOSING QUESTIONS

23. Is there anything else would you like to tell me today?

24. Is there anything else you would like to ask me today?

25. Would you indicate someone else who could be interested or contribute to my research?

Thank you very much for talking to me today and sharing your experiences and thoughts. If you would like to know about the research findings, I can make sure we send you these later.

Appendix C – Sample of participant observations entries

Sites	Observations entries
Indiana	21/07 - Walking Observation accompanied by Mr. Agenor
	25/07 - Public Audience at Tijuca Tennis Club to discuss the City's Strategic Plan for 2017/2020 where representatives of Indiana and Horto were present
	03/08 - Visit Dona Clara and Mr. Agenor and introduced to Dona Nara who I talked with in her house for hours; she offered me lunch and she walked a bit with me through Indiana.
	04/08 - Mr. Agenor invited me to accompany him to the NUTH to participate in the monthly meeting to update the cases of threatened removal communities
	07/08 - Murilo - President of the Residents' Commission - invited me to visit ITERJ where there is extensive documentation on favela removals.
	21/09 - Field visit to Indiana – I spent a day there talking to some dwellers and after that me and Mr. Agenor went to NUTH to participate in the first meeting to discuss the project proposed by the Public Defender to manage solid waste of some favelas in Rio
Estradinha	14/09 – A field visit that was restricted because of the presence of traffic watchers occupying the houses partially demolished by City Hall. Even Angélica, the Estradinha leader, refused to have a walk through the community. Situation became worse since the escalation of violence in Rocinha, that began in October, and which led to the escape of drug traffickers to the Ladeira dos Tabajaras. Actually, there were more risks of shootouts.
Santa Marta	17/07 - Field visit to the favela, with efforts concentrated on the area called Santa Martinha
	10/09 - I went to a football game in a dirt camp near Santa Marta where the locals usually play every Sunday. I went there to try to talk to residents of Pico – a target area of removals in 2013 and from there I went to Santa Marta to visit Pico and Santa Martinha.
	17/09 - I revisited Santa Martinha. On this day I was approached by traffickers who were bothered by my presence. Since this episode, I have never been there again.
	22/07 - I participated in a walk with students from PUC-Rio where the President of the Horto Association told the whole history of the place from the different points visited
	14/09 - Participation in the Residents' Association Assembly to discuss the new sentence which determined the eviction of five dwellers from Horto
	17/09 - Attended Residents' Association Assembly with the participation of Senator Lindbergh Farias from Workers Party [Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT)] to discuss alliances between parliamentarians (municipal and federal spheres) to create strategies in the institutional political field to protect Horto from evictions

	09/11 - Participation in the Residents' Association Assembly to invite the dwellers to participate in the street protests aiming to end removal policies in the city
Vila Autódromo	09/12/16 - Visit to the Museu das Remoções at Vila Autódromo
	26/09 - Participation in the event promoted by the Goethe Institute and Vila Autódromo at Museum of Rio's Art (MAR) -
	02/09 - Attended the inauguration of Vila Autódromo square - a symbol of resistance and reconstruction after the violent attempts of evicting the Vila. Flags that refer to the Olympic Games were erected as a way to highlight the process of resistance and struggle experienced by the residents.
	18-19/09 - Attended the event "Primavera dos Museus ´['Spring of the Museum'] to celebrate the birth of the Museu das Remoções which aims to rescue and preserve the memories of the Vila, besides reconstructing all the trajectories of community struggle against the evictions. Main motto: "Memories cannot be removed!"
	08/11 - Participation in a conversation circle where the residents told their stories of struggle and resistance. There was a photography exhibition with pictures taken by Luís, from Vila Autódromo
Pastoral de Favelas	13/09/2017 - Visit to Pastoral invited by a leader from Indiana
	25/09 - Attended a meeting at Pastoral of Favelas to create a parliamentary front in defence of Horto. This meeting discussed the contributions that each politician could make regarding the Horto case. At this meeting, tensions between the Commission and the Association were revealed, even in the political-ideological field.
	28/10/2017 - Attended the meeting to celebrate the 40 years of the Pastoral
Conselho Popular	27/09/2017 - Attended a regular meeting of the Conselho to discuss the case of Horto.
	25/10/2017 - Participation in the meeting that define the strategies to the demonstration in front of the affluent condominium where Crivella lives.
	31/10/2017 - Participation in the meeting that created a commission to organize the 'Journey against removals'. Attended the meeting favela dwellers, members of leftist party (PT and PSOL), researchers and students.
	06/11/2017 - Meeting to discuss the preparation of the letter to be addressed to the City Hall on the Strategic Planning 2017-2020 that brings removals by risk